Environmental economics has employed the seminal contribution of Ronald H. Coase (1960) intensively but has remained relatively unaffected by the contributions of perhaps his most influential follower, Oliver E. Williamson. As an initial step in addressing this oversight, we apply the analytical framework of discrete structural alternatives to the choice of policy instruments. Environmental-related transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with categories of policy instruments, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating - mainly transaction costs-economizing - result. Insightful strategic and policy implications are stressed.

Over the last decade, market-based incentives have become the regulatory tool of choice when trying to solve difficult environmental problems. Evidence of their dominance can be seen in recent proposals for addressing global warming (through an emissions trading scheme in the Kyoto Protocol) and for amending the Clean Air Act (to add a new emissions trading systems for smog precursors and mercury--the Bush administration's "Clear Skies" program). They are widely viewed as more efficient than traditional command and control regulation. This collection of essays takes a critical look at this question, and evaluates whether the promises of market-based regulation have been fulfilled. Contributors put forth the ideas that few regulatory instruments are actually purely market-based, or purely prescriptive, and that both approaches can be systematically undermined by insufficiently careful design and by failures of monitoring and enforcement. All in all, the essays recommend future research that no longer pits one kind of approach against the other, but instead examines their interaction and compatibility. This book should appeal to academics in environmental economics and law, along with policymakers in government agencies and advocates in non-governmental organizations.

This paper helps clarify the relation among the many policy instruments that the government uses when transaction costs limit the applicability of the Coase Theorem. This is accomplished by synthesizing results from the environmental economics, new institutional economics, and public economics literatures into a new conceptual framework and taxonomy of environmental policy instruments. Three primary conclusions emerge. First, the taxonomy of policy instruments frequently described in the environmental economics literature needs to be expanded to recognize that the government can operate in either a coersive (regulatory and taxing) mode or an enterprise mode (subsidies, contracts and government production). Second, the typical characterization of coersive policy instruments as command and control versus taxes/marketable allowances is a false dichotomy. Third, choosing the most cost-effective instruments requires expanding the analysis beyond the typical focus on production costs to include implementation costs and public finance costs. This is accomplished by recasting the evaluation criteria that are typically used in comparative analysis of policy instruments as a constrained cost minimization problem. The paper concludes with a set of heuristic principles indicating which factors raise the relative attrativeness of the various instruments. The result demonstrates that in environmental policy instrument choice, one size does not fit all.

Presents original research that explores the extent to which the constraints of law explain economic behavior and the role of economics in forming the law. This title proposes three different definitions for market power from an antitrust perspective. It offers an analysis of efforts exerted and utilities obtained in a double lawsuit.

How to tackle environmental damage from the throwaway society is one of the defining questions of the twenty-first century. By establishing a circular economy, we can encourage and support sustainable production and consumption. These essays by an international group of leading scholars from a range of disciplines analyse policies and legal instruments and challenge mainstream assumptions, from the choice of a policy mix to the actual effect of imposing standards on the market, and from corporate objectives and priorities to the use of precaution in assessing particularly harmful substances. Each chapter contributes to a better understanding of the current policy and regulatory framework in Europe and identifies the challenges and opportunities ahead. The book breaks new ground by examining how product policies can contribute to important objectives and visions, such as the aims of the circular economy. It is a must-read for researchers as well as for policymakers and practitioners.