In 1966, a soft-spoken 32-year old man emerged from relative obscurity and humble background to become Nigeria's Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. His name was Lt Col (later General)Yakubu Gowon. He emerged as the compromise candidate following the political crisis that engulfed the country after the July 1966 military coup that had led to the assassination of the country's first military Head of State, General Aguiyi Ironsi. At the end of the Civil War in 1970, General Gowon's doctrine of 'No Victor No Vanquished' greatly endeared him to many, and he was variously dubbed 'Abraham Lincoln of Nigeria', 'a soft spoken but dynamic leader' 'a real gentleman' and 'an almost faultless administrator'. However, after he was overthrown in a military coup in July 1975, long knives were drawn out for him, with the hitherto friendly press and public crying 'crucify him', and now variously vilifying him as 'weak' and of managing a purposeless administration that had led to the 'drifting' of the nation. In this book Professor J. Isawa Elaigwu attempts a scholarly political biography of someone he believes has rendered great serA-vices to the Nigerian nation despite his weaknesses as a leader. He rejects the notion that Gowon's nine years in office were 'nine years of failure' as the General's ardent critics posit, arguing that if it is possible to identify a number of thresholds in his administration, it is also possible to identify the approxiA-mate point in time when the strains of his administration became visible to observers and the public in general. He poses and methodically seeks answers to a number of fundamental questions: Who was Yakubu Gowon? Why and how was the reservoir of goodwill and credibility which he had accumulated by the end of the Civil War expended? What image of Nigeria did he have when he came into power? And did he ever achieve his objectives? The book, first published in 1986, has been revised and expanded for this edition

An insider traces the details of hope and ambition gone wrong in the ?Giant of Africa, ? Nigeria, Africa's most populous country. When it gained independence from Britain in 1960, hopes were high that, with mineral wealth and over 140 million people, the most educated workforce in Africa, Nigeria would become Africa's first superpower and a stabilizing democratic influence in the region.

Yakuba Gowon was born in 1934 and became Head of State in Nigeria in 1966. After successfully commanding the armed forces of the Federal Government during the Civil War 1967-70, he guided the reconstruction of the country for a further five years. He was deposed in a coup in 1975. First Published in 1987. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

International media coverage in the 1960s and early 1970s represented the Biafran War, in which the state of Biafra attempted to secede from the Nigerian Federation, as a grand humanitarian disaster, characterised by sustained conflict, starvation and genocide. Using interviews and newly-released archival material, Michael Gould questions this depiction, examining the role of foreign parties in the conflict and the impact of propaganda upon its international reception both during and after the war. Envisaged initially by both sides as a short conflict, the war confounded all expectations, stretching on for four years. It was a 'brother's war', one which divided families, and was characterised overwhelmingly by both sides' reluctance to enter into hostilities. This book seeks to answer some of the most fundamental questions surrounding the conflict, including how this avoidable conflict came about, why the war became so drawn-out and how the leadership of the opposing Generals Ojukwu, who led the Biafran revolt and Gowon, who was President of the Nigerian Federation, defined the conflict. In the process, Gould offers a radical reappraisal of the many entrenched conceptions which currently surround the conflict. This book will be essential reading for all students of African history and politics, and post-colonial studies.

This book's insight on media practice shakes conventional notions of the role and enabling environment of the modern press. It rattles the academic tradition by illustrating that Nigeria's hard-hitting press has not only thrived better under military rule, but that it welcomed and supported military rule. By questioning conventional wisdom and mental habits, Romancing the Gun unveils the power and irresponsibility of the Nigerian press, Africa's - and one of the world's - freest presses, and provides crucial pieces in the puzzle of global media practice.