Do human beings have a special and distinguished place in reality? In Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality Thomas Hofweber contends that they do. We are special since there is an intimate connection between our human minds and reality itself. This book defends a form of idealism which holds that our human minds constrain, but do not construct, reality as the totality of facts. Reality as the totality of facts is thus not independent of our minds, and our minds play a metaphysically special role in all of reality. But reality as the totality of things is taken to be completely independent of us. Hofweber's proposed form of conceptual idealism is formulated via the notion of a harmony between our minds and reality. This harmony is defended through considerations in the philosophy of language. How can one possibly defend a metaphysical thesis like idealism from considerations about our own representation? A key step in the book's argument is to consider a special class of concepts--inescapable concepts--which we cannot rationally replace with different ones. This leads to a new approach for making progress in metaphysics--immanent metaphysics--which is broadly neo-Kantian in spirit.

Do human beings have a special and distinguished place in reality? In Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality Thomas Hofweber contends that they do. We are special since there is an intimate connection between our human minds and reality itself. This book defends a form of idealism which holds that our human minds constrain, but do not construct, reality as the totality of facts. Reality as the totality of facts is thus not independent of our minds, and our minds play a metaphysically special role in all of reality. But reality as the totality of things is taken to be completely independent of us. Hofweber's proposed form of conceptual idealism is formulated via the notion of a harmony between our minds and reality. This harmony is defended through considerations in the philosophy of language. How can one possibly defend a metaphysical thesis like idealism from considerations about our own representation? A key step in the book's argument is to consider a special class of concepts—inescapable concepts—which we cannot rationally replace with different ones. This leads to a new approach for making progress in metaphysics—immanent metaphysics—which is broadly neo-Kantian in spirit.

A rigorous case for the primacy of mind in nature, from philosophy to neuroscience, psychology and physics. The Idea of the World offers a grounded alternative to the frenzy of unrestrained abstractions and unexamined assumptions in philosophy and science today. This book examines what can be learned about the nature of reality based on conceptual parsimony, straightforward logic and empirical evidence from fields as diverse as physics and neuroscience. It compiles an overarching case for idealism - the notion that reality is essentially mental - from ten original articles the author has previously published in leading academic journals. The case begins with an exposition of the logical fallacies and internal contradictions of the reigning physicalist ontology and its popular alternatives, such as bottom-up panpsychism. It then advances a compelling formulation of idealism that elegantly makes sense of - and reconciles - classical and quantum worlds. The main objections to idealism are systematically refuted and empirical evidence is reviewed that corroborates the formulation presented here. The book closes with an analysis of the hidden psychological motivations behind mainstream physicalism and the implications of idealism for the way we relate to the world.

From the Introduction. In discussing the attitude of idealism towards the metaphysics of natural science one is embarrassed at the outset by the indeflniteness of the term idealism. Systems which are called idealistic differ radically in character, as do those of Leibniz and Berkeley. Many, of them exhibit features which are supposed to be characteristic of realism. Yet the distinction between realism and idealism is a time-honored one, and cannot be without significance. It is therefore important to determine with some precision in what this distinction consists. Two criteria often used to make the distinction appear to the writer to be of very inferior value. According to one, an idealist is a thinker who denies that the external world and the objects of knowledge possess a reality independent of the perception or thought by which they form a part of his consciousness. Their esse is percipi, and in addition to their reality as perception no sort of existence can be ascribed to them. The realist, on the other hand, urges that things exist by themselves, and that afterwards a knowing mind may happen to perceive them-or it may not, the incident being of no great significance. There is no doubt much excuse for resting the distinction upon the denial of an objective world independent of consciousness. The general contention of idealism, both in England and Germany, has been that the reality of the object consists in nothing else than being perceived. Except as related to consciousness, it is urged, no meaning can be ascribed to objectivity. With Berkeley insisting that the esse of things is nothing but their percipi, and with Fichte striving to show how the Ego constructs the world by its own spontaneity, the foregoing characterization has seemed just and has won wide acceptance. The extreme subjectivism which this statement of the idealistic position entails is a matter of regret. Wherever it is dominant idealism fights at a marked disadvantage. The suppression of subjectivism has been the perennial struggle of the idealist. The idealist does not actually mean that the mind of the individual constructs for itself a field of consciousness which is its universe, and that the universe so known carries with it no implication or evidence of an existent reality external to the consciousness of the individual mind. He can no more dispense with such a reality than his opponent can dispense with the material world. It is the principle which makes the world a system, and causes the universe constructed by one mind to harmonize with that constructed by another. From the standpoint of the individual, this may be called an external world. It is not exter.nal to the mind, if by external we understand something opposed to the mind and distinct from it. On the contrary, for most forms of idealism this universal principle must be immanent in the mind, and may in this sense be called internal. It is external, however, in the sense that it involves immensely more than the consciousness of the single individual. Its sphere of activity lies largely outside the consciousness of the finite subject, and it is in this extra-mental sphere that we must find the ground and explanation of the cosmic order.

Many significant problems in metaphysics are tied to ontological questions, but ontology and its relation to larger questions in metaphysics give rise to a series of puzzles that suggest that we don't fully understand what ontology is supposed to do, nor what ambitions metaphysics can have for finding out about what the world is like. Thomas Hofweber aims to solve these puzzles about ontology and consequently to make progress on four central metaphysical problems: the philosophy of arithmetic, the metaphysics of ordinary objects, the problem of universals, and the question whether reality is independent of us. Crucial parts of the proposed solution include considerations about quantification and its relationship to ontology, the place of reference in natural languages, the possibility of ineffable facts, the extent of empirical evidence in metaphysics, and whether metaphysics can properly be esoteric. Overall, Hofweber defends a rationalist account of arithmetic, an empiricist picture in the philosophy of ordinary objects, a restricted from of nominalism, and realism about reality, understood as all there is, but idealism about reality, understood as all that is the case. He defends metaphysics as having some questions of fact that are distinctly its own, with a limited form of autonomy from other parts of inquiry, but rejects several metaphysical projects and approaches as being based on a mistake.

Idealism is a family of metaphysical views each of which gives priority to the mental. The best-known forms of idealism in Western philosophy are Berkeleyan idealism, which gives ontological priority to the mental (minds and ideas) over the physical (bodies), and Kantian idealism, which gives a kind of explanatory priority to the mental (the structure of the understanding) over the physical (the structure of the empirical world). Although idealism was once a dominant view in Western philosophy, it has suffered almost total neglect over the last several decades. This book rectifies this situation by bringing together seventeen essays by leading philosophers on the topic of metaphysical idealism. The various essays explain, attack, or defend a variety of idealistic theories, including not only Berkeleyan and Kantian idealisms but also those developed in traditions less familiar to analytic philosophers, including Buddhism and Hassidic Judaism. Although a number of the articles draw on historical sources, all will be of interest to philosophers working in contemporary metaphysics. This volume aims to spark a revival of serious philosophical interest in metaphysical idealism.