The Supreme Court of India is a powerful institution at the forefront of public attention in India. It is often engaged in a bitter duel with the government on issues as diverse as the administration of cricket in India to whether liquor shops are allowed on highways. Despite such public prominence, very little attention has been paid to who the judges of the Supreme Court are, how they are appointed, transferred and removed, and what they do after retirement. This book provides an account of these four facets of judicial functioning and analyses the processes in operation today. It argues that each of these four aspects gives rise to significant concerns pertaining to judicial independence, accountability, or both. Its main argument is that both judicial independence and accountability are necessary for 'an effective judiciary', and these two values are not in conflict with each other as is commonly assumed.

This book investigates the mechanisms of judicial control to determine an efficient methodology for independence and accountability. Using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts, the author creates a theoretical framework that can be applied to future case studies and decrease the frequency of accountability perversions.

In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India, by majority, struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), established to appoint judges to the Supreme Court of India and High Courts. Unsurprisingly, the NJAC judgment has been the subject of a deeply polarized debate in the public sphere and academia. The essays in this volume analyse the NJAC judgment, and provide a rich context to it, in terms of philosophical, comparative, and constitutional issues that underpin it. The work traces the history of judicial appointments in India; analyses constitutional principles behind selecting judges and their application in the NJAC Case; and comparatively examines the judicial appointments process in six foreign jurisdictions, enquiring into what makes a good judge and an effective appointments process.

CONTENTS: I. The Needless Mystery of Court House Government. II. Fights and Rights. III. Facts Are Guesses. IV. Modern Legal Magic. V. Wizards and Lawyers. VI. The "Fight" Theory versus the "Truth" Theory. VII. The Procedural Reformers. VIII. The Jury System. IX. Defenses of the Jury System--Suggested Reforms. X. Are Judges Human? XI. Psychological Approaches. XII. Criticism of Trial-Court Decisions--The Gestalt. XIII. A Trial as a Communicative Process. XIV. "Legal Science" and "Legal Engineering." XV. The Upper-Court Myth. XVI. Legal Education. XVII. Special Training for Trial Judges. XVIII. The Cult of the Robe. XIX. Precedents and Stability. XX. Codification. XXI. Words and Music: Legislation and Judicial Interpretation. XXII. Constitutions--The Merry-Go-Round. XIII. Legal Reasoning. XXIV. Da Capo. XXV. The Anthropological Approach. XXVI. Natural Law. XXVII. The Psychology of Litigants. XXVIII. The Unblindfolding of Justice. XXIX. Classicism and Romanticism. XXX. Justice and Emotions. XXXI. Questioning Some Legal Axioms. XXXII. Reason and Unreason--Ideals.

Examines whether the Indian Supreme Court can produce progressive social change and improve the lives of the relatively disadvantaged.

This study discusses the many different aspects of judicial independence in Israel. It begins with an historical analysis of the concept of judicial independence in a comparative perspective, emphasizing the conceptual roots of the judiciary in Jewish law. Recent decades have witnessed a marked increase in the role played by the judiciary in society. This general trend is apparent in Israel, where the highly significant social role played by the judiciary has been on the increase for some years. The constitutional role of the judiciary in society is more pronounced in countries where the courts are empowered to review the constitutionality of legislative acts. In Israel the power of judicial review, in decisions of the Supreme Court, has been applied in a number of cases in which legislation of the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, has been set aside. The increasingly prominent role of the judiciary in Israel is further manifested by the frequent recourse to judicial commissions of inquiry, chaired by judges who are often called upon to examine some of the major public controversies.

First M.C. Setalvad Memorial Lecture, held at India Habitat Centre, New Delhi on 22nd Feb., 2005.