Om krigen mellem Israel og PLO i Libanon fra 1982 baseret på interviews med soldater og civile og med fokus på de militære begivenheder i en større social og politisk kontekst.

On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded the neighboring state of Lebanon in Operation "Peace for Galilee". The planning and execution of this invasion is examined from an operational-strategic perspective. Tasked with carrying out the invasion, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) prepared detailed operational plans which used the principles of warfare to maximize Israel's advantages while minimizing its disadvantages. Upon execution of the plan, IDF units overran south Lebanon in a matter of days in spite of ardous terrain and stiff resistance. However, what was to have been a three day operation stretched into two months of combat followed by a bloody three year occupation of Lebanon. The strategic failure of the IDF despite the brilliance of its operational and tactical performance provides a number of valuable operational lessons. First, regardless of operational excellence, strategic success is unlikely when military operations fail to support policy. Second, a failure to match political and military objectives can cause major problems in the execution of military operations. Moreover, when using military force to deal with a primarily political problem, the identification of an enemy center of gravity based solely on military operations will preclude strategic success. Finally, failure to recognize the culminating point of victory in a military operation can lead to strategic overextension, exhaustion, and eventual defeat. (RWJ).

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The fact that the outcome of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige tarnished. This historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. The IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force. ¿An insightful, comprehensive examination of the war.¿ Illustrations.

The uncertain nature of future threats to U.S. forces presents interesting challenges to military planners. As the emphasis on the littoral environment and urban warfare continues, valuable lessons can be learned from Israel's swift and successful drive into Lebanon in 1982. Operation Peace for Galilee was epitomized by expert planning and operational excellence, as the IDF achieved its stated aim of establishing a PLO-free 40 kilometer buffer zone north of its border within 40 hours. Yet, as defense minister Ariel Sharon manipulated its conduct, the operation grew beyond the scope of IDF capabilities. By incorrectly identifying the PLO center of gravity as its military "fighters", the Israelis expanded their aims and found themselves in a two month siege of Beirut that resulted in mounting casualties and rising domestic dissatisfaction. The IDF was caught unprepared for urban warfare. Its heavy armor forces were more suited to the desert terrain of its previous wars, rather than the mountainous and urban terrain of Lebanon, which favored the defender. A planned 72 hour operation lasted 3 months and resulted in a 3 year occupation of Lebanon. While full of operational excellence at its outset, the operation protracted and ended in strategic failure and erosion of domestic support, resulting in the resignations of both the president and defense minister.

During the summer and fall of 1982 the Israeli government used military force in an operation which they believed would achieve certain immediate political goals. Israel invaded Lebanon with an announced goal of clearing PLO terrorists from an area which threatened the northern section of Israel known as Galilee. While military forces initially committed to the operation were equal to the announced political goal, changes in policy which occurred during the operation created tensions in the campaign plan conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces. This monograph first analyzes the background of all active and supporting belligerents in order to ascertain the political and strategic goals which guided the participants. The plans for the operation are presented and the actual conduct of the invasion is described. Two aspects of classical theory--the identification of centers of gravity and the relationship between military means and political ends--are assessed in the light of the success and failure of the nations involved in the conflict. The monograph concludes that there was a glaring military means-political ends mismatch and that the Israeli planners failed in identifying the PLO center of gravity. The indications are that modern nation-states must be prepared to understand and fight any type of warfare on the conflict spectrum. Understanding of military theory and history assists the planner in these demands.