This document addresses the concern raised in the Savannah River Site (SRS) Acceptance Criteria (Reference 1, Section 6.a.3) about receiving an item that is over batched by 1.0 kg of fissile materials. This document shows that the occurrence of this is incredible. Some of the Department of Energy Standard 3013 (DOE-STD-3013) requirements are described in Section 2.1. The SRS requirement is discussed in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes the way fissile materials are handled in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility (B332). Based on the material handling discussed in Section 2.3, there are only three errors that could result in a shipping container being over batched. These are: incorrect measurement of the item, selecting the wrong item to package, and packaging two items into a single shipping container. The analysis in Section 3 shows that the first two events are incredible because of the controls that exist at LLNL. The third event is physically impossible. Therefore, it is incredible for an item to be shipped to SRS that is more than 1.0 kg of fissile materials over batched.