The declining financial health of many further education colleges has potentially serious consequences for learners and local economies, but the bodies responsible for funding and oversight have been slow to address the problem. Too often, they have taken decisions without understanding the cumulative impact that these decisions have on colleges and their learners. Oversight arrangements are complex, sometimes overlapping, and too focused on intervening when financial problems have already become serious rather than helping to prevent them in the first place. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills and the Department for Education appear to see area-based reviews of post-16 education as a fix-all solution to the current problems, but the reviews do not cover all types of provider and it is not clear how they will deliver a robust and financially sustainable sector.

The General Practice Extraction Service (GPES) is an IT system designed to allow NHS organisations to extract data from all GP practice computer systems in England. This data would be used to monitor quality, plan and pay for health services and help medical research. The National Audit Office conducted an investigation into the service following concerns raised during a financial audit of the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). The investigation found that the project had been delayed and only one customer, NHS England, had so far received data from GPES. Mistakes in the original procurement and contract management contributed to losses of public funds, through asset write-offs and settlements with suppliers. However, the need for the service remains and further public expenditure is needed to improve GPES or replace it. This inquiry will examine the procurement and development of the GPES system, the total expected cost of the GPES programme, which increased from £14 million to £40 million during planning and procurement, and how the capability of GPES can be used to provide a suitable data extraction service in the future.

Survival rates for cancer patients in England have generally been worse than those in other high-income countries in Europe, mainly because patients in England tend to be diagnosed later and have poorer access to treatment. The government set up the Cancer Drugs Fund in 2010 to improve access to cancer drugs that would not otherwise be routinely available on the NHS. In the last five years about 80,000 people received drugs through the Fund. However, the Department of Health and NHS England do not have the data needed to assess the impact of the Fund on patient outcomes, such as extending patients' lives, or to demonstrate whether this is a good use of taxpayers' money. NHS England overspent the Fund's �480 million budget for the two years 2013-14 and 2014-15 by �167 million. The cost of the Fund grew from �175 million in 2012-13 to �416 million in 2014-15, an increase of 138% in two years, but NHS England did not start to take action to control the cost until November 2014. There is agreement that the Fund is not sustainable in its current form and NHS England and the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) are currently consulting on proposals to reform the Fund from April 2016. We expect NHS England, in making changes, to take account of our recommendations and apply the clear lessons from the last five years to ensure that the new Fund is managed better in the future.

In March 2015 HM Treasury agreed to sell its 40% stake in Eurostar for £585.1 million, almost double the valuations produced before the sale by both the government's project team and UBS its financial adviser. While some of this difference may be explained by the successful sale process and favourable market conditions, it is also further evidence of the government and its advisers undervaluing assets. We are also concerned about the seeming over-reliance by government on a small pool of costly advisers for asset sales. For example, UBS, the financial adviser for this transaction, was also involved in the sale of the Royal Mail and High Speed 1 (HS1). Eurostar also agreed, in a separate transaction, to redeem the government's preference share, providing a further £172 million for the taxpayer. The sale of the UK government's entire financial interest in Eurostar therefore generated proceeds of £757.1 million, significantly less than taxpayers' total financial investment in Eurostar which is estimated to have been some £3 billion. In October 2015, some two years later than expected, the Department for Transport published an evaluation of the economic impact and regeneration benefits for HS1. We are concerned that this delay has prevented the evaluation, which shows that the costs of HS1 far outweigh its quantified benefits, from being used to aid the scrutiny of other projects such as High Speed 2. Despite the results of its own evaluation, which it described as "world class", the Department maintains that there are further "wider wider benefits" from HS1 that it cannot yet value which make the investment worthwhile.

A six year investigation by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) has resulted in Google paying a further £130 million to settle its corporation tax liabilities over the last 10 years. This vindicates the previous Committee's concerns in 2012 and 2013 that Google did not appear to be paying the full tax it owed in the UK. However, in the absence of full transparency over the details of this settlement and how it was reached we cannot judge whether it is fair to taxpayers. The sum paid by Google seems disproportionately small when compared with the size of Google's business in the UK, reinforcing our concerns that the rules governing where corporation tax is paid by multinational companies do not produce a fair outcome. Google's stated desire for greater tax simplicity and transparency is at odds with the complex operational structure it has created which appears to be directed at minimising its tax liabilities. Google admits that this structure will not change as a result of this settlement.

Over 4 million people in England have a neurological condition. Services for people with these conditions are not consistently good enough, and there remains wide variation across the country in access, outcomes and patient experience. As well as affecting patients, poor care has implications for the NHS; for example, it costs �70 million to deal with emergency admissions of epilepsy patients and many of these admissions are likely to result from shortcomings in care. Neurological services remain poorly integrated with a lack of joint commissioning of health and social care. Over 40% of people with a neurological condition do not think that local services work well together, and only 12% of people have a written care plan to help coordinate their care. There has been some progress in implementing the recommendations that the previous Committee made in 2012, including the appointment of a national clinical director for adult neurology and some improvements in data. However, these changes have not yet led to demonstrable improvements in services and outcomes for patients. It is clear that neurological conditions are not a priority for the Department of Health and NHS England, and we are concerned that the progress that has been made may not be sustained. We therefore intend to review the position again later in this Parliament.

The last time we discussed rail franchising was in 2012, in the wake of the collapsed competition for the InterCity West Coast franchise. We are encouraged that, since then, the Department for Transport has strengthened its capability to let franchises, but there are still gaps in its ability to then manage the contracts effectively. The Department's increased focus on the passenger experience is also welcome, but it is unclear when passengers themselves will actually see the benefits. Furthermore, the Department has not yet developed the partnerships with operators that are required to support innovation, improve efficiency and improve services for passengers. Successful rail franchising depends on strong interest from the market and effective competition but there are barriers to entry to the UK market and the possibility that current participants in the market may drop out. Any reduction to the current level of competition is a major risk to securing value for money for the taxpayer. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the Department is to manage the complex interdependencies between passenger rail franchises, the infrastructure that train services run on and the introduction of new fleets of trains to the network. Uncertainty about infrastructure work has resulted in delays to franchise competitions and the Department will have to rely on potentially expensive changes to franchises during the life of contracts. The Department's role is to provide a strategic lead for the complex rail system but it has not yet shown that it has embraced this role. It needs to provide a coherent strategic vision and stronger leadership to ensure that the investment decisions it makes now do not result in increased costs in the long term.