Reputed to be one of the most difficult yet rewarding works of philosophical literature, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit has long been in need of an introduction for English readers. Without using jargon or technical terms, Donald Phillip Verene provides that introduction, guiding the reader through Hegel's text as a whole and offering a way to grasp the major insights and sections of Hegel's text without oversimplifying its narrative. A glossary of sixty of Hegel's terms, discussed in both their original German and English equivalents, is included.

Art and the Absolute restores Hegel's aesthetics to a place of central importance in the Hegelian system. In so doing, it brings Hegel into direct relation with the central thrust of contemporary philosophy. The book draws on the astonishing scope and depths of Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics, exploring the multifaceted issue of art and the absolute. Why does Hegel ascribe absoluteness to art? What can such absoluteness mean? How does it relate to religion and philosophy? How does Hegel's view of art illuminate the contemporary absence of the absolute? Art and the Absolute argues that these aesthetic questions are not mere theoretical conundrums for abstract analysis. It argues that Hegel's understanding of art can provide an indispensable hermeneutic relevant to current controversies. Art and the Absolute explores the intricacies of Hegel's aesthetic thought, communicating its contemporary relevance. It shows how for Hegel art illuminates the other areas of significant human experience such as history, religion, politics, literature. Against traditional, closed views, the result is a challenge to re-read Hegel's aesthetic philosophy.

Hegel's doctrines of absolute negativity and 'the Concept' are among his most original contributions to philosophy and they constitute the systematic core of dialectical thought. Brady Bowman explores the interrelations between these doctrines, their implications for Hegel's critical understanding of classical logic and ontology, natural science and mathematics as forms of 'finite cognition', and their role in developing a positive, 'speculative' account of consciousness and its place in nature. As a means to this end, Bowman also re-examines Hegel's relations to Kant and pre-Kantian rationalism, and to key post-Kantian figures such as Jacobi, Fichte and Schelling. His book draws from the breadth of Hegel's writings to affirm a robustly metaphysical reading of the Hegelian project, and will be of great interest to students of Hegel and of German Idealism more generally.

Donald Phillip Verene has advanced a completely new reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. He shows that the philosophic meaning of this work depends as much on Hegel's use of metaphor and image as it does on Hegel's dialectical and discursive descriptions of various stages of consciousness. The focus is on Hegel's concept of recollection (Erinnerung). Consciousness confronts itself with the aim of achieving absolute knowing. This is the first commentary to regard metaphor, irony, and memory as keys to the understanding of Hegel's basic philosophical position.

An argument that what is usually dismissed as the “mystical shell” of Hegel's thought—the concept of absolute knowledge—is actually its most “rational kernel.” This book sets out from a counterintuitive premise: the “mystical shell” of Hegel's system proves to be its most “rational kernel.” Hegel's radicalism is located precisely at the point where his thought seems to regress most. Most current readings try to update Hegel's thought by pruning back his grandiose claims to “absolute knowing.” Comay and Ruda invert this deflationary gesture by inflating what seems to be most trivial: the absolute is grasped only in the minutiae of its most mundane appearances. Reading Hegel without presupposition, without eliminating anything in advance or making any decision about what is essential and what is inessential, what is living and what is dead, they explore his presentation of the absolute to the letter. The Dash is organized around a pair of seemingly innocuous details. Hegel punctuates strangely. He ends the Phenomenology of Spirit with a dash, and he begins the Science of Logic with a dash. This distinctive punctuation reveals an ambiguity at the heart of absolute knowing. The dash combines hesitation and acceleration. Its orientation is simultaneously retrospective and prospective. It both holds back and propels. It severs and connects. It demurs and insists. It interrupts and prolongs. It generates nonsequiturs and produces explanations. It leads in all directions: continuation, deviation, meaningless termination. This challenges every cliché about the Hegelian dialectic as a machine of uninterrupted teleological progress. The dialectical movement is, rather, structured by intermittency, interruption, hesitation, blockage, abruption, and random, unpredictable change—a rhythm that displays all the vicissitudes of the Freudian drive.

wide criticism both from Western and Eastern scholars.

In the Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God, prepared just before his death, Hegel states that the question of proving God can receive its “scientific” treatment in the (Science of) Logic and nowhere else. He also states that Logic, at least his logical system, is the same as that of metaphysics. Here, everything finds its place in relation to everything else. This book presents a total system in the light of which everything, from physics to theology, finds its place and true presentation. It chiefly follows, in textual citation, the later, more concise version (as Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences) of Hegel’s two presentations of this science. The stress has been on showing God’s own thought, or that of the cosmos, with which all mind is as such in unity. Logic and its forms, Hegel claims, is and are “the form of the world”. This ultimate objectivity, therefore, is at once utter subjectivity. The opposition collapses. The method here has been simply to follow the logic’s own development of thought (a development from within which Hegel himself calls its only method), to allow it once more to run its course rather than to merely “comment” on it, as if from a superior standpoint. In this work on Logic specifically, therefore, the intention is not to substitute one religion for another, as so many scholars, such as Charles Taylor, interpret Hegel as doing. Rather, it stakes out the path for specifically theological development as its ecumenical absorption into sophia, into the Idea as “all in all”, into the pure theology or wisdom of the ecumenical “Church”. One stakes this out, not in a “reduction” to philosophy, but in the re-establishment of metaphysics as itself the true theologia, the mind of heaven. What else could philosophy meaningfully be, unless “understanding spiritual things spiritually”, the being led into all truth, perched on the shoulders of those going before?