What effects do laws have? Do individuals drive more cautiously, clear ice from sidewalks more diligently, and commit fewer crimes because of the threat of legal sanctions? Do corporations pollute less, market safer products, and obey contracts to avoid suit? And given the effects of laws, which are socially best? Such questions about the influence and desirability of laws have been investigated by legal scholars and economists in a new, rigorous, and systematic manner since the 1970s. Their approach, which is called economic, is widely considered to be intellectually compelling and to have revolutionized thinking about the law. In this book Steven Shavell provides an in-depth analysis and synthesis of the economic approach to the building blocks of our legal system, namely, property law, tort law, contract law, and criminal law. He also examines the litigation process as well as welfare economics and morality. Aimed at a broad audience, this book requires neither a legal background nor technical economics or mathematics to understand it. Because of its breadth, analytical clarity, and general accessibility, it is likely to serve as a definitive work in the economic analysis of law.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.

The papers here range from description and analysis of how our political economy allocates its inventive effort, to studies of the decision making process in specific industrial laboratories. Originally published in 1962. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

A theoretical and empirical analysis of the disposition of malpractice claims compares the actual outcomes with the legal standard of payment equal to damages, if, and only if, negligence occurred. An economic model of the settlement process assumes that the litigants attempt to maximize wealth, subject to the legal standards of liability and damage, and the costs of litigating. The model predicts that awards in settlements out of court will reflect the expected verdict, the probability of the plaintiff's winning, and the costs of going to court. The probability of the plaintiff's winning in settlement will also reflect the probability of winning in court, the size of the expected verdict, and the costs of going to court. Evidence from three malpractice claims surveys is consistent with the legal standard but departs in ways predicted by the model. Characteristics of the injury, the plaintiff, and the defense influence the outcome.

Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty.

Contains an overview discussion of the Freedom of Information Act's (FOIA) exemptions, its law enforcement record exclusions, and its most important procedural aspects. 2009 edition. Issued biennially. Other related products: Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, Pursuant to Public Law 236, 103d Congress can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/052-071-01228-1 Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, 2015 Edition can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/027-000-01429-1