This book is concerned with the international regulation of non-state armed groups. Specifically, it examines the possibility of subjecting armed groups to international human rights law obligations. First addressed is the means by which armed groups may be bound by international law. Of particular interest is the de facto control theory and the possibility that international law may be applied in the absence of direct treaty regulation. Application of this theory is dependent upon an armed group's establishment of an independent existence, as demonstrated by the displacement of state authority. This means that armed groups are treated as a vertical authority, thereby maintaining the established hierarchy of international regulation. At issue therefore is not a radical approach to the regulation of non-state actors, but rather a modification of the traditional means of application in response to the reality of the situation. The attribution of international human rights law obligations to armed groups is then addressed in light of potential ratione personae restrictions. International human rights law treaties are interpreted in light of the contemporary international context, on the basis that an international instrument has to be applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation. Armed groups' status as vertical authorities facilitates the vertical application of international human rights law in a manner consistent with both the object and purpose of the law and its foundation in human dignity. Finally, if international human rights law is to be applied to armed groups, its application must be effective in practice. A context-dependent division of responsibility between the territorial state and the armed group is proposed. The respect, protect, fulfil framework is adapted to facilitate the application of human rights obligations in a manner consistent with the control exerted by both the state and the armed group. ''Daragh Murray's book analyses the practical and theoretical difficulties associated with the topic of the international human rights obligations of non-state armed groups by considering the latest developments in this field and suggesting ways forward. His proposals are realistic and carefully argued; this book should be essential reading for anyone grappling with this subject.'' Andrew Clapham, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

Introduction -- International legal personality -- Determining the criteria necessary to satisfy the capacity requirement associated with international legal personality -- Establishing a legal basis for the application of international law to armed groups -- The de facto control theory and the international regulation of armed groups in the absence of directly applicable international treaty law -- The application of international human rights law to armed groups -- The gradated application of international human rights law obligations -- Prosecution, detention, and satisfaction of the right to health by armed groups -- Conclusion

The threats to human rights posed by non-state actors are of increasing concern. Human rights activists increasingly address the activity of multinational corporations, the policies of international organizations such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, and international crimes committed by entities such as armed opposition groups and terrorists. This book presents an approach to human rights that goes beyond the traditional focus on states and outlines the human rights obligations of non-state actors. Furthermore, it addresses some of the ways in which these entities can be held legally accountable for their actions in various jurisdictions. The political debate concerning the appropriateness of expanding human rights scrutiny to non-state actors is discussed and dissected. For some, extending human rights into these spheres trivializes human rights and allows abusive governments to distract us from ongoing violations. For others such an extension is essential if human rights are properly to address the current concerns of women and workers. The main focus of the book, however, is on the legal obligations of non-state actors. The book discusses how developments in the fields of international responsibility and international criminal law have implications for building a framework for the human rights obligations of non-state actors in international law. In turn these international developments have drawn on the changing ways in which human rights are implemented in national law. A selection of national jurisdictions, including the United States, South Africa and the United Kingdom are examined with regard to the application of human rights law to non-state actors. The book's final part includes suggestions with regard to understanding the parameters of the human rights obligations of non-state actors. Key to understanding the legal obligations of non-state actors are concepts such as dignity and democracy. While neither concept can unravel the dilemmas involved in the application of human rights law to non-state actors, a better understanding of the tensions surrounding these concepts can help us to understand what is at stake.

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The number of non-state actors, in the past not accountable for committing international crimes or violating human rights, is proliferating rapidly. Their ways of operating evolve, with some groups being increasingly fragmented and others organizing transnationally or in cyber space. As non-state armed groups are involved in the vast majority of today's armed conflicts and crisis situations, a new and increasingly important question has to be raised as to whether, and at what point, these groups are bound by international law and thereby accountable for their acts. Breaking new ground in addressing international human rights law, international criminal law, and international humanitarian law in one swoop, Rodenh user's text will be essential to academics and practitioners alike.

Today the majority of the armed conflicts around the world are fought between States and armed groups, rather than between States. This changed conflict landscape creates an imperative to clarify the obligations of armed groups under international law. While it is generally accepted that armed groups are bound by international humanitarian law, the question of whether they are also bound by human rights law is controversial. This book brings significant new understanding to the question of whether and when armed groups might be bound by human rights law. Its conclusions will benefit international law academics, legal practitioners, and political scientists and anthropologists working on issues related to rebel governance and civil wars. This book addresses the debate on this topic by employing a theoretical, historical, and comparative analysis that spans international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international human rights law. Embedding these different perspectives in public international law, this book brings several key points of clarification to the legal framework. Firstly, the book draws upon social science literature on armed conflict to present a new viewpoint on the role that human rights law plays vis-à-vis international humanitarian law in non-international armed conflicts. Secondly, the book sheds light on the circumstances in which armed groups acquire obligations under human rights law. It brings illumination to these topics by combining historical and comparative research on belligerency, insurgency, and international humanitarian law with a theoretical analysis of legal personality under international law. In the final part of the book, the author tests the four most utilised theories of how armed groups are bound by human rights law, examining whether armed groups can be bound by virtue of (i) treaty law (ii) control of territory (iii) international criminal law and (iv) customary international law. In the book's conclusions, the author presents final remarks that are designed to provide concrete guidance on how the issue of armed groups and human rights law can be dealt with more thoroughly in practice.

The central question of this pioneer work on the responsibility of non-state actors (NSAs) and the consequences thereof, is: To whom are such actors, in particular armed opposition groups and business corporations, accountable for their actions in armed conflict and in peace times? Does responsibility in international law apply to these NSAs qua groups? While much has been written about NSAs’ rights and participation in the global theatre as well as the responsibility of the state and international organisations for wrongful acts by NSAs, scant attention has been paid to questions of NSA organizational responsibility, in spite of their potential to wreak international havoc. This volume offers innovative insights into this unexplored territory by analyzing responsibility questions from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.