House of Lords reform is a large and thorny issue on which it has proved very difficult to get political consensus. This inquiry focused on the incremental changes that could possibly be achieved outside the wider reforms that are doubtless required. Creating the power to remove Peers who have actually broken the law of the land and to remove persistent non-attendees will enjoy widespread support and would indicate that the unelected chamber was not opposed to sensible reform. Establishing a consensus about the principles that should determine the relative numerical strengths of the different party groups in the House of Lords, and for codifying such principles, is probably the most contentious of all the issues considered, but it is also the most crucial to any further progress. The Government and political parties in the Lords need to set out their positions on this matter and to engage in dialogue that will establish a consensus before the next General Election, so that both Houses can act upon an agreed reform

The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee publishes its own draft parliamentary resolution setting out the process that should be followed to consult Parliament on conflict decisions, to serve as an interim step towards putting Parliament's role in war making decisions on a legal footing. The Committee has repeatedly called on Government to make progress on the Foreign Secretary's commitment in 2011 to "enshrine in law for the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action". The key points of the report are as follows: (1) The debate in the House of Commons on 29 August 2013 regarding Syria and the use of chemical weapons highlighted the important role Parliament plays in conflict decisions; (2) The Government needs to make a clear statement of how it intends to honour the Foreign Secretary's commitment of 2011, and give a specific Minister responsibility for making progress on this.; (3) A parliamentary resolution would serve as a useful interim step towards enshrining Parliament's role in law, by embedding the current convention and clarifying some of the ambiguities that exist under current arrangements.

The essential verdict on Britain's first coalition government since the Second World War delivered by an unrivalled team of experts.

This book considers the function of the royal prerogative in the changing landscape of the British constitution. It explains each of the prerogative powers in separate chapters. It clarifies the respective roles of government, Parliament and the courts in defining the extent of prerogative powers, and in regulating their use. It also looks at which powers should be codified in statute, which should be regulated by convention, and which could be left at large. The book is very timely in contributing to current debates. The fevered parliamentary debates over Brexit thrust the prerogative centre-stage. Recent controversies have ranged from the role of Parliament in assenting to treaties, to the prorogation and dissolution of Parliament, to the grant or withholding of royal assent to bills. In their 2019 election manifesto, the Conservative Party stated that 'After Brexit we also need to look at the broader aspects of our constitution, the relationship between the Government, Parliament and the courts; the functioning of the Royal Prerogative...'. The book covers the whole range of prerogative powers, from going to war and ratifying treaties, appointing and dismissing ministers, regulating the civil service and public appointments, to the grant of honours and pardons and the issue of passports. Its 19 chapters provide a comprehensive guide to the operation of the prerogative – past, present, and future – together with suggestions for reform.

This report is part of the Committee's ongoing work on a codified constitution for the UK. It discusses the constitutional role of the judiciary if there were a codified constitution. If the UK were to move towards a codified constitution, one way of addressing the question of what powers the judiciary should have if they held a piece of legislation to be unconstitutional, would be to introduce the concept of a "declaration of unconstitutionality". This could work in the same way as the declaration of incompatibility used under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 for situations in which UK legislation is held to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, if the UK were to adopt a codified constitution, there would be no need for a separate constitutional court. The Supreme Court could adjudicate on constitutional matters. It would be understandable if the judiciary were unwilling to comment on the contents of a codified constitution, but it would be important to find a way of hearing their views on the implications of the proposals once the general structure of the constitution had been agreed. If necessary, some of the discussion could take place under Chatham House rules. Retired members of the judiciary would also be likely to feel freer to offer their opinions than those still serving as judges

Following the passage of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, the date of the next general election has been fixed by statute for 7 May 2015. Greater certainty about the date of the next general election has created a unique opportunity to consider how best this final year can be spent, and the Committee has heard that there is scope both to enhance the quality of public policy debate, and also to better prepare for the next Parliament. Key recommendations are: that this final year be used by the Government, Parliament and political parties to consider some of the long-term issues that will need to be addressed in the next Parliament; arrangements for pre-election contacts between the Civil Service and Opposition be formalised and authorised automatically in the final year of a Parliament, and that the Cabinet Manual should be updated to that effect; that parties work to develop a consensus, before the next general election, on how party policy could most effectively be costed ahead of future general elections - this would improve both policy formation and debate ahead of a general election. Achieving this will require active engagement from the Government, parliamentarians and political parties, and the Committee hopes they will all appreciate the potential for a constructive year ahead of the next general election, and support the recommendations.

Many of the Prime Minister's powers are obscure "prerogative" powers, which are not well understood or defined. More of these prerogative powers should be codified in statute to make them more transparent and increase accountability to Parliament. Government should also consider consolidating the existing Prime Ministerial powers in one place - the way the role has evolved means there is no single and authoritative source of information on the powers. There is widespread agreement that the Prime Minister's role has increased in recent decades-including in policy making. Coalition government has to some extent constrained the powers of the Prime Minister but this might not persist under single-party government. The need for support by a majority of Members of Parliament and the Cabinet acts as a check and balance on the Prime Minister. However, these political mechanisms are not effective on a "day-to-day" basis. The Liaison Committee has the potential to be a very effective mechanism for Parliament to hold the Prime Minster to account, and should continue to improve the way it works. The Government should consider a role for Parliament in the investiture of the Prime Minister, or the Government, after a general election. Some consider that accountability of the Prime Minister would be strengthened by direct election by the public, US style. The Government could also consider the creation of a combined Department for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, with a departmental Select Committee specifically to scrutinise that Department