The global financial and economic turmoil of 2008–09 plunged Europe and the United States into their worst economic downturns in 75 years. Many experts feared that developing regions like Latin America, which had experienced many of their own crises in recent decades, would be even worse affected. Instead, Latin America suffered only limited damage. Indeed the region’s GDP is 20 percent higher than its pre-crisis level. José De Gregorio, governor of the Central Bank of Chile from 2007 to 2011, explains Latin America’s success with a perspective that only an insider can have. This book focuses mainly on the seven largest economies of Latin America—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela—which together account for more than 90 percent of regional output. The author argues that strong performance during the crisis resulted from the sound macroeconomic and financial policies that these countries followed beforehand. Their accomplishments allowed them to undertake significant monetary and fiscal expansion in the context of robust financial systems. De Gregorio acknowledges that there was also an element of luck—in terms of improved terms of trade. This is a candid, searching, and dramatic case study of crisis preparation—and crisis management.

Why has the economy of Latin America responded more positively than Asia, Europe or the United States after being hit by the recent global financial crisis? Three years after the worst of the crisis, Latin America's GDP is 25 percent higher than its precrisis level. José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile from 2007 to 2011, tells the story of how Latin America has responded to the crisis with a perspective that only an insider can have. De Gregorio focuses on the seven largest economies of the region, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela (90 percent of the region's output). He argues that Latin America was resilient because of good macroeconomic policies, strong financial systems, and "a bit of luck."

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the 2009 global recession. Most emerging market and developing economies weathered the global recession relatively well, in part by using the sizable fiscal and monetary policy ammunition accumulated during prior years of strong growth. However, their growth prospects have weakened since then, and many now have less policy space. This study provides the first comprehensive stocktaking of the past decade from the perspective of emerging market and developing economies. Many of these economies have now become more vulnerable to economic shocks. The study discusses lessons from the global recession and policy options for these economies to strengthen growth and prepare for the possibility of another global downturn.

This volume documents and explains the remarkable resilience of emerging market nations in East Asia and Latin America when faced with the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Their quick bounceback from the crisis marked a radical departure from the past, such as when the 1982 debt shocks produced a decade-long recession in Latin America or when the Asian financial crisis dramatically slowed those economies in the late 1990s. Why? This volume suggests that these countries' resistance to the initial financial contagion is a tribute to financial-sector reforms undertaken over the past two decades. The rebound itself was a trade-led phenomenon, favoring the countries that had gone the farthest with macroeconomic restructuring and trade reform. Old labels used to describe "neoliberal versus developmentalist" strategies do not accurately capture the foundations of this recovery. These authors argue that policy learning and institutional reforms adopted in response to previous crises prompted policymakers to combine state and market approaches in effectively coping with the global financial crisis. The nations studied include Korea, China, India, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, accompanied by Latin American and Asian regional analyses that bring other emerging markets such as Chile and Peru into the picture. The substantial differences among the nations make their shared success even more remarkable and worthy of investigation. And although 2012 saw slowed growth in some emerging market nations, the authors argue this selective slowing suggests the need for deeper structural reforms in some countries, China and India in particular.

During the 1980s and 1990s, financial sectors were the Achilles heel of economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Since then, these sectors have grown and deepened, becoming more integrated and competitive, with new actors, markets, and instruments springing up and financial inclusion broadening. To crown these achievements, the region s financial systems were left largely unscathed by the global financial crisis of 2008 09. Now that the successes of LAC s macrofinancial stability are widely recognized and tested, it is high time for an in-depth stocktaking of what remains to be done. Financial Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Road Ahead provides both a stocktaking and a forward-looking assessment of the region s financial development. Rather than going into detail about sector-specific issues, the report focuses on the main architectural issues, overall perspectives, and interconnections. The report s value added thus hinges on its holistic view of the development process, its broad coverage of the financial services industry beyond banking, its emphasis on benchmarking, its systemic perspective, and its explicit effort to incorporate the lessons from the recent global financial crisis. Financial Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Road Ahead builds on and complements several overview studies on financial development in both LAC countries and the developing world that were published in the past decade. It will be of interest to policy makers and financial analysts interested in improving the financial sector in the LAC region.

Contents: (1) Recent Developments and Analysis; (2) The Global Financial Crisis and U.S. Interests: Policy; Four Phases of the Global Financial Crisis; (3) New Challenges and Policy in Managing Financial Risk; (4) Origins, Contagion, and Risk; (5) Effects on Emerging Markets: Latin America; Russia and the Financial Crisis; (6) Effects on Europe and The European Response: The ¿European Framework for Action¿; The British Rescue Plan; Collapse of Iceland¿s Banking Sector; (7) Impact on Asia and the Asian Response: Asian Reserves and Their Impact; National Responses; (8) International Policy Issues: Bretton Woods II; G-20 Meetings; The International Monetary Fund; Changes in U.S. Reg¿s. and Regulatory Structure; (9) Legislation.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.