Theoretical models predict that countries with unchanged long-run savings preferences will respond to debt relief by running up new debts or by running down assets. And there are some signs that incremental debt relief over the past two decades has fulfilled those predictions. Debt relief is futile for countries with unchanged long-run savings preferences.

Theoretical models predict that countries with unchanged long-run savings preferences will respond to debt relief by running up new debts or by running down assets. And there are some signs that incremental debt relief over the past two decades has fulfilled those predictions. Debt relief is futile for countries with unchanged long-run savings preferences. How did highly indebted poor countries become highly indebted after two decades of debt relief efforts? A set of theoretical models predict that countries with unchanged long-run savings preferences will respond to debt relief with a mixture of asset decumulation and new borrowing. A model also predicts that a high-discount-rate government will choose poor policies and impose its intertemporal preferences on the entire economy. Reviewing the experience of highly indebted poor countries, compared with that of other developing countries, Easterly finds direct and indirect evidence of asset decumulation and new borrowing associated with debt relief. The ratio of the net present value of debt to exports rose strongly over 1979-97 despite the debt relief efforts. Average policies in highly indebted poor countries were generally worse than those in other developing countries, controlling for income. The trend for terms of trade was no different in highly indebted poor countries than in other developing countries, not were wars more likely in highly indebted poor countries. Over time there has been an important shift in financing for highly indebted poor countries, away from private and bilateral nonconcessional sources to the International Development Association and other sources of multilateral concessional financing. But this implicit form of debt relief also failed to reduce debt in net present value terms. Although debt relief is done in the name of the poor, the poor are worse off if debt relief creates incentives to delay reforms needed for growth. This paper - a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the effectiveness of aid for growth.

After a massive international campaign calling attention to the development impact of foreign debt, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative is now underway. But will the HIPC Initiative meet its high expectations? Will debt relief substantially raise growth? How do we make sure that debt relief benefits poor people? And how can we ensure that poor countries do not become highly indebted again? These are some of the key policy issues covered in this rigorous and independent analysis of debt, development, and poverty.

The history of debt relief goes back several decades. It reveals that a country s accumulation of unsustainable debt stems from such factors as deficiencies in macroeconomic management, adverse terms-of-trade shocks, and poor governance. Debt-relief initiatives have provided debt-burdened countries with the opportunity for a fresh start, but whether the benefits of debt relief can be preserved depends on transformations in a country s policies and institutions. In 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was launched as the first comprehensive, multilateral, debt-relief framework for low-income countries. In 2005, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative was established, which increased the level of debt relief provided to HIPCs. As of early 2009, assistance through these two initiatives had been committed to 35 countries and amounted to US$117 billion in nominal terms, or half of the 2007 GDP of these countries. 'Debt Relief and Beyond' assesses the implications of debt relief for low-income countries and how its benefits can be preserved and used to fight poverty. The chapter authors bring unique operational experience to their examination of debt relief, debt sustainability, and debt management. Several key questions are addressed, including, what consequences does debt relief have for poverty-reducing expenditures, growth, and access to finance? Can debt relief guarantee debt sustainability? How can debt management at all levels of government be improved? What lessons can be learned from countries that have experienced debt restructuring? Finally, this book provides sound empirical evidence using current econometric techniques.

International debt relief continues to be a highly controversial subject. Although many heavily indebted poor countries have received large amounts of debt relief over the past quarter of a century, it doesn’t appear to be enough. This book examines the impact of international debt relief efforts since 1990. It assesses whether the various debt relief modalities have enhanced economic growth in eight highly indebted countries in Latin America and Africa. Dijkstra argues that fundamental changes of the international aid and debt architecture are necessary to stop the flow of new multilateral loans and the possible perverse effects of conditionality.