It could certainly be argued that the way in which Hegel criticizes Newton in the Dissertation, the Philosophy of Nature and the lectures on the History of Philosophy, has done more than anything else to prejudice his own reputation. At first sight, what we seem to have here is little more than the contrast between the tested accomplishments of the founding father of modern science, and the random remarks of a confused and somewhat disgruntled philosopher; and if we are persuaded to concede that it may perhaps be something more than this - between the work of a clearsighted mathematician and experimentalist, and the blind assertions of some sort of Kantian logician, blundering about among the facts of the real world. By and large, it was this clear-cut simplistic view of the matter which prevailed among Hegel's contemporaries, and which persisted until fairly recently. The modification and eventual transformation of it have come about gradually, over the past twenty or twenty-five years. The first full-scale commentary on the Philosophy of Nature was published in 1970, and gave rise to the realization that to some extent at least, the Hegelian criticism was directed against Newtonianism rather than the work of Newton himself, and that it tended to draw its inspiration from developments within the natural sciences, rather than from the exigencies imposed upon Hegel's thinking by a priori categorial relationships.

Hegel is regarded as the pinnacle of German idealism and his work has undergone an enormous revival since 1975. In this book, David Gray Carlson presents a systematic interpretation of Hegel's 'The Science of Logic', a work largely overlooked, through a system of accessible diagrams, identifying and explicating each of Hegel's logical derivations.

Both Hegel's philosophy and psychoanalytic theory have profoundly influenced contemporary thought, but they are traditionally seen to work in separate rather than intersecting universes. This book offers a new interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and brings it into conversation the work of two of the best-known contemporary psychoanalysts, Christopher Bollas and André Green. Hegel and Psychoanalysis centers a consideration of the Phenomenology on the figure of the Unhappy Consciousness and the concept of Force, two areas that are often overlooked by studies which focus on the master/slave dialectic. This book offers reasons for why now, more than ever, we need to recognize how concepts of intersubjectivity, Force, the Third, and binding are essential to an understanding of our modern world. Such concepts can allow for an interrogation of what can be seen as the profoundly false and constructed senses of community and friendship created by social networking sites, and further an idea of a "global community," which thrives at the expense of authentic intersubjective relations.

This volume provides the first sustained treatment of the legal theory of Eduard Gans (1789--1839) and the first translation of Gans's Systems of Roman Civil Law in Outline (1827). Hegel's close personal friend and recognized leader of the Hegelian movement, Gans posthumously edited Hegel's Philosophy of Law and Philosophy of History. As Professor of Law in Berlin, Gans championed legal codification in opposition to Savigny and the Historical School of Jurisprudence. Hoffheimer argues that Gans's legal writings, especially his systematic exposition of Roman Law, combined a brilliant application of Romanist legal scholarship with a creative, original vision of Hegelian methodology. The teacher of Karl Marx and Felix Mendelssohn, Gans promoted a liberal interpretation of Hegel and influenced an important generation of German thinkers.

A two-volume set. Print edition available in cloth only. Awarded the Nicholas Hoare/Renaud-Bray Canadian Philosophical Association Book Prize, 2001 From the Preface: Hegel's Ladder aspires to be . . . a ‘literal commentary’ on Die Phänomenologie des Geistes. . . . It was the conscious goal of my thirty-year struggle with Hegel to write an explanatory commentary on this book; and with its completion I regard my own ‘working’ career as concluded. . . . The prevailing habit of commentators . . . is founded on the general consensus of opinion that whatever else it may be, Hegel’s Phenomenology is not the logical ‘Science’ that he believed it was. This is the received view that I want to overthrow. But if I am right, then an acceptably continuous chain of argument, paragraph by paragraph, ought to be discoverable in the text.

Hegel is, arguably, the most difficult of all philosophers. To find a way into his thought interpreters have usually approached him as though he were developing Kantian and Fichtean themes. This book demonstrates in a systematic way that it makes much more sense to view Hegel's idealism in relation to the metaphysical and epistemological tradition stemming from Aristotle. The book offers an account of Hegel's idealism in light of his interpretation, discussion, assimilation and critique of Aristotle's philosophy. There are explorations of Hegelian and Aristotelian views of system and history; being, metaphysics, logic, and truth; nature and subjectivity; spirit, knowledge, and self-knowledge; ethics and politics. No serious student of Hegel can afford to ignore this major interpretation. It will also be of interest in such fields as political science and the history of ideas.