This book addresses one main question: whether the United States has a cohesive foreign policy for Africa. In assessing the history of the United States and its interactions with the continent, particularly with the Horn of Africa, the author casts doubt on whether successive US administrations had a cohesive foreign policy for Africa. The volume examines the historical interactions between the US and the continent, evaluates the US involvement in Africa through foreign policy lenses, and compares foreign policy preferences and strategies of other European, EU and BRIC countries towards Africa.

In this book Peter Schraeder offers the first comprehensive theoretical analysis of US foreign policy toward Africa in the postwar era. He argues that though we often assume that US policymakers 'speak with one voice', Washington's foreign policy is, however, derived from numerous centres of power which each have the ability to pull policy in different directions. The book describes the evolution of policy at three levels: Presidents and their close advisors; the bureaucracies of the executive branch; and Congress and African affairs interest groups. Most importantly, the evidence presented demonstrates that the nature of events in Africa has itself affected the operation of the US policymaking process, and the substance of US policy. Drawing on over 100 interviews, and detailed case studies in Zaire, Ethiopia-Somalia and South Africa, this book provides a unique analysis of the historical evolution of US foreign policy towards Africa from the 1940s to the 1990s.

This book explores foreign policy developments in post-colonial Africa. A continental foreign policy is a tenuous proposition, yet new African states emerged out of armed resistance and advocacy from regional allies such as the Bandung Conference and the League of Arab States. Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan African country to gain independence in 1957. Fourteen more countries gained independence in 1960 alone, and by May 1963, when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed, 30 countries were independent. An early OAU committee was the African Liberation Committee (ALC), tasked to work in the Frontline States (FLS) to support independence in Southern Africa. Pan-Africanists, in alliance with Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia groups, approached continental unity differently, and regionalism continued to be a major feature. Africa’s challenges were often magnified by the capitalist-democratic versus communist-socialist bloc rivalry, but through Africa’s use and leveraging of IGOs – the UN, UNDP, UNECA, GATT, NIEO and others – to advance development, the formation of the African Economic Community, OAU’s evolution into the AU and other alliances belied collective actions, even as Africa implemented decisions that required cooperation: uti possidetis (maintaining colonial borders), containing secession, intra- and inter-state conflicts, rebellions and building RECs and a united Africa as envisioned by Pan Africanists worked better collectively.

Many foreign policy analysts assume that elite policymakers in liberal democracies consistently ignore humanitarian norms when these norms interfere with commercial and strategic interests. Today's endorsement by Western governments of repressive regimes in countries from Kazakhstan to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the name of fighting terror only reinforces this opinion. In Just Politics, C. William Walldorf Jr. challenges this conventional wisdom, arguing that human rights concerns have often led democratic great powers to sever vital strategic partnerships even when it has not been in their interest to do so.Walldorf sets out his case in detailed studies of British alliance relationships with the Ottoman Empire and Portugal in the nineteenth century and of U.S. partnerships with numerous countries—ranging from South Africa, Turkey, Greece and El Salvador to Nicaragua, Chile, and Argentina—during the Cold War. He finds that illiberal behavior by partner states, varying degrees of pressure by nonstate actors, and legislative activism account for the decisions by democracies to terminate strategic partnerships for human rights reasons.To demonstrate the central influence of humanitarian considerations and domestic politics in the most vital of strategic moments of great-power foreign policy, Walldorf argues that Western governments can and must integrate human rights into their foreign policies. Failure to take humanitarian concerns into account, he contends, will only damage their long-term strategic objectives.