This book demonstrates that geohistory is a more effective concept than geopolitics in understanding inter-state relations, at a time of considerable confusion in world affairs, and that Francesco Guicciardini’s thoughts are an efficient medium to demonstrate not only the inadequacies of geopolitics, but that a geohistorical approach can be a more responsible way of understanding international affairs. The book introduces a fresh approach, based on the individual, on which corporate characteristics and behaviour depend, often in the shape of state interests, which are unable on their own to predict actions driven by human behaviour. The book shows how show mainstream international relations theories are stuck in paradigms, inadequate in explaining why world politics is moving in a direction that nobody could predict even a decade ago. It shows how ideology can blur clear understanding. In short, it represents a new and intellectually refreshing approach and method in understanding, and tackling, the vagaries of relations between states.

Geopolitics, both in name, and in its application via geostrategy, is a controversial area of international relations. Although the practice of obtaining resources is as old as Mankind, the word came into its own with the imperial policies of the great powers in the nineteenth century, was used to justify world wars, went into decline, but was ‘taken to America’ and then re-exported to Europe after the last war by the likes of Henry Kissinger. Nowadays, the term is used unconsciously by politicians obsessed with power, often to justify war. This book tears apart the simplistic thinking of geopolitics, and proposes its replacement with the authors’ own method of ‘geohistory’, a method based on recognising that at the base of any analysis and evaluation of the international situation lie human characteristics.

In the troubled island of Cyprus, the national interests and rivalries of Greece and Turkey still collide, the population remains divided between the Greek and Turkish communities and the country is still a cat's paw of outside powers - especially the USA and the now resurgent Russia - as it has been since the acquisition of the island by Britain in 1878. Global rivalry between the great powers and Cyprus's vitally strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean - a 'listening post' in the Cold War and even today - has meant that the populations have never been free to shape their own destinies which have been constantly influenced by great power interests. These are problems that have been brought into sharp focus by Cyprus's entry into the European Union. William Mallinson's book is a fast-moving and incisive narrative history which portrays Cyprus as a continuing source of international tension in the Mediterranean and beyond. It features the latest source material from the recently released National Archive, vivid interviews with key players, even reports which raise awkward and embarrassing questions. His critical eye uncovers the underlying story of American and British involvement in the island's affairs, first as a key territory in Cold War politics with its close proximity to the Middle East and Asia and now as a key asset in the 'war on terror'. Mallinson's new insights and revelations on the period leading up to and following the Turkish invasion in 1974, when Greece and Turkey - both NATO members - were on the brink of war are fascinating and make essential reading. Henry Kissinger is seen to be even more the master puppeteer, pressuring Britain not to give up her bases. Mallinson examines how after the Turkish invasion Kissinger planned the abortive Annan Plan to divide the island and how he regarded the retention of Cyprus as vital for a future solution of the Arab-Israeli problem. For Kissinger Cyprus was the important square on the 'world chequer-board' while British influence continued to decline and her independence in foreign policy was virtually non-existent. Mallinson also explores how Turkey's drive to join the EU will affect not only stability in Cyprus but also the whole region, as Russia's influence in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean expands. So, in William Mallinson's words, 'Cyprus lies [still] at the epicentre of this whole geopolitical merry-go-round'.

A Comparative History of Literatures in the Iberian Peninsula is the second comparative history of a new subseries with a regional focus, published by the Coordinating Committee of the International Comparative Literature Association. As its predecessor for East-Central Europe, this two-volume history distances itself from traditional histories built around periods and movements, and explores, from a comparative viewpoint, a space considered to be a powerful symbol of inter-literary relations. Both the geographical pertinence and its symbolic condition are obviously discussed, when not even contested. Written by an international team of researchers who are specialists in the field, this history is the first attempt at applying a comparative approach to the plurilingual and multicultural literatures in the Iberian Peninsula. The aim of comprehensiveness is abandoned in favor of a diverse and extensive array of key issues for a comparative agenda. A Comparative History of Literatures in the Iberian Peninsula undermines the primacy claimed for national and linguistic boundaries, and provides a geo-cultural account of literary inter-systems which cannot otherwise be explained.

Can Henry Kissinger be described as a serious statesman who altered the course of relations between states? Or was he a shallow impersonator of those whom he admired, and a geopolitical engineer who treated people as collateral fodder, reducing morality to the status of a strategic and tactical tool? Using the story of Kissinger’s behaviour over Cyprus, backed up by recently revealed government documents, many critical, William Mallinson, former diplomat and leading authority on Cyprus’ history, provides an incisive analysis and evaluation of Kissinger’s approach, revealing a man who appears to have considered political strategy more important than law and ethics.

Until the mid-twentieth century, the Dutch, with their overseas empire, had managed to stay aloof from the machinations of intra-European fighting. However, the beginning of the Cold War found them persuaded by Britain and the US to break with their independent past, and fit into the emerging Western security system. William Mallinson here considers how major post-war developments in Europe affected Dutch foreign policy, traditionally one of abstentionism, and studies the extent of Dutch influence in post-war Western co-operation. Important landmarks, including the Marshall Plan, Brussels Treaty Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Council of Europe, Schuman Plan and Pleven Plan, so vital to an understanding of contemporary international relations, are all treated incisively. The book sheds light on defence, foreign and economic policy, treating European developments from a previously neglected angle. In so doing, it provides vital insights into the history of European recovery after World War II and into the development of a postwar international order.