By virtue of its geographical and historical position, postwar Austria was condemned to a prominent role in the plans of both the East and the West. In this account of an unusual episode in the Cold War, Audrey Kurth Cronin examines the negotiations over Austria and the Soviet Union's sudden and surprising decision to withdraw its troops and accept the country as a neutral Western state, after having rejected any settlement for eight years. Drawing on a wealth of recently declassified British and American documents and on interviews with key Austrian participants, Cronin analyzes the events leading up to the 1955 Austrian State Treaty and, in the process, strengthens our understanding of current East-West relations. Her account of the creation of a neutral state in the heart of a divided Europe will be important reading for all who are concerned with security affairs, international relations, and the history of the Cold War.

The year 1995 marks two decisive anniversaries in the history of modern Austria: 50 years since the ending of the German occupation and 40 years since the signing of the State Treaty and the ending of the Allied occupation. This book will focus on the first ten years of post-war Austria at a time when this period is under critical and popular scrutiny. 'This is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the critical first ten years of Austria's postwar history . . . readable, well documented and informative . . .There is much food for thought; some of it may even cause indigestion in Austria if, as one hopes, the book finds a wide readership there.' (Forum for Modern Language Studies)

"A superb book.…Mearsheimer has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the behavior of great powers."—Barry R. Posen, The National Interest The updated edition of this classic treatise on the behavior of great powers takes a penetrating look at the question likely to dominate international relations in the twenty-first century: Can China rise peacefully? In clear, eloquent prose, John Mearsheimer explains why the answer is no: a rising China will seek to dominate Asia, while the United States, determined to remain the world's sole regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to prevent that from happening. The tragedy of great power politics is inescapable.

His stature enabled him to play an active part in the promotion of the Arab-Israeli dialogue and pave the way for President Jimmy Carter's mediation of the Israeli-Egypt peace accord through his close relationship with Sadat. As a result of such activity, Kreisky was respected and praised by every U.S. administration from Kennedy to Reagan, and was on excellent terms with Khrushchev and Brezhnev, despite his support for the containment of Soviet communism."--BOOK JACKET.

At the height of the first Cold War in the early 1950s, the Western powers worried that occupied Austria might become 'Europe's Korea' and feared a Communist takeover. The Soviets exploited their occupation zone for maximum reparations. American economic aid guaranteed Austria's survival and economic reconstruction. Their military assistance turned Austria into a 'secret ally' of the West. Austrian diplomacy played a vital role in securing the Austrian treaty in bilateral negotiations with Stalin's successors in the Kremlin demonstrating the leverage of the weak in the Cold War.

Few would contest that the U.S. occupation of Iraq is a clear example of just how fraught a military occupation can become. In Occupational Hazards, David M. Edelstein elucidates the occasional successes of military occupations and their more frequent failures. Edelstein has identified twenty-six cases since 1815 in which an outside power seized control of a territory where the occupying party had no long-term claim on sovereignty. In a book that has implications for present-day policy, he draws evidence from such historical cases as well as from four current occupations—Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq—where the outcome is not yet known. Occupation is difficult, in Edelstein's view, because ambitious goals require considerable time and resources, yet both the occupied population and the occupying power want occupation to end quickly and inexpensively; in drawn-out occupations, impatience grows and resources dwindle. This combination sabotages the occupying power's ability to accomplish two tasks: convince an occupied population to suppress its nationalist desires and sustain its own commitment to the occupation. Structural conditions and strategic choices play crucial roles in the success or failure of an occupation. In describing those factors, Edelstein prescribes a course of action for the future.