In response to the Global Financial Crisis, the IMF launched many initiatives to strengthen financial surveillance and better advise member countries of vulnerabilities and risks. While these initiatives have not yet been tested by a major crisis, the efforts have delivered a substantial upgrade of the Fund’s financial surveillance, including giving the IMF clearer responsibilities over financial sector stability and cross-country spillovers; making periodic financial stability assessments mandatory for jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors; invigorating efforts to integrate financial and macroeconomic analysis in bilateral and multilateral surveillance; enhancing cooperation with the Financial Stability Board and standard setting bodies to promote reforms and monitor agreed standards; and taking steps to recruit and train greater financial expertise. While recognizing these achievements, this evaluation finds that the quality and impact of the IMF’s financial surveillance has been uneven. The expansion of products and activities has presented the Fund with difficult trade-offs between bilateral and multilateral surveillance; between countries with systemically important financial sectors and other member countries; and between financial surveillance and other activities. Moreover, resource constraints have slowed the needed build-up of financial and macrofinancial expertise. These are critical issues, given the IMF’s position as the only international financial institution with the mandate and ability to conduct financial and macrofinancial surveillance over the full range of countries as well as the global economy, and given that these issues are at the core of the IMF’s responsibilities. Thus, to further strengthen financial surveillance, the evaluation recommends devoting greater resources to financial surveillance overall; further strengthening financial and macrofinancial analysis in Article IV surveillance; refining resource allocation for FSAPs; enhancing rigor and transparency in multilateral surveillance; intensifying efforts to be a global center of excellence on financial and macrofinancial research; and extending efforts to develop financial expertise among IMF staff.

Drawing on evidence from a sample of emerging market economies over the period 1990-2004, this evaluation report reviews the IMF’s approach to capital account liberalization and related issues. The evaluation seeks to contribute to transparency by documenting what in practice has been the IMF's approach to these issues and to identify areas where the IMF’s instruments and operating methods might be improved, in order to deal with these issues more effectively.

The IEO of the IMF was created in 2000 to enhance the learning culture of the IMF, to build the IMF’s external credibility by undertaking objective evaluations in a transparent manner, to provide independent feedback to the Executive Board in its governance and oversight responsibilities, and to promote greater understanding of the work of the IMF among its members and the broader public. In the period October 2005-February 2006, the Evaluation Panel assessed how well the IEO meets these objectives, asking at the outset whether the IMF needs an IEO and whether the existing office is adequately independent. The Panel concludes that the IEO has served the IMF well but identifies certain weaknesses and makes recommendations to the IEO and the IMF to address them.

A recovery is underway, but the economic fallout from the global pandemic could be with us for years to come. With the crisis exacerbating prepandemic vulnerabilities, country prospects are diverging. Nearly half of emerging market and developing economies and some middle-income countries are now at risk of falling further behind, undoing much of the progress made toward achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

IEO evaluations are an integral part of the Fund’s learning culture, helping the Fund absorb lessons that improve its work. In addition, the objectivity of IEO evaluations has bolstered the Fund’s credibility. In discussing the report of the External Evaluation of the IEO (the “Lissakers report”), Executive Directors welcomed the suggestions to strengthen follow-up to the IEO recommendations?including more Board involvement—and supported a more systematic approach for following up and monitoring the implementation of IEO recommendations approved by the Board. This periodic monitoring report (PMR) is the first such effort under the new procedures approved by the Executive Board in January 2007. In particular, it responds to the instruction that “Management shall present to the Board a periodic monitoring report on the state of implementation of actions contained in the forward-looking implementation plans already in force and not deemed completed on the occasion of a prior periodic monitoring report. These reports shall indicate difficulties in implementing the original plan and propose remedial or substitute actions whenever appropriate. The first periodic monitoring report shall be prepared following the delivery of the 2007 IEO Annual Report. As the IEO Annual Reports cover the status of all past IEO recommendations, it is expected that the first periodic monitoring report produced by Management would also review the implementation of recommendations made to date.”

The 2014 Annual Report of the Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund.