Consolidation via merger both from hospital-to-hospital mergers and from hospital acquisitions of physician groups is changing the competitive landscape of the provision of health care delivery in the United States. This Article undertakes a legal and economic examination of a recent Ninth Circuit case examining the hospital acquisition of a physician group. This Article explores the Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. (St. Luke's) decision -- proposing a type of analysis that the district court and Ninth Circuit should have undertaken and that we hope future courts undertake when analyzing mergers in the health care sector. First, the Article addresses the question of how best to frame the acquisition of a physician group by a hospital -- is the merger horizontal, vertical, or potentially both? In undertaking this analysis the Article examines the broader issue of the treatment of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in antitrust law. ACOs are short of full integration and as such, a potential contractual alternative for hospitals and physician groups to an acquisition. A hospital acquisition of a physician practice also has implications for how to view competitive effects in the context of ACOs. Indeed, in St. Luke's the Ninth Circuit suggests that integration short of full merger was a possible alternative. Second, the Article examines the justification for integration as a way to address countervailing power in health care, the reduction of transaction costs, and potential cost and quality efficiencies. Third, the Article applies the economics of these issues to merger case law generally and specifically to the St. Luke's decision. Ultimately, the Article finds the economic analysis of the Ninth Circuit lacking. Finally, the Article offers policy implications of the decision and concludes with some suggestions to improve health care antitrust analysis in practice for litigated cases to make such analysis better follow economic principles.

The health care industry continues to undergo unprecedented consolidation. Health care providers and payors alike have pursued a wide variety of integrative strategies to achieve efficiencies or other business advantages. The Health Care Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook is designed to educate the practitioner about the antitrust analysis of mergers and acquisitions within the health care industry. Over the past two decades there has been an extraordinary amount of litigation related to challenges of hospital mergers. Each chapter identifies and analyzes important antitrust issues governing such consolidations. Accordingly, the first several chapters are devoted to a detailed treatment of substantive issues peculiar to such mergers: an introduction to hospital merger litigation, describing trends in litigation and the way in which such mergers are analyzed; issues unique to market definition, including product market definition and geographic market definition; the competitive effects of hospital mergers, assessing the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case in a merger challenge and the rebuttal arguments offered by merging parties; a unique rebuttal argument offered by merging hospitals that is treated separately due to its prominent role in hospital merger litigation - the role and significance of efficiencies in determining the competitive merits of such mergers; the potential applicability of the state action doctrine to hospital mergers. In addition to a substantive treatment of hospital mergers, the Handbook also addresses; combinations of health care management organizations (HMOs) and physician practice groups; the analysis used by the enforcement agencies when reviewing mergers of HMOs; antitrust issues posed by physician practice consolidations. The appendix contains a chart summarizing litigated hospital mergers.--