DigiCat Publishing presents to you this special edition of "Grandeur and Misery of Victory" by Georges Clemenceau. DigiCat Publishing considers every written word to be a legacy of humankind. Every DigiCat book has been carefully reproduced for republishing in a new modern format. The books are available in print, as well as ebooks. DigiCat hopes you will treat this work with the acknowledgment and passion it deserves as a classic of world literature.

First published in 1996. The First World War was the single most important event of the twentieth century. This volume concentrates on non-U.S. aspects of the conflict. Organized alphabetically, its more than 600 detailed entries offer information and insight on such subjects as the causes of the conflict, major battles and campaigns, weapons systems (including military aviation, chemical warfare, the submarine, and the tank), and the terms of the peace. Some 350 biographies provide information on the roles played in the conflict by generals, admirals, and civilian leaders. There are also biographies of individuals who were shaped by the war, such as Charles De Gaulle, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Joseph Stalin; essays on each of the countries involved in the conflict; new appraisals of such subjects as military medicine and artillery tactics; and essays on such diverse subjects as art, literature, and music in the war. Each entry has references for additional reading, and a subject index provides easy access. The volume is an excellent reference source for scholar and neophyte alike.

"...an immense and highly impressive work of historical/political scholarship. [An] admirably detailed yet still eminently readable account of the lives of three of the twentieth century's most influential politicians..." —Manhattan Book Review "...impressively researched, with...fresh insights that will appeal to even seasoned diplomatic historians. Readers will be introduced to myriad rich details about the lives of the early-20th-century's most important world leaders." —Kirkus The three men who met in Paris for the most consequential summit conference of the twentieth century were very different men: Georges Clemenceau, 77, “The Tiger” who had spent five decades fighting for the ideals of the French Republic; David Lloyd George, who grew up in poverty in rural Wales, had entered the House of Commons at twenty-seven, had stood alone in his opposition to the South African War, and who rose to become prime minister and become the face of Britain’s defiance to the kaiser; and Woodrow Wilson, the lifelong academic who went from president of Princeton University to the president of the United States in the span of two years. They were, in many ways, much alike: They were three of the most brilliant men of their age. Each had the ability to charm and sway an audience, whether in the House of Commons, the French Chamber of Deputies or in a Princeton classroom. Yet, the document they produced, the Treaty of Versailles, was the “Carthaginian” peace that sowed the seeds of the Second World War. How did these brilliant men—who knew better—let it happen? For the first time, Robert F. Klueger traces their tumultuous histories until they reach Paris in 1919, Wilson determined to remake international law based upon the ideals of his Fourteen Points, Clemenceau every bit as determined to make France secure against another German invasion, and Lloyd George, leading a coalition government and a people determined to “make Germany pay,” until, at the very last, he tried and failed to reverse what he saw would be a tragic result.

Condemned to Repeat It addresses six historical myths that underwrote U.S. containment policy during the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet empire seemed to confirm the wisdom of U.S. containment policy and these lessons of history as universal truths that still influence U.S. foreign policy thinking today. A European states system based on realism, balance-of-power, raison d'etat, and great power diplomacy did not keep a "long peace" from 1815 to 1914. The punitive Versailles Treaty with Germany did not cause the rise of Adolf Hitler and World War II. Erroneous analogies to Neville Chamberlain's failed attempt to avert war at Munich in 1938 worked its way into virtually every debate on the use of force to stop communist aggression during the Cold War. Franklin Roosevelt did not "give away" Eastern Europe to Stalin at the Yalta Conference in 1945. The conventional version of Yalta as a deal to divide Europe is fictional. U.S. containment policy did not create a stable bipolar world and, like the nineteenth-century balance-of power system, preserve another "long peace" for forty-five years after World War II. Ronald Reagan's military build-up and ideological crusade against the Soviet Union did not cause the fall of communism in 1989. Mikhail Gorbachev gave up the Soviet Empire. The Reagan "victory school" version of the end of the Cold War has given American leaders the dubious belief that the United States alone possesses the power to create a liberal democratic, free market world order. Condemned to Repeat It appeals to anyone with an interest in the legacy of the Cold War, including undergraduate students.

As historian Gordon Craig has observed, "Americans are deeply ambivalent about history, choosing instead to follow the imperative of moral absolutes; they are uncomfortable with the idea of national interest as a guiding principle of policy, preferring motivations that are nobler." What does the national interest require? What does morality command? These issues bedevil us in Bosnia and Rwanda today as they did yesterday in the Persian Gulf and in Somalia. Such questions were fully played out in the era that led up to the dominant event of our century, the Second World War. The Avoidable War details how the war, its destruction, and its consequences could have been avoided. This original interpretation of history also provides insights into ways of preserving peace that can guide contemporary diplomacy. J. Kenneth Brody describes an incomparable galley of characters: a chief villain, Hitler; a thoughtful, conflicted, and human Mussolini; a fatuous Ramsey MacDonald; an uncharacteristically silent William Churchill; a smaller than life Stanley Baldwin. Above all, he rescues from undeserved obscurity the noble and inspiring figure of Lord Robert Cecil providing a thorough, controversial reappraisal and sympathetic portrait of Pierre Laval, his policy, and his character. Brody is the first to tell the story of the Peace Ballot, the first modern public opinion poll, created by Cecil in 1935. In this privately organized referendum on issues of war and peace, the British voted overwhelmingly in support of disarmament and morality rather than the national interest. Unfortunately its results helped bring on the war they worked so hard to avoid as, instructed by the Peace Ballot, the British met brute force with arms limitations proposals, the love of peace, and exalted ideals. Under cover of those ideals they betrayed a trusting ally, France. In doing so, they reaped a whirlwind of wartime consequences. The first of a two-volume series sheds new and original light on the origins of the Second World War. It is a study of both modern British history and a period of French history usually consigned to darkness. It also explores the role of morality in policymaking. This is a very human story of the passionate devotion to peace and justice of the proponents of the Peace Ballot and their supporters, and of the paradoxical and perverse result they achieved.

Leffler argues that American officials did not disregard European developments after World War I but, rather, they sought to settle the war debt and reparations controversies, to stabilize European currencies, and to revive European markets. Leffler bridges the gap between revisionist and traditionalist studies by integrating the diverse aspects of foreign policy and elucidates many new aspects of the foreign policymaking process in the postwar period. Originally published in 1979. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

In Wilsonianism , American foreign relations specialist Lloyd E. Ambrosius has compiled his published and unpublished essays on Woodrow Wilson's liberal ideology and statecraft during and after World War I. Although the president failed in his pursuit of a new world order, his legacy of Wilsonianism - the principles of national self-determination, economic globalization, collective security, and progressive historicism - continued to shape U.S. foreign relations throughout the American Century. Ambrosius examines the American roots of Wilson's liberal internationalism, the dilemmas and contradictions in his principles, and the problematic consequences of U.S. efforts to implement Wilsonian ideals without fully appreciating the world's cultural pluralism as well as its economic and political interdependence. Offering a pluralist variant of the realist tradition in international relations, Ambrosius stresses the centrality of power; but maintains that culture and political economy as well as military strength determine the balance of power within and among nations or empires. Consequently, he concludes, making the world safe for democracy has been more problematic in practice, both at home and abroad, than proclaiming Wilsonian principles in the abstract.