Ideologues and Presidents argues that ideologues have been gaining influence in the modern presidency. There were plenty of ideologues in the New Deal, but they worked at cross purposes and could not count on the backing of the cagey pragmatist in the Oval Office. Three decades later, the Johnson White House systematically sought the help of hundreds of liberals in drawing up blueprints for policy changes. But when it came time to implement their plans, Lyndon Johnson's White House proved to have scant interest in ideological purity.By the time of the Reagan Revolution, the organizations that supported ideological assaults on government had never been stronger. The result was a level of ideological influence unmatched until the George W. Bush presidency. In Bush's administration, not only did anti-statists and social conservatives take up positions of influence throughout the government, but the president famously pursued an elective war that had been promoted for a decade by a networked band of ideologues.In the Barack Obama presidency, although progressive liberals have found their way into niches within the executive branch, the real ideological action continues to be Stage Right. How did American presidential politics come to be so entangled with ideology and ideologues? Ideologues and Presidents helps us move toward an answer to this vital question.

The authors cut through party bias to present the quantifiable facts about how modern presidents have performed on critical national issues Politicians and the media spend a lot of time telling Americans how the presidents and their administrations are performing, but this analysis always skews along party lines. In Presimetrics, Kimel and Kanell take a fresh look at modern politics by gathering data from numerous government sources in order to compare and rank presidential performance on critical issues, from employment and health care to taxes and family values. The results frequently defy expectations: Reagan, godfather of neoconservatives, increased the federal workforce more than any president since LBJ Clinton, a hero to Democrats, cut funding for the NEA by a larger percentage than any other president Nixon/Ford outperformed all administrations on Democratic issues like Federal spending on social programs The lively text clearly explains how various policies of each administration affect the data, and fascinating information graphics lend even greater depth to the discussion, showing at a glance how multiple administrations stack up.

Congress is crippled by ideological conflict. The political parties are more polarized today than at any time since the Civil War. Americans disagree, fiercely, about just about everything, from terrorism and national security, to taxes and government spending, to immigration and gay marriage. Well, American elites disagree fiercely. But average Americans do not. This, at least, was the position staked out by Philip Converse in his famous essay on belief systems, which drew on surveys carried out during the Eisenhower Era to conclude that most Americans were innocent of ideology. In Neither Liberal nor Conservative, Donald Kinder and Nathan Kalmoe argue that ideological innocence applies nearly as well to the current state of American public opinion. Real liberals and real conservatives are found in impressive numbers only among those who are deeply engaged in political life. The ideological battles between American political elites show up as scattered skirmishes in the general public, if they show up at all. If ideology is out of reach for all but a few who are deeply and seriously engaged in political life, how do Americans decide whom to elect president; whether affirmative action is good or bad? Kinder and Kalmoe offer a persuasive group-centered answer. Political preferences arise less from ideological differences than from the attachments and antagonisms of group life.

Several generations of historians figuratively abandoned the Oval Office as the bastion of out-of-fashion stories of great men. And now, decades later, the historical analysis of the American presidency remains on the outskirts of historical scholarship, even as policy and political history have rebounded within the academy. In Recapturing the Oval Office, leading historians and social scientists forge an agenda for returning the study of the presidency to the mainstream practice of history and they chart how the study of the presidency can be integrated into historical narratives that combine rich analyses of political, social, and cultural history. The authors demonstrate how "bringing the presidency back in" can deepen understanding of crucial questions regarding race relations, religion, and political economy. The contributors illuminate the conditions that have both empowered and limited past presidents, and thus show how social, cultural, and political contexts matter. By making the history of the presidency a serious part of the scholarly agenda in the future, historians have the opportunity to influence debates about the proper role of the president today.

Ideologues and Presidents argues that ideologues have been gaining influence in the modern presidency. There were plenty of ideologues in the New Deal, but they worked at cross purposes and could not count on the backing of the cagey pragmatist in the Oval Office. Three decades later, the Johnson White House systematically sought the help of hundreds of liberals in drawing up blueprints for policy changes. But when it came time to implement their plans, Lyndon Johnson's White House proved to have scant interest in ideological purity. By the time of the Reagan Revolution, the organizations that supported ideological assaults on government had never been stronger. The result was a level of ideological influence unmatched until the George W. Bush presidency. In Bush's administration, not only did anti-statists and social conservatives take up positions of influence throughout the government, but the president famously pursued an elective war that had been promoted for a decade by a networked band of ideologues. In the Barack Obama presidency, although progressive liberals have found their way into niches within the executive branch, the real ideological action continues to be Stage Right. How did American presidential politics come to be so entangled with ideology and ideologues? Ideologues and Presidents helps us move toward an answer to this vital question.

Ideologues and Presidents argues that ideologues have been gaining influence in the modern presidency. There were plenty of ideologues in the New Deal, but they worked at cross purposes and could not count on the backing of the cagey pragmatist in the Oval Office. Three decades later, the Johnson White House systematically sought the help of hundreds of liberals in drawing up blueprints for policy changes. But when it came time to implement their plans, Lyndon Johnson's White House proved to have scant interest in ideological purity. By the time of the Reagan Revolution, the organizations that supported ideological assaults on government had never been stronger. The result was a level of ideological influence unmatched until the George W. Bush presidency. In Bush's administration, not only did anti-statists and social conservatives take up positions of influence throughout the government, but the president famously pursued an elective war that had been promoted for a decade by a networked band of ideologues. In the Barack Obama presidency, although progressive liberals have found their way into niches within the executive branch, the real ideological action continues to be Stage Right. How did American presidential politics come to be so entangled with ideology and ideologues? Ideologues and Presidents helps us move toward an answer to this vital question.

The Last Liberal Republican is a memoir from one of Nixon’s senior domestic policy advisors. John Roy Price—a member of the moderate wing of the Republican Party, a cofounder of the Ripon Society, and an employee on Nelson Rockefeller’s campaigns—joined Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and later John D. Ehrlichman, in the Nixon White House to develop domestic policies, especially on welfare, hunger, and health. Based on those policies, and the internal White House struggles around them, Price places Nixon firmly in the liberal Republican tradition of President Theodore Roosevelt, New York governor Thomas E. Dewey, and President Dwight Eisenhower. Price makes a valuable contribution to our evolving scholarship and understanding of the Nixon presidency. Nixon himself lamented that he would be remembered only for Watergate and China. The Last Liberal Republican provides firsthand insight into key moments regarding Nixon’s political and policy challenges in the domestic social policy arena. Price offers rich detail on the extent to which Nixon and his staff straddled a precarious balance between a Democratic-controlled Congress and an increasingly powerful conservative tide in Republican politics. The Last Liberal Republican provides a blow-by-blow inside view of how Nixon surprised the Democrats and shocked conservatives with his ambitious proposal for a guaranteed family income. Beyond Nixon’s surprising embrace of what we today call universal basic income, the thirty-seventh president reordered and vastly expanded the patchy food stamp program he inherited and built nutrition education and children’s food services into schools. Richard Nixon even almost achieved a national health insurance program: fifty years ago, with a private sector framework as part of his generous benefits insurance coverage for all, Nixon included coverage of preexisting conditions, prescription drug coverage for all, and federal subsidies for those who could not afford the premiums. The Last Liberal Republican will be a valuable resource for presidency scholars who are studying Nixon, his policies, the state of the Republican Party, and how the Nixon years relate to the rise of the modern conservative movement.