This book touches on most of the important questions that arise in life. Somewhat in the manner of Nietzsche, it presents provocative perspectives on topics ranging from morality to politics, from art to religion, from capitalism to socialism. What is the "meaning of life"? What does it mean to act morally? What are the sources of modern unhappiness and social ills? How has Western society evolved to its present state, and what is its future? What is the future of capitalism itself? Such questions, and many others, are addressed. The book is also intended as literature, though, and as such contains poetry, fiction, and even satire. Ultimately its purpose is simply stated: it is meant to contribute to the collective project of dragging "humanism" out from the underground.

Raymond Aron called Merleau-Ponty "the most influential French philosopher of his generation." First published in France in 1947, Humanism and Terror was in part a response to Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon, and in a larger sense a contribution to the political and moral debates of a postwar world suddenly divided into two ideological armed camps. For Merleau-Ponty, the central question was: could Communism transcend its violence and intentions? The value of a society is the value it places upon man's relation to man, Merleau-Ponty examines not only the Moscow trials of the late thirties but also Koestler's re-creation of them. He argues that violence in general in the Communist world can be understood only in the context of revolutionary activism. He demonstrates that it is pointless to ask whether Communism respects the rules of liberal society; it is evident that Communism does not. In post-Communist Europe, when many are addressing similar questions throughout the world, Merleau-Ponty's discourse is of prime importance; it stands as a major and provocative contribution to limits on the use of violence. The argument is placed in its current context in a brilliant new introduction by John O'Neill. His remarks extend the line of argument originally developed by the great French political philosopher. This is a major contribution to political theory and philosophy. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, until his death in 1961, held the Chair of Philosophy at the Collge de France. He was recognized as both an authentic and profoundly original disciple of Husserlian phenomenology, and a major figure in the development of existential thought. John O'Neill, who has prepared this accurate and well-written translation, is professor of sociology at York University, Ontario, Canada. Educated at the London School of Economics, Notre Dame, and Stanford, he is translator of Jean Hyppolite's Studies on Marx and Hegel and author of Perception, Expression and History.

This study of the origins and development of Marxist-Humanism probes the philosophic-organizational labors of Raya Dunayevskaya. Beginning with her work as secretary to Leon Trotsky in exile in Mexico in 1937-38, the book explores her development of state-capitalist theory in the 1940s and her thought-dive into Hegel's Absolutes in the 1950s. Each of Dunayevskaya's major works--Marxism and Freedom (1958), Philosophy and Revolution (1973), and Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution (1983)--is examined inseparable from the objective world events and revolu-tionary subjectivity that unfolded from the 1940s into the 1980s. The U.S.-Russia super-power rivalry, the Sino-Soviet Conflict, the rise of the Afro-Asian-Latin American and East European revolts and revolutions, together with the Black Di-mension, Women's Liberation, anti-war youth, and rank-and-file labor struggles in the United States--all in fusion with the re-creation of the Hegelian and Marxian dialectic in the later half of the twentieth century--formed the contours of Dunayevskaya's labors traced within this new work. Her final, unfinished and unpublished studies on Dialectics of Organization and PhilosophyÓ are examined in the concluding part.

First published in France In 1947, Merleau-Ponty's essay was in part a response to Arthur Koestler's novel, Darkness at Noon, and in a larger sense a contribution to the political and moral debates of a postwar world suddenly divided into two armed camps. For Merleau-Ponty, the basic question was: given the violence in Communism, is Communism still equal to its humanist intentions? Starting with the assumption that a society is not a "temple of value-idols that figure on the front of its monuments or in its constitutional scrolls; the value of a society is the value It places upon man's relation to man," Merleau-ponty examines not only the Moscow trials of the late thirties but also Koestler's re-creation of them. And Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that the Moscow trials—and violence in general in the Communist world—can be understood only In the context of revolutionary violence. He demonstrates that it is pointless to begin an examination of Communist violence by asking whether Communism respects the rules of liberal thought; it is evident that Communism does not. The question that should be asked is whether the violence Communism exercises is revolutionary violence, capable of building humane relations among men. At a time when many are addressing similar questions to societies both in the East and in the West, Merleau-Ponty's investigations and speculations are of prime importance; they stand as a major and provocative contribution to the argument surrounding the use of violence.