The paper documents the benefits provided by IMF’s precautionary instruments (FCL and PLL) to countries in accessing international financial markets. It builds on multiple methods to show that the announcement of new FCL or PLL generally leads to a significant decline in sovereign spreads. Next, it evaluates the role of the FCL and PLL in mitigating external financial pressures, focusing on the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study. Economies which had a PLL or FCL arrangement in place during the pandemic experienced a lower increase in spreads relative to other emerging markets, even after controlling for country-specific effects and other covariates, suggesting that these arrangements help cushion external shocks. Finally, the study asks whether FCL/PLL drawdowns have an impact on financial perceptions; the analysis finds—albeit on the basis of a very small sample— no evidence of downside effects from countries drawing down on these arrangements .

Despite increasing volatility in the global economy, the uptake of the IMF's two precautionary credit lines, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), has remained limited -- currently to just four countries. The two new lending instruments were created in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008 to enable IMF member states to respond quickly and effectively to temporary balance of payment needs resulting from external shocks. Both credit lines offer immediate access to considerable sums -- over 10 times a country's IMF quota in some cases with no (FCL) or very limited (PLL) conditionality. This paper addresses four misconceptions (or 'myths') that have likely played a role in the limited utilization of the two precautionary credit lines: 1) too stringent qualification criteria that limit country eligibility; 2) insufficient IMF resources; 3) high costs of precautionary borrowing; and 4) the economic stigma associated with IMF assistance. We show, in fact, that the pool of eligible member states is likely to be seven to eight times larger than the number of current users; that with the 2016 quota reform IMF resources are more than adequate to support a larger precautionary portfolio; that the two IMF credit lines are among the least costly and most advantageous instruments for liquidity support countries have; and that there is no evidence of negative market developments for countries now participating in the precautionary lines.

This review of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), and the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) focuses on four key issues: (i) the demand for the FCL and PLL in the context of the broader role of the Fund’s lending (including precautionary) instruments in the global financial safety net (GFSN); (ii) the qualification/conditionality framework for the FCL and the PLL; (iii) concerns about repeated usage of FCL arrangements by the same members and consideration of ways to further improve the transparency in the discussion of access/exit in the underlying staff documents; and (iv) the lack of demand for the RFI.

A recovery is underway, but the economic fallout from the global pandemic could be with us for years to come. With the crisis exacerbating prepandemic vulnerabilities, country prospects are diverging. Nearly half of emerging market and developing economies and some middle-income countries are now at risk of falling further behind, undoing much of the progress made toward achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Precautionary balances are a key element of the Fund’s multilayered framework to mitigate financial risks. Overall financial risks remain elevated but have not increased significantly since the last review. Staff proposes to leave the medium-term target of SDR 25 billion, and the minimum floor of SDR 15 billion, unchanged at this time. With the projected increase in lending income, the pace of reserve accumulation is expected to remain adequate relative to the medium-term indicative target. The paper also reviews policy factors discussed in recent Board meetings that affect the level and accumulation of reserves.

At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.

The Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) has expanded considerably since 2008, including in the non-traditional elements of the safety net such as Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs). The resulting multi-layered structure of the GFSN makes collaboration between its various elements more important than in the past. Specifically, stronger collaboration between the Fund and RFAs would help increase the effective firepower of the GFSN and ensure a timely deployment of resources. The Fund’s experience in macroeconomic adjustment and its universal risk pooling would combine with the greater regional knowledge and country ownership brought the RFA. In this way, improved collaboration between the Fund and RFAs, including in co-financing, would significantly reduce the risk of contagion by encouraging countries to seek early assistance from the Fund. This paper is part of a broader set of proposals to fortify the GFSN (IMF, 2017b, c, d). It proposes both modalities for collaboration—across capacity development, surveillance, and lending—and some operational principles to help guide future co-lending between the Fund and the various RFAs. To date, the only operational guidance to facilitate collaboration has been limited to the high-level 2011 G20 Principles for Cooperation between the IMF and RFAs. Building on several case studies and the principles derived from them, this paper proposes an operational framework for future engagement. It aims to start a more structured dialogue between the Fund and individual RFAs on the modalities of how best to work together.