This is a new strategy to deal with the challenges we face from serious and organised crime. It is published to coincide with the launch of the new National Crime Agency (NCA) and reflects changes to the threats faced and the lessons learned from previous work. Organised crime includes drug trafficking, human trafficking, and organised illegal immigration, high value fraud and other financial crimes, counterfeiting, organised acquisitive crime and cyber crime. The aim of the strategy is to substantially reduce the level of serious and organised crime affecting the UK and its interests. The strategy uses the framework developed for our counter-terrorist work and has four components: prosecuting and disrupting people engaged in serious and organised crime (Pursue); preventing people from engaging in this activity (Prevent); increasing protection against serious and organised crime (Protect); and reducing the impact of this criminality where it takes place (Prepare). The strategy lists strategic objectives under each of the four areas of work. Tactical operational objectives (e.g. priority crime groups) will be set by the NCA with law enforcement agency counterparts. Our immediate priority is the work set out under Pursue to prosecute and relentlessly disrupt organised criminals and reduce the threat they pose. Like other threats to our national security, serious and organised crime requires a response across the whole of government, and close collaboration with the public, the private sector and with many other countries

This paper analyses the UK's approach to identifying and managing threats to the national security of the UK, and the implications for these arrangements of a vote for independence. It complements analysis of the UK's approach to defence explored elsewhere in the Scotland analysis series. It is clearly in the UK's interests to be surrounded by secure and resilient neighbouring countries, including - in the event of a yes vote - an independent Scottish state. While the UK endeavours to work with other countries and international organisations to improve security and fight organised crime for everyone's mutual benefit there is something qualitatively different about being influential and intimately connected with the rest of the UK by being a part of it. Issues of national security are of the utmost sensitivity, linked to a country's foreign, security and defence policy posture, and any decisions are closely related to matters of sovereignty and democratic accountability. For this reason, a security union is closely connected to the existence of a political union. The creation of an independent Scottish state would see an end to the current arrangements for ensuring Scotland's security, as Scotland, including Police Scotland, would no longer be part of the UK's national security infrastructure and capabilities. In practical terms this means that the present level of strategic and operational communication and co-ordination that occurs everyday across the UK, with Scotland playing a key role within it - whether concerned with counter-terrorism, fighting serious and organised crime or protecting against cyber threats - would end

Serious organised crime is an area that is evolving rapidly and it is viewed as one of the major threats to the UK in the National Security Strategy (2009, Cm. 7590, ISBN 9780101759021). It is a multi-billion pound global industry: trafficking in drugs and people, fraud and financial crime cost the UK some £30 billion a year. This strategy paper reviews the progress made since the 2004 white paper "One step ahead: a 21st century strategy to defeat organised crime" (Cm. 6167, ISBN 9780101616720) and the establishment of the Serious Organised Crime Agency in 2006. It outlines the extent of the problem; explains the principles underlying the Government's approach; details system improvements to enhance the response to organised crime; addresses the roots of the problem overseas; describes action to strengthen the capabilities of law enforcement agencies. A hostile environment for organised crime will be created, backed by increased powers to target the finances. The importance of support and assistance from business and the public in tackling this type of crime is recognised. The action plan for 2009-2011 is included in the annexes.

Money laundering is a global issue and there is evidence that the services provided by the legal profession may be misused to launder the proceeds of crime. This book explores the experiences of professionals within Top 50 law firms when seeking to comply with the UK’s anti-money laundering (AML) regime. The book draws upon empirical evidence from 40 in-depth interviews with solicitors and compliance personnel from 20 Top 50 law firms. Access to this section of the legal profession is challenging in the context of academic research, and the research provides an account, seldom heard in academic literature, directly from practitioners. The book uses these research findings to explore and discuss the AML compliance issues faced by this section of the profession. It highlights the challenges presented by the legislative architecture of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and considers compliance issues relating to customer due diligence, AML training, the client account and the suspicious activity reporting regime. It also considers participants’ perceptions of the regime, their role within it, and their own assessment of money laundering risk. It concludes by using this evidence to recommend amendments to current AML policy and legislation. This book will be of interest to students and researchers studying Financial Crime Law, Business and Company Law, and White Collar Crime, as well as policy makers in the areas of money laundering, compliance, and corruption.

Government has no overall coherent strategy for confiscation orders and this fundamentally undermines the process for confiscating assets. In 2012-13, 673,000 offenders were convicted of a crime, many of which had a financial element, yet only 6,400 confiscation orders were set. The annual amount of fraud perpetrated by criminals in England and Wales has been estimated by the National Fraud Authority as some £52 billion. On this basis, it has been further estimated that, out of every £100 generated by the criminal economy, £99.65 was kept by the perpetrators. Without the government knowing what constitutes the overall success of its policy, the bodies involved have no way of knowing which criminals or court cases should be prioritized for confiscation activity. Action was not taken early enough in many cases and this, together with out-of-date ICT systems, data errors and poor joint working, hampers the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcing confiscation orders. Throughout the criminal justice system, there is insufficient awareness of the proceeds of crime and its potential impact. Confiscation orders have a low profile within law enforcement agencies, with low awareness of financial legislation outside specialist teams. This results in many cases not being considered for confiscation. Owing to a lack of data and agreed success criteria, it is impossible to make meaningful cost-benefit assessments of the enforcement of different orders. Where confiscation orders are made and not paid, the main sanctions do not work. The Courts and Tribunals Service found that in 2012, only two per cent of offenders paid in full once the sentence was imposed.

Serious and organised crime includes drug trafficking, human trafficking, organised illegal immigration, child sexual exploitation, high value fraud and other financial crime, counterfeiting, organised acquisitive crime and cyber crime. Organised crime costs the United Kingdom at least £24 billion each year. As at December 2013, there are some 36,600 organised criminals in 5,300 groups currently operating in ways that directly affect the UK. The Government's Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (Cm 8715, ISBN 9780101871525) aims to reduce substantially the level of serious and organised crime affecting the UK and its interests. The strategy has four components: prosecuting and disrupting people engaging in serious and organised crime (Pursue); preventing people from engaging in such activity (Prevent); increasing protection against serious and organised crime (Protect); and reducing the impact of such criminality where it takes place (Prepare). The principal objective of the Bill is to ensure that law enforcement agencies have effective legal powers to deal with the threat from serious and organised crime. The Bill will: strengthen the operation of the asset recovery process by closing loopholes in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; better tackle people who actively support, and benefit from, participating in organised crime; create new powers to seize and detain chemical substances suspected of being used as cutting agents for illegal drugs; and amend the Computer Misuse Act 1990 to update the existing offences to cover importing tools for cyber crime (such as data programmes designed for unlawfully accessing a computer system).