The Committee was satisfied that Professor Stephen Nickell has the profession competence and personal independence to be reappointed as a member of the Budget Responsibility Committee

The Committee was satisfied that Professor Stephen Nickell has the profession competence and personal independence to be reappointed as a member of the Budget Responsibility Committee

One of the most significant consequences of Co-op Bank's near-collapse, from a public policy perspective, was the collapse of Lloyds Banking Group's planned divestment under Project Verde. Co-op Bank's withdrawal forced Lloyds to resort to its fallback option of an Initial Public Offering. The result is a new bank, TSB, which, not having an existing banking presence of its own, consists solely of the business divested by Lloyds. Accordingly, it has a personal current account market share not of 7 per cent, but of 4.2 per cent. There is a risk that a bank of this size might struggle to grow significantly and to act as a true challenger in the market. Had Co-op Bank's resulting capital shortfall been uncovered earlier, it is likely that the bank would not have progressed so far with Verde. As it was, the rapid and late emergence of the capital problem led to Co-op's withdrawal from the Verde process at a relatively late stage. The Committee recommends that the FRC investigation and the independent inquiry into the events at Co-op Bank consider the role of KPMG and the FSA in relation to the late emergence of loan impairment and IT losses. On the basis of these findings, the independent inquiry into the events at Co-op Bank should also form a view on whether Co-op's Verde bid could or should have been halted sooner. While it may not have been fully transparent from the start that Co-op Bank's bid was doomed to failure, it was beset by problems from an early stage. But it was not these problems that killed the deal-it was the capital shortfall that emerged only late in the day. It is important, from every angle to determine why the capital shortfall was not uncovered earlier.

Appointments to the Budget Responsibility Committee : Fifth report of session 2010-11, Vol. 2: Oral and written Evidence

In this report the Treasury Committee welcomes the Chancellor's commitment to the provision of a statutory veto over the appointment and dismissal of all the members of the Budget Responsibility Committee. It is recommended that the Treasury ensure there is a two month gap for an appointment to the Budget Responsibility Committee, and the proposed starting date for candidates so as to allow adequate time for the Treasury Committee to arrange hearings and consider the candidature properly. It is also recommended that candidates are reminded that application material is submitted to the Treasury Committee on a confidential basis

Volume 2: Oral evidence. Written evidence can be found on the Committee's website at www.parliament.uk/treascom

The Money Advice Service is not currently fit for purpose. The Committee considered whether to recommend that the MAS be scrapped completely but given that the Treasury had already announced its intention to conduct a review of the MAS they granted a stay of execution. They asked the Government to expedite this review and recommended that it should be independent, rather than led by the Treasury. The review must assess whether the MAS should continue to exist and, if so, how it can overcome the serious problems discussed. The current management of the MAS should also explain how they are going to act on the concerns identified. The independent review should seek to answer the following questions: Should the Money Advice Service-or something like it-exist as a statutory organisation? If so, what should the role and strategy of such a body be? Should it be a co-ordinator, commissioner or direct provider of advice? What channels should it use? If not, should the FCA take responsibility for the objectives of the Service? Does the FCA need greater statutory powers to hold the Money Advice Service to account? What are the views of other bodies in this sector about the way in which the Money Advice Service is now engaging with them? To what extent does the work of the Money Advice Service unnecessarily duplicate existing provision? What should the role of the Service be in each of the areas in which it operates? Is the remuneration of the Service's senior staff set at an appropriate level?