The dynamic nature of the British operation at Cambrai in 1917, in particular related to the actions of the British CINC Douglas Haig, provides useful insights into the nature of operational leadership for today. This is true in large part because the Cambrai operation came at a time when technology, tactics and strong political pressure came together to exert their combined influence on all levels of war, particularly the operational level. A similar situation exists today. The primary lessons which can be drawn from Haig’s experience as an operational commander at Cambrai include; the need to define and communicate the commander’s intent, an operational commander’s need to avoid involving himself at the tactical level, and the requirement for an operational commander to examine carefully his motives for deciding on a particular course of action.

The dynamic nature of the British operation at Cambrai in 1917, in particular related to the actions of the British CINC Douglas Haig, provides useful insights into the nature of operational leadership for today. This is time in large part because the Cambrai operation came at a time when technology, tactics and strong political pressure came together to exert their combined influence on all levels of war, particularly the operational level. A similar situation exists today. The primary lessons which can be drawn from Haig's experience as an operational commander at Cambrai include; the need to define and communicate the commander's intent, an operational commander's need to avoid involving himself at the tactical level, and the requirement for an operational commander to examine carefully his motives for deciding on a particular course of action.

This book sets out to expose and analyse a major historical fraud. The author's theme is the Western Front in Haig's time - from the Somme to the armistice. Using evidence that the documents from which previous histories have been written are tampered-with and often entirely rewritten versions of the truth - for example, a daily war diary was kept by all units up to GHQ and these were often altered by the Cabinet Office and crucial appendices totally removed. Cabinet war minutes were likewise rewritten, with reference to whole meetings often removed. Records such as Haig's own diary were also tampered with, and Denis Winter even claims to have found documents which the war's official historian thought he had deliberately destroyed in the 1940s.

During the First World War, the British Army's most consistent German opponent was Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. Commanding more than a million men as a General, and then Field Marshal, in the Imperial German Army, he held off the attacks of the British Expeditionary Force under Sir John French and then Sir Douglas Haig for four long years. But Rupprecht was to lose not only the war, but his son and his throne. Haig's Enemy by Jonathan Boff explores the tragic tale of Rupprecht's war--the story of a man caught under the wheels of modern industrial warfare. Providing a fresh viewpoint on the history of the Western Front, Boff draws on extensive research in the German archives to offer a history of the First World War from the other side of the barbed wire. He revises conventional explanations of why the Germans lost with an in-depth analysis of the nature of command, and of the institutional development of the British, French, and German armies as modern warfare was born. Using Rupprecht's own diaries and letters, many of them never before published, Haig's Enemy views the Great War through the eyes of one of Germany's leading generals, shedding new light on many of the controversies of the Western Front. The picture which emerges is far removed from the sterile stalemate of myth. Instead, Boff re-draws the Western Front as a highly dynamic battlespace, both physical and intellectual, where three armies struggled not only to out-fight, but also to out-think, their enemy. The consequences of falling behind in the race to adapt would be more terrible than ever imagined.

The landmark exposé of incompetent leadership on the Western Front - why the British troops were lions led by donkeys On 26 September 1915, twelve British battalions – a strength of almost 10,000 men – were ordered to attack German positions in France. In the three-and-a-half hours of the battle, they sustained 8,246 casualties. The Germans suffered no casualties at all. Why did the British Army fail so spectacularly? What can be said of the leadership of generals? And most importantly, could it have all been prevented? In The Donkeys, eminent military historian Alan Clark scrutinises the major battles of that fateful year and casts a steady and revealing light on those in High Command - French, Rawlinson, Watson and Haig among them - whose orders resulted in the virtual destruction of the old professional British Army. Clark paints a vivid and convincing picture of how brave soldiers, the lions, were essentially sent to their deaths by incompetent and indifferent officers – the donkeys. ‘An eloquent and painful book... Clark leaves the impression that vanity and stupidity were the main ingredients of the massacres of 1915. He writes searingly and unforgettably’ Evening Standard

Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.