There is at present around £46 billion of outstanding student loans on the Government's books, and this figure is set to rise dramatically to £200 billion by 2042 (in 2013 prices). By 2042 there will be an estimated 6.5 million borrowers of student loans. At the same time estimates for the amount of loans that will not be repaid are also rising and the Government assumes that 35-40% of outstanding loans will never be repaid. That is some £16 billion to £18 billion on the current debt of £46 billion and £70 billion to £80 billion on the estimated value of student loans by 2042. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (the Department) is not doing enough to secure value for money from its collection arrangements. The Department is unable to accurately forecast student loan repayments, and does not have a sufficient understanding of the likely future cost of non-repayment to the taxpayer. The Student Loans Company is not doing enough to ensure that it identifies and collects all the repayments due, given the substantial size of the financial assets involved, and will need to demonstrate value for money from the proposed sale of the student loans book.

Nearly one fifth of consultant posts in emergency departments were either vacant or filled by locums in 2012. Neither the Department nor NHS England have a clear strategy to tackle the shortage of A&E consultants and there is too much reliance on temporary staff to fill gaps. The Committee raised the possibility of paying consultants more to work at struggling hospitals. Greater use in A&E of consultants from other departments could also be made, or mandate that all trainee consultants spend time in A&E, or make A&E positions more attractive through improved terms and conditions. The slow introduction of round-the-clock consultant cover in hospitals - which will not be in place before the end of 2016-17 - is also having a negative impact. More people die as a result of being admitted at the weekend when fewer consultants are in A&E. Changing this relies on the British Medical Association and NHS Employers negotiating a more flexible consultants' contract, and neither the Department nor NHS England has direct control over the timescale or details of these negotiations. Hospitals, GPs and community health services all have a role to play in reducing emergency admissions - but financial incentives to make this happen are not in place. While hospitals get no money if patients are readmitted within 30 days, there are no financial incentives for community and social care services to reduce emergency admissions. Both the Department of Health and NHS England struggled to explain to us who is ultimately accountable for the efficient delivery of local A&E services

This report summarises the key areas of the Committee's work over the past five years. It draws out the areas where progress has been made and where their successors might wish to press in future. The Committee has assiduously followed the taxpayer's pound wherever it was spent. Since 2010 they held 276 evidence sessions and published 244 unanimous reports to hold government to account for its performance. 88% of their recommendations were accepted by departments. In many cases they successfully secured substantial changes, for example with the once secret tax avoidance industry. They secured consensus from government and from industry that private providers of public services do have a duty of care to the taxpayer, and in pushing the protection of whistleblowers further up the agenda of all government departments. By drawing attention to mistakes in the Department for Transport's procurement of the West Coast Mainline, more recent procurements for Crossrail, Thameslink and Intercity Express have all benefited from more expert advice and a more appropriate level of challenge from senior staff. After discovery in 2012-13 that 63% of calls to government call centres were to higher rate telephone numbers, the Government accepted our recommendation that telephone lines serving vulnerable and low income groups never be charged above the geographic rate and that 03 numbers should be available for all government telephone lines. They also secured a commitment to close large mental health hospitals.

The Department for Communities & Local Government introduced the Help to Buy equity loan scheme in April 2013, with the objectives of increasing demand for new homes, making mortgage finance more accessible and affordable and encouraging developers to build more new homes. Under the Scheme, the Department makes equity loans to buyers financing up to 20% of the purchase price of newly-built properties that cost £600,000 or less, which supplements the buyers' own deposit of, normally, at least 5%. Buyers then raise a repayment mortgage of, typically, 75% of the property's value. The equity loan is interest-free for the first five years, and is paid back within 25 years, or when borrowers redeem their mortgage, for example when they sell their home. The Department initially aimed to spend up to £3.7 billion to help 74,000 households buy a new home by 2015-16. In the 2014 Budget the Government decided to extend the Scheme to March 2020, and was providing an extra £6 billion to support the purchase of a further 120,000 homes. The Scheme is administered by the Homes and Communities Agency, through its network of Help to Buy agents. The Committee has set out a number of recommendations for the Department & Agency, including: (i) Maintain downward pressure on the Scheme's costs; (ii) Follow the guidance in the HM Treasury Green Book, assessing a range of alternative options and presenting this analysis in its business case; (iii) Set out how they will protect the taxpayer and ensure they have the skills and capacity both to monitor and manage the loan portfolios; (iv) Develop a robust methodology to assess the Scheme's impact on both demand for, and supply of, new homes; (v) Assess the Scheme's effectiveness in different local and regional housing markets; (vi) Carry out a wider and integrated evaluation, assessing the combined impact of its major interventions in the housing market.

In this report the Public Accounts Committee examines DCLG and DWP's programmes to help families facing multiple challenges. In 2006, the Government estimated that there were 120,000 families in England facing multiple challenges, such as unemployment and poor housing, crime and antisocial behaviour. The estimated cost to the taxpayer of providing services to support these families is £9 billion a year, of which £8 billion is spent reacting to issues and £1 billion in trying to tackle them. In 2012, DCLG and DWP each introduced separate programmes to help these families. DCLG's Troubled Families programme, with a central government budget of £448 million, aims to 'turn around' all 120,000 families by May 2015. DWP's Families with Multiple Problems programme, with a budget of £200 million, seeks to move 22% of those joining the programme into employment by March 2015. There was no clear rationale for the simultaneous introduction of two separate programmes, which focused on addressing similar issues. The integration of the programmes at the design phase was poor, leading to confusion, and contributing to the low number of referrals to the DWP's programme. But the good practice evident in DCLG's Troubled Families programme, demonstrates how central and local government agencies can work together effectively. Data sharing is critical to identifying the families most in need of the support available. Both departments should publish, alongside details of the programmes' progress against their respective targets, details of the wider benefits and financial savings that they have identified.

Recent high-profile failures demonstrate that the Department for Education and the Education Funding Agency's oversight arrangements for free schools are not yet working effectively. The Department and Agency have set up an approach to oversight which emphasises schools' autonomy, but standards of financial management and governance in some free schools are clearly not up to scratch. The Agency relies on high levels of compliance by schools, yet fewer than half of free schools submitted their required financial returns for 2011-12 to the Agency on time. Whistleblowers played a major role in uncovering recent scandals when problems should have been identified through the Agency's monitoring processes. There is also concern that applications for new free schools are not emerging from areas of greatest forecast need for more and better school places. The Department needs to set out how, and by when, it will encourage applications from areas with a high or severe forecast need for extra schools places, working with local authorities where appropriate. The Department should also be more open about the reasons for making decisions. Capital costs of the free school programme are escalating. The most recent round of approved free schools had a greater proportion of more expensive types, such as secondaries, special and alternative provision, located in more expensive regions such as London, the South East and South West. If this mix of approved free schools continues, there is a risk of costs exceeding available funding.

The National Offender Management Service (the Agency) is responsible for the prison system in England and Wales which holds around 84,000 prisoners. The prison estate consists of some 130 prisons of varying layout, geographical location, age and state of repair. The main factor behind the Agency's estate strategy, of closing small costly prisons and building new accommodation that is cheaper to run, is the need to make recurring savings. Under the strategy, the Agency had by the end of 2013, closed 13 prisons and built two new prisons. The estate strategy's objectives are to reduce resource costs; create durable, good standard accommodation and provide an estate that better meets offenders' needs, allowing more of them to work and be kept closer to their homes. Against these objectives, the Agency has built new, good quality, accommodation to time and within budget; is on track to achieve cost reductions of £70 million a year; and is starting to match better the geographical spread of prisons to the prison population. Key factors behind this good performance are that senior staff in the Agency have experience and knowledge and have remained in post throughout this period of change. However, the performance of the two new prisons, HMP Oakwood and HMP Thameside, has been poor and disappointing since they opened. They do not give sufficient priority to meeting offenders' rehabilitation needs, nor do they provide enough quality purposeful activity for prisoners. The Agency has also closed some prisons that were performing well.