Theories of explanation in the social sciences vacillate between holism and individualism. Wettersten contends that this has been a consequence of theories of rationality which assume that rationality requires coherent theories to be shown to be true. Rejecting these traditional assumptions about rationality Wettersten claims that the traditional explanations of rationality have placed unrealistic demands on both individuals and institutions. Analysing the theories of Weber and Popper, Wettersten shows that Popper made considerable progress in the theory of rationality, but ultimately stayed too close to the ideas of Hayek, he explains how this dilemma leads to difficulties in economics, anthropology, sociology, ethics and political theory, and constructs an alternative theory that rationality is critical problem-solving in institutional contexts. Wettersten contends that 'the critical consideration of theories followed by their improvement' dispenses with the need for justification and sees rationality as a social phenomena with an institutional basis. The main social advantages this view offers is that the degree of rationality individuals achieve may be increased by institutional reform without moralizing and that we can explain how institutions steer events insofar as we understand how they determine the problems which individuals seek to solve. It is argued that the central moral advantage of this view is that rationality is shown to be Spinozistic in the sense that it is natural and furthers morality and peace of mind.

Since Karl Popper‘s fallibilist portrayal of scientific methodology in the 1940s, critical rationalism has developed in many ways, and in many fields. However, some of these developments still leave deep and important possibilities open. One of these is the portrayal of all rational actions as social. This book elucidates the significance of this perspective in regard to psychology, political and social philosophy, the understanding of how scientists can better communicate, and strategies for better living. The importance of the social theory of rationality for psychology arises above all due to the numerous assumptions made in psychological research that rationality is strictly individualist. This is at hand, for example, in its historical portrayal and in important aspects of cognitive psychology. As shown here, these assumptions have damaging consequences for the relationship of rationality with cognitive and social psychology.

This book identifies and explains far-ranging consequences for methodology as a consequence of the observation that all rationality is social, and highlights the need for methodological reforms in publications and interactions among colleagues and research programs. The idea that all rationality is social needs to be part and parcel of all social scientific theories, which means that their content must be changed. Sociology needs to study the impact of social rules, economics must revise assumptions about how individual rationality impacts financial developments, and cognitive psychology must include social dimensions. In addition, there is also a need for moral theories that explain how social standards of behavior can be improved in specific institutional contexts.

In September 2007, more than 100 philosophers came to Prague with the determination to approach Karl Popper’s philosophy as a source of inspiration in many areas of our intellectual endeavor. This volume is a result of that effort. Topics cover Popper’s views on rationality, scientific methodology, the evolution of knowledge and democracy; and since Popper’s philosophy has always had a strong interdisciplinary influence, part of the volume discusses the impact of his ideas in such areas as education, economics, psychology, biology, or ethics. The concept of falsification, the problem of demarcation, the ban on induction, or the role of the empirical basis, along with the provocative parallels between historicism, holism and totalitarianism, have always caused controversies. The aim of this volume is not to smooth them but show them as a challenge. In this time when the traditional role of reason in the Western thought is being undermined, Popper’s non-foundationist model of reason brings the Enlightenment message into a new perspective. Popper believed that the open society was vulnerable, due precisely to its tolerance of otherness. This is a matter of great urgency in the modern world, as cultures based on different values gain prominence. The processes related to the extending of the EU, or the increasing economic globalization also raise questions about openness and democracy. The volume’s aim is to show the vitality of critical rationalism in addressing and responding to the problems of this time and this world.

As a student and disciple of Karl Popper and longtime managing editor of Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Ian C. Jarvie extended the notion of Critical Rationalism to be useful in anthropology, aesthetics, film studies, and various social sciences. In this Festschrift, contributors from a range of interests and disciplines engage with the Popperian legacy and Jarvie’s scholarly and editorial work in Critical Rationalism to contextualize it in the broader, contemporary intellectual landscape. These original essays not only honor Jarvie’s legacy, but expand it to cross the philosophical divide between analytic and continental schools of thought. In so doing, the authors bring the state-of-the-art achievements of Critical Rationalism to the forefront of current academic debates.

Tracing its origins back to 1822 in Whampoa, the Mariners’ Club in Hong Kong was established to meet a specific need for an Anglo-Chinese society defined by that most dubious of activities, seafaring. Its creation was anything but straightforward, and in this can be seen the mutable and often tortuous relations between the various religious bodies, the local population, the transient sailors, the emerging captains of industry, and the growing regulatory reach of the colonial government. The club evolved through many embodiments and witnessed the growth of Hong Kong from a collection of mat-sheds on the foreshore, through colony to its current status. Throughout its turbulent past it has been occasionally marginalized but has always served as an important base for the key actors in the main commercial activity in Hong Kong: seafarers. This is a history of one of the most enduring institutions of Hong Kong, and the first of its kind. Using the Club’s own records as well as a wide range of sources both from within Hong Kong and from the seafaring world at large, this is a comprehensive account of the life of the Missions, the tenancy of the different chaplains, managers, and stewards, the changes in seafaring practices and shipping, and the transformation of Hong Kong itself.

‘Situational Analysis’ represents Karl Popper’s methodological proposal for the social sciences. Although it has been widely studied and interpreted, this book argues that Situational Analysis remains underestimated and undeveloped and, if properly reformulated, could yet become a broad methodological framework that encompasses both the ‘historical’ social sciences and a large section of the ‘theoretical’ social sciences. The first part of this book develops this idea by returning to Popper’s texts. This book calls for both a reformulation of Situational Analysis and a clarification of the status and role of Popper’s ‘Rationality Principle’. This book also develops Situational Analysis by addressing two aspects of the Problem-Situation facing individual actors that are only sketched out in Popper’s work: institutions and expectations. The second part of this book utilizes the reformulated version of Situational Analysis to shed light on the core methodological differences across some of the most widespread approaches in contemporary economics and sociology. In particular, by showing that many of these approaches are variants of the reformulated version of Situational Analysis presented in the first part of this book, this book argues that apparent methodological differences across these approaches may be reinterpreted as differences in the way social scientists reconstruct the Problem-Situation facing individual actors. This book will be vital reading for academic economists, sociologists, philosophers of science, and other social scientists interested in methodology.