A Little Good In A Big World.Persistence helps us try new things, get better at hard things, and cope when things get difficult. Persistence helps us see things through to the end. There are many ways to be persistent.

A Little Good In A Big World.Honesty is talking to yourself and others truthfully. Honesty brings us closer, keeps us safer and helps people trust us. Honesty is not always easy. Sometimes it's the hardest choice. There are many ways to be honest.

Where did the human species originate, why are tropical peoples much more diverse than those at polar latitudes, and why can only Japanese peoples digest seaweed? In Humankind, U. C. Davis professor Alexander Harcourt answers these questions and more, as he explains how the expansion of the human species around the globe and our interaction with our environment explains much about why humans differ from one region of the world to another, not only biologically, but culturally. What effects have other species had on the distribution of humans around the world, and we, in turn, on their distribution? And how have human populations affected each other’s geography, even existence? For the first time in a single book, Alexander Harcourt brings these topics together to help us understand why we are, what we are, where we are. It turns out that when one looks at humanity's expansion around the world, and in the biological explanations for our geographic diversity, we humans are often just another primate, just another species. Humanity's distribution around the world and the type of organism we are today has been shaped by the same biogeographical forces that shape other species.

Presents a new way of looking at what it means to be human, offering a convincing case that humans are more than immaterial souls or "biological computers".

Drawing from psychology, economics, philosophy, anthropology, and classic works of literature, Landman provides an insightful anatomy of regret--what it is, how you experience it, and how it changes you. At best regret is a dynamic changing process--one can transcend regret and thus transform the self.

New technologies and medicines make it increasingly possible to enhance human functioning in new ways: to become smarter, more emotionally attuned, and perhaps even morally better. But just because we can use the latest science to improve ourselves, should we? This book has two main aims. First, it outlines and criticises the six main contemporary arguments for scepticism about the role of human enhancements in promoting well-being. These arguments concern, respectively, (i) the value of achievements, (ii) freedom, (iii) hyperagency, (iv) human nature, (v) authenticity, and (vi) inequality. It will be shown – for the first time in a book-length treatment – why the overarching bioconservative case against enhancement doesn’t hold water. The second central aim of the book is positive; as we’ll see, each of the bioconservative critiques considered and rejected will be shown to nonetheless motivate a distinctive kind of theoretical desideratum that a viable positive enhancement proposal should satisfy. The remainder of the book then defends a two-part enhancement proposal that will be shown to clearly satisfy the theoretical desiderata that emerged from reflecting on the earlier critique of bioconservativism. The first part of the positive proposal motivates and outlines the general role of an enhancement counsellor in facilitating voluntary enhancement; I then offer an applied case study of this role in the special case of enhancement for the purpose of facilitating romantic and parental relationships. Human Enhancement and Well-Being: A Case for Optimism will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in applied ethics, bioethics, philosophy of technology, philosophy of well-being, and social epistemology.

Human nature is frequently evoked to characterize our species and describe how it differs from others. But how should we understand this concept? What is the nature of a species? Some take our nature to be an essence and argue that because humans lack an essence, they also lack a nature. Others argue for non-essentialist ways of understanding human nature, which usually aim to provide criteria for sorting human traits into one of two bins, the one belonging to our nature and the other outside our nature. This Element argues that both the essentialist and trait bin approaches are misguided. Instead, the author develops a trait cluster account of human nature, which holds that human nature is based on the distribution of our traits over our (actual and possible) life histories. One benefit of this account is that it aligns human nature with the human sciences, rendering the central concern of the human sciences to be the study of human nature. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.