We examine the roles of sample initial conditions and unobserved individual effects in consistent estimation of the dynamic binary response panel data model. Different specifications of the model are estimated using female welfare and labor force participation data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). These include alternative random effects models, in which the conditional distributions of both the unobserved heterogeneity and the initial conditions are specified, and fixed effects conditional logit models that make no assumptions on either distribution. There are several findings. First, the hypotheses that the sample initial conditions are either exogenous or in equilibrium are rejected by the data. Misspecification of the initial conditions results in drastically overstated estimates of the state dependence and understated estimates of the short- and long-run effects of children on labor force participation. The fixed effects conditional legit estimates are similar to the estimates from the random effects model that is flexible with respect to both the initial conditions and the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the covariates. Heterogeneity appears to explain about 50% and 70% of the overall persistence in welfare and labor force participation, respectively. In addition, for female labor force participation, there is evidence that fertility choices are correlated with both unobserved heterogeneity and pre-sample participation histories.

This paper develops identification and estimation methods for dynamic structural models when agents' actions are unobserved by econometricians. We provide conditions under which choice probabilities and latent state transition rules are nonparametrically identified with a continuous state variable in a single-agent dynamic discrete choice model. Our identification results extend to (1) models with serially correlated unobserved heterogeneity and continuous choices, (2) cases in which only discrete state variables are available, and (3) dynamic discrete games. We apply our method to study moral hazard problems in US gubernatorial elections. We find that the probabilities of shirking increase as the governors approach the end of their terms.

Economic Models for Industrial Organization focuses on the specification and estimation of econometric models for research in industrial organization. In recent decades, empirical work in industrial organization has moved towards dynamic and equilibrium models, involving econometric methods which have features distinct from those used in other areas of applied economics. These lecture notes, aimed for a first or second-year PhD course, motivate and explain these econometric methods, starting from simple models and building to models with the complexity observed in typical research papers. The covered topics include discrete-choice demand analysis, models of dynamic behavior and dynamic games, multiple equilibria in entry games and partial identification, and auction models.