When managers have objectives beyond maximizing monetary profits, inefficiencies may arise. An increase in competition may then force managers to improve the productivity of the firm in order to ensure survival. While this hypothesis has received ample theoretical attention, empirical evidence is scarce, mainly because preferences of managers are typically unobserved. In this paper, we exploit the fact that a large literature has documented specific non-monetary preferences of family managers. Using Spanish firm-level data, we compare how family-managed and professionally-managed firms react to import competition shocks. We find that import competition leads to productivity increases in family-managed firms that are initially unproductive. Productivity improvements are driven by family management as opposed to family ownership or non-managing family members. Furthermore, we show that these managers increase efficiency by reducing material usage, which is consistent with them trying to increase their short-term cash flow in order to survive. Finally, productivity improvements seem to be particularly pronounced in multi-generational family firms that also introduce organizational changes.

Empirical evidence on the relationship between import competition and firm productivity is mixed. We explore a new dimension of firm heterogeneity by focusing on different types of managers. Using Spanish firm-level data, we show that import competition leads to productivity increases for family-managed firms that are initially unproductive. Productivity changes are driven by family management as opposed to family ownership or non-managing family members. This evidence is consistent with a model in which family managers care more about the survival of their firm than professional managers, which triggers additional effort when the firm is faced with an increased bankruptcy risk. We show evidence consistent with this mechanism.

Does competition spur productivity? And if so, how? These have long been regarded as central questions in economics. The extent of competition can be influenced by policy decisions, so understanding how competition impacts productivity and, in turn, living standards is of more than academic importance. To fully answer these questions of whether, and how, an increase in competition impacts productivity, two issues must be addressed. First, the authors define what we mean by an ¿increase in competition.¿ Second, they attempt to understand the mechanisms through which competition impacts productivity. Both issues present substantial challenges, which the authors address. Illustrations. This is a print-on-demand publication; it is not an original.

We explore how the competitive pressure of imports affects productivity, at the firm level. There are two conflicting effects of import-competition: the pro-competitive effect fosters productivity, while the direct effect hinders it. The pro-competitive effect dominates in the steady-state, yielding free-trade as the optimal long run policy. However, under a large initial productivity gap, the firm shuts down. Here, a temporary tariff sways the firm to fight, and ensures survival, which is welfare increasing. Trade liberalization, around the steady-state, increases productivity growth and closes the gap. However, a radical liberalization kills the domestic firm. Gradualism increases the likelihood of survival, and increases welfare.

This study analyses empirically the effects of import competition on firm productivity (TFPQ) using administrative firm-level panel data from German manufacturing. We find that only import competition from high-income countries is associated with positive incentives for firms to invest in productivity improvement, whereas import competition from middle- and low-income countries is not. To rationalise these findings, we further look at the characteristics of imports from the two types of countries and the effects on R&D, employment and sales. We provide evidence that imports from high-income countries are relatively capital-intensive and technologically more sophisticated goods, at which German firms tend to be relatively good. Costly investment in productivity appears feasible reaction to such type of competition and we find no evidence for downscaling. Imports from middle- and low-wage countries are relatively labour-intensive and technologically less sophisticated goods, at which German firms tend to generally be at disadvantage. In this case, there are no incentives to invest in innovation and productivity and firms tend to decline in sales and employment.