Why have the costs of acquiring space systems been so high? What are the sources of the problems? To answer these questions, RAND researchers examined the sources of cost growth of Air Force space systems and undertook an extensive study of two space systems--the Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS) and the Global Positioning System (GPS)--including an evaluation of their sources of cost growth, an assessment of their approaches to technical risk assessment, and an examination of their acquisition policy adaptations and industrial base environments. The researchers recommend independent program assessment for space systems that emphasizes technical and program factors, and a modified organizational structure that maintains cost analyst independence. They also summarize the cost estimating best practices of several other government organizations.

In response to historically high cost growth in the acquisition of space systems, the Under Secretary of the Air Force, in accordance with National Security Space (NSS) Acquisition Policy, directed the Air Force acquisition community to support the development of independent, accurate, and timely cost analyses to make the acquisition of NSS systems more realistic in terms of estimated costs. In turn, the former commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Gen Lance W. Lord, and the former commander of the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), Lt Gen Michael Hamel, asked RAND Project AIR FORCE to assess cost-estimating requirements and capabilities of SMC cost-estimating organizations as well as their resources, tools, methods and processes and to recommend an enhanced approach to cost analysis aimed at improving cost-estimating for space systems and increasing the understanding of factors that influence their cost. The study was sponsored by the former commander of SMC, General Hamel. The project technical monitor was Col Delane Aguilar, SMC/FMC. The research was conducted within the Resource Management Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a multiyear study entitled Air Force Space Systems Costs. The initial data collection was completed in May of 2006 and the final update was provided in February of 2007, with frequent updates in between. The final briefing was presented to General Hamel on March 13, 2007, and to Gen Kevin P. Chilton, the former commander of Air Force Space Command, on March 21, 2007. This monograph should interest government personnel involved in cost estimation and acquisition of defense systems, the military space acquisition communities, and those concerned with current and future acquisition policies.

1. Introduction / 2. Space system fundamentals / 3. Reviewing a cost estimate / 4. Space vehicle cost crosschecks / 5. Common issues in estimating space programs / 6. Resources for space system cost estimation / 7. Recommendations.

The purpose of this project was to expand and enhance IDA's capabilities to estimate the future acquisition costs and schedules of space systems. This study accumulated information on launch systems, manned space systems, and interplanetary systems from NASA. Cost and schedule information was collected on representative programs, estimating methods, and supporting databases. The results of the effort include this document, which summarizes costs and schedules of representative space systems along with cost-estimating methods currently being applied, and also a library of over 500 documents that describe technical, schedule, and cost characteristics of U.S. space activities during the past 40 years. Preliminary findings of this study have been applied to estimate the costs of manned access to space.

NASA is responsible for developing much of the nation's future space technology. Cost estimates for new programs are required early in the planning process so that decisions can be made accurately. Because of the long lead times required to develop space hardware, the cost estimates are frequently required 10 to 15 years before the program delivers hardware. The system design in conceptual phases of a program is usually only vaguely defined and the technology used is so often state-of-the-art or beyond. These factors combine to make cost estimating for conceptual programs very challenging. This paper describes an effort to develop parametric cost estimating methods for space systems in the conceptual design phase. The approach is to identify variables that drive cost such as weight, quantity, development culture, design inheritance and time. The nature of the relationships between the driver variables and cost will be discussed. In particular, the relationship between weight and cost will be examined in detail. A theoretical model of cost will be developed and tested statistically against a historical database of major research and development projects. Cyr, Kelley Unspecified Center ...

NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD) currently operates over five dozen missions, with approximately two dozen additional missions in development. These missions span the scientific fields associated with SMD's four divisionsâ€"Astrophysics, Earth Science, Heliophysics, and Planetary Sciences. Because a single mission can consist of multiple spacecraft, NASA-SMD is responsible for nearly 100 operational spacecraft. The most high profile of these are the large strategic missions, often referred to as "flagships." Large strategic missions are essential to maintaining the global leadership of the United States in space exploration and in science because only the United States has the budget, technology, and trained personnel in multiple scientific fields to conduct missions that attract a range of international partners. This report examines the role of large, strategic missions within a balanced program across NASA-SMD space and Earth sciences programs. It considers the role and scientific productivity of such missions in advancing science, technology and the long-term health of the field, and provides guidance that NASA can use to help set the priority of larger missions within a properly balanced program containing a range of mission classes.

Cost and schedule growth is a problem experienced by many types of projects in many fields of endeavor. Based on prior studies of cost growth in NASA and Department of Defense projects, this book identifies specific causes of cost growth associated with NASA Earth and space science missions and provides guidance on how NASA can overcome these specific problems. The recommendations in this book focus on changes in NASA policies that would directly reduce or eliminate the cost growth of Earth and space science missions. Large cost growth is a concern for Earth and space science missions, and it can be a concern for other missions as well. If the cost growth is large enough, it can create liquidity problems for NASA's Science Mission Directorate that in turn cause cost profile changes and development delays that amplify the overall cost growth for other concurrent and/or pending missions. Addressing cost growth through the allocation of artificially high reserves is an inefficient use of resources because it unnecessarily diminishes the portfolio of planned flights. The most efficient use of resources is to establish realistic budgets and reserves and effective management processes that maximize the likelihood that mission costs will not exceed reserves. NASA is already taking action to reduce cost growth; additional steps, as recommended herein, will help improve NASA's mission planning process and achieve the goal of ensuring frequent mission opportunities for NASA Earth and space science.