"This report assesses the impact upon the 29th Infantry Division (Light) of participating in a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping (PK) mission in the Sinai Desert. Senior leaders from the nine maneuver battalions that contributed approximately 90% of the division's PK mission volunteers were surveyed (twice) and interviewed (once) to determine what training and personnel impacts their units had experienced. A stratified random sample of junior leader's/soldiers from these units was also surveyed, along with active Army readiness advisers to these units, and soldiers who had volunteered initially for the mission but later withdrew. Senior leaders reported that the opportunity to participate in the PK mission produced a psychological boost for the soldiers in their units. The mission inspired renewed pride in their units and pride in the Army National Guard as a entity capable of manning significant 'real-world' contributions to world peace. Future participation in similar missions was endorsed by all group surveyed. Positive impacts on morale and family support were reported. Senior leader reports of training impact were initially negative, grew increasingly positive during the course of the mission, and were found to be decidedly positive after mission volunteers were reassigned to their units. Combat readiness was the only area where negative impacts were reported throughout the duration of the PK mission. The return of mission volunteers, however, caused more than offsetting positive impacts in this area."--DTIC.

This report assesses the impact upon the 29th Infantry Division (Light) of participating in a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping (PK) mission in the Sinai Desert. Senior leaders from the nine maneuver battalions that contributed approximately 90% of the division's PK mission volunteers were surveyed (twice) and interviewed (once) to determine what training and personnel impacts their units had experienced. A stratified random sample of junior leader's/soldiers from these units was also surveyed, along with active Army readiness advisers to these units, and soldiers who had volunteered initially for the mission but later withdrew. Senior leaders reported that the opportunity to participate in the PK mission produced a psychological boost for the soldiers in their units. The mission inspired renewed pride in their units and pride in the Army National Guard as a entity capable of manning significant 'real-world' contributions to world peace. Future participation in similar missions was endorsed by all group surveyed. Positive impacts on morale and family support were reported. Senior leader reports of training impact were initially negative, grew increasingly positive during the course of the mission, and were found to be decidedly positive after mission volunteers were reassigned to their units. Combat readiness was the only area where negative impacts were reported throughout the duration of the PK mission. The return of mission volunteers, however, caused more than offsetting positive impacts in this area.

In the continuing effort to maintain a ready force and honor the United States commitments throughout the world, in 1993 the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a test of the use of Reserve Component forces for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. A battalion composed of 80% RC individual volunteers and 20% Active Component soldiers was activated, trained and deployed as the 28th MFO rotation to the Sinai (Jan-Jul 95). ARI conducted an assessment of personnel and training issues using performance, interview and survey data. The four research questions and their findings are as follows. (1) Personnel: Who volunteered and why? What, if any, changes should be made to the volunteer screening process? (2) Family Support: How well did the family support system work? What was the impact of Sinai service on the family and civilian lives of volunteers? (3) Training/Performance: What are the unique and minimal training requirements? Did the training process produce a cohesive unit that could perform the mission? (4) Impact on the 29th ID(L): What is the impact on the ARYG units that sent volunteers, both during the deployment and post-deployment? Recommendations for future deployments are discussed in the text. ARI will continue to assess the impact of the deployment and post-redeployment re-entry on National Guard soldier commitment/retention, marital stability and financial well-being through October 1997. Cost analyses are not included in the ARI portion of the MFO assessment.

Should all of the Army National Guard's divisions include peacekeeping tasks in their Mission Essential Task Lists (METL)? Most ARNG units focus their training efforts on traditional combat arms tasks, and only after they receive a peacekeeping mission do they execute pre-deployment PKO proficiency training. Following the model of alert-train-deploy rather than train-alert-deploy places additional stress not only on the deploying unit, but also on external units that are assisting with the mobilization process. FM 7-0, Training the Force, dictates that Army units use the train-alert-deploy model. This study evaluates the arguments for and against the research question by using the criteria of readiness, compliance with Federal directives, and legitimacy. Divisions that regularly train on PKO tasks will sustain the unit's PKO support. Increased proficiency at home station improves readiness. If readiness is better, then the primary research question is supported. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) dictates that the Army maintain the ability of operating in a full-spectrum environment (from smaller-scale contingencies, or SSCs, to large-scale combat operations); consequently, peacekeeping training in the ARNG should help satisfy this requirement. If units comply with Federal directives, then the primary research question is supported. FM 3-0, Operations, states that in order to achieve objectives, Army forces conducting PKO rely on legitimacy. The legitimacy envisioned by the sponsoring state, nations or international organization is critical to operational success. If legitimacy is better, then the primary research question is supported. The study concludes that ARNG divisions should include peacekeeping tasks in their METL. Recommendations include updating Army peace operations doctrine with new FMs, MTPs and POIs. The new PKSOI at the Army War Col.