The Supreme Court of India is a powerful institution at the forefront of public attention in India. It is often engaged in a bitter duel with the government on issues as diverse as the administration of cricket in India to whether liquor shops are allowed on highways. Despite such public prominence, very little attention has been paid to who the judges of the Supreme Court are, how they are appointed, transferred and removed, and what they do after retirement. This book provides an account of these four facets of judicial functioning and analyses the processes in operation today. It argues that each of these four aspects gives rise to significant concerns pertaining to judicial independence, accountability, or both. Its main argument is that both judicial independence and accountability are necessary for 'an effective judiciary', and these two values are not in conflict with each other as is commonly assumed.

The impartial administration of justice and the accountability of government officials are two of the most strongly held American values. Yet these values are often in direct conflict with one another. At the national level, the U.S. Constitution resolves this tension in favor of judicial independence, insulating judges from the undue influence of other political institutions, interest groups, and the general public. But at the state level, debate has continued as to the proper balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. In this volume, constitutional scholar G. Alan Tarr focuses squarely on that debate. In part, the analysis is historical: how have the reigning conceptions of judicial independence and accountability emerged, and when and how did conflict over them develop? In part, the analysis is theoretical: what is the proper understanding of judicial independence and accountability? Tarr concludes the book by identifying the challenges to state-level judicial independence and accountability that have emerged in recent decades, assessing the solutions offered by the competing sides, and offering proposals for how to strike the appropriate balance between independence and accountability.

This new book explores the important and topical subject of judicial independence and judicial accountability. Contributions from distinguished practitioners and academics place these twin issues within a comparative law perspective, showing how legal systems across the world have adapted to recent developments in this field.

This book investigates the mechanisms of judicial control to determine an efficient methodology for independence and accountability. Using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts, the author creates a theoretical framework that can be applied to future case studies and decrease the frequency of accountability perversions.

The impartial administration of justice and the accountability of government officials are two of the most strongly held American values. Yet these values are often in direct conflict with one another. At the national level, the U.S. Constitution resolves this tension in favor of judicial independence, insulating judges from the undue influence of other political institutions, interest groups, and the general public. But at the state level, debate has continued as to the proper balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. In this volume, constitutional scholar G. Alan Tarr focuses squarely on that debate. In part, the analysis is historical: how have the reigning conceptions of judicial independence and accountability emerged, and when and how did conflict over them develop? In part, the analysis is theoretical: what is the proper understanding of judicial independence and accountability? Tarr concludes the book by identifying the challenges to state-level judicial independence and accountability that have emerged in recent decades, assessing the solutions offered by the competing sides, and offering proposals for how to strike the appropriate balance between independence and accountability.