Shows that the welfare state makes a fundamental contribution to economic efficiency and should be an important component of a policy for a successful transition.

This is a story of the soft budget constraint. It seeks an answer to a paradox: the prevalence of the soft budget constraint in spite of the tremendous inefficiencies that it gives rise to, and its persistence in spite of reform of the system of which it is an integral part. The story aims at increasing our understanding of why the phenomenon exists. By studying the case of state in Tanzania before, during and after socialism, an explanation of the owned enterprises emergence, persistence and logic of the soft budget constraint is suggested. This introductory chapter presents an argument showing why this story is worth telling. It discusses the research topic and how the problem it presents is attacked. THE SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT The soft budget constraint is today a popular metaphor. Originally it was seen as a characteristic of the socialist system. It refers to the tendency of primarily state-owned enterprises to have their liquidity gaps or losses accommodated by the state, or some other external funding body, and to the resulting expectations of such bail-out. The concept was coined by the Hungarian economist Hmos Kornai. ' He distinguishes between four major forms of external financial assistance that contribute to the soft budget constraint: soft subsidies, soft taxation, soft credit and soft 2 administrative pricing.

Beginning in 1983, the Mexican government implemented one of the most extensive programs of market-oriented reform in the developing world. Downsizing the State examines a key element of this reform program: the privatization of public firms. After providing a broad overview of the growth and decline of public ownership in Mexico, Dag MacLeod analyzes the process of privatization in three key industries - aviation, telecommunications, and railroads. Drawing upon interviews with government officials, business executives, and labor leaders as well data from government archives and corporate documents, MacLeod highlights the difficulties of linking market reforms to improved public welfare. Privatization failed to live up to its promise of raising living standards or decentralizing the economy. Indeed, privatization actually increased the concentration of wealth in Mexico while redirecting the economy toward foreign markets. Downsizing the State is a theoretically innovative account of how actors and institutions may construct capitalist markets so that they actually resemble the asocial ideal of neoclassical economics: facilitating exchange among actors while denying the obligations and commitments that attach to other types of social relations.

Budget report for 1929/31 deals also with the operations of the fiscal year ended June 30, 1928 and the estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929.

Does liberalization necessitate a reduced government role? Is there a residual role of government after socialism and dirigisme? This work provides indepth analysis of issues pertinent to public finance.

As the new Russian state struggles with the transition to a market economy, the need for radical monetary reform becomes increasingly urgent. The choice of reform is crucial, for it will largely determine Russia's future economic performance. In order to break free of the lingering effects of Soviet central planning, the new Russian state needs a stable, convertible currency. Steve H. Hanke, Lars Jonung and Kurt Schuler propose that Russia establishes a currency board which would issue a Russian currency fully convertible with international currency, backed 100 per cent by international bonds. The international community would aid in establishing the currency board by providing the initial reserves. Early supplies of this new Russian currency would be distributed free to Russian citizens. The authors give detailed explanations of how the currency board could be established and how it would work.

Exploring why professional team sport clubs are almost always able to survive despite financial mismanagement, inflated player salaries and persistent deficits, this book provides new evidence on how to explain this phenomenon. It looks at the context in which many clubs operate – the soft budget constraint – and how the clubs in this respect resemble state-owned enterprises in socialist countries or big banks in financial crises.