Why do some voters split their ballots, selecting a Republican for one office and a Democrat for another? Why do voters often choose one party to control the White House while the other controls the Congress? Barry Burden and David Kimball address these fundamental puzzles of American elections by explaining the causes of divided government and debunking the myth that voters prefer the division of power over one-party control. Why Americans Split Their Tickets links recent declines in ticket-splitting to sharpening policy differences between parties and demonstrates why candidates' ideological positions still matter in American elections. "Burden and Kimball have given us the most careful and thorough analysis of split-ticket voting yet. It won't settle all of the arguments about the origins of ticket splitting and divided government, but these arguments will now be much better informed. Why Americans Split Their Tickets is essential reading for anyone interested in understanding the major trends in U.S. electoral politics of the past several decades." -Gary Jacobson, University of California, San Diego "When voters split their tickets or produce divided government, it is common to attribute the outcome as a strategic verdict or a demand for partisan balance. Burden and Kimball strongly challenge such claims. With a thorough and deft use of statistics, they portray ticket-splitting as a by-product of the separate circumstances that drive the outcomes of the different electoral contests. This will be the book to be reckoned with on the matter of ticket splitting." -Robert Erikson, Columbia University "[Burden and Kimball] offset the expansive statistical analysis by delving into the historical circumstances and results of recent campaigns and elections. ... [They] make a scholarly and informative contribution to the understanding of the voting habits of the American electorate-and the resulting composition of American government." -Shant Mesrobian, NationalJournal.com

DIVA marriage of behavioral and formal theory to explain the electoral strategies of political parties /div

Competition law is designed to promote a consumer-friendly economy, but for the law to work in practice, competition agencies - and the courts who oversee them - must enforce it effectively and impartially. Today, however, the rule of populist governments is challenging the foundations of competition law in unprecedented ways. In this comprehensive work, Maciej Bernatt analyses these challenges and describes how populist governments have influenced national and regional (EU) competition law systems. Using empirical findings from Poland and Hungary, Bernatt proposes a new theoretical framework that will allow the illiberal influence of populism on competition law systems to be better measured and understood. Populism and Antitrust will be of interest not only to antitrust and constitutional law scholars, but also to those concerned about the future of liberal democracy and free markets.

Competitive Interests does more than simply challenge the long-held belief that a small set of interests control large domains of the public policy making landscape. It shows how the explosion in the sheer number of new groups, and the broad range of ideological demands they advocate, have created a form of group politics emphasizing compromise as much as conflict. Thomas T. Holyoke offers a model of strategic lobbying that shows why some group lobbyists feel compelled to fight stronger, wealthier groups even when they know they will lose. Holyoke interviewed 83 lobbyists who have been advocates on several contentious issues, including Arctic oil drilling, environmental conservation, regulating genetically modified foods, money laundering, and bankruptcy reform. He offers answers about what kinds of policies are more likely to lead to intense competition and what kinds of interest groups have an advantage in protracted conflicts. He also discusses the negative consequences of group competition, such as legislative gridlock, and discusses what lawmakers can do to steer interest groups toward compromise. The book concludes with an exploration of greater group competition, conflict, and compromise and what consequences this could have for policymaking in a representation-based political system.

The relationship between the government and the market lies at the heart of Economics as a discipline. This title approaches this issue with a new lens termed mezzoeconomics—A branch of modern economics that mainly studies regional economic entities and the allocation of regional resources after they are generated. Combining mezzoeconomic theory with practice in the light of China’s Reform and Opening-up, the author analyzes the regional governments’ participation in market competition, the dual entities (enterprises and regional governments) of market competition, and a mature market economy featuring a strong form of effective government and efficient market. Three corresponding theories are proposed—the Regional Government Competition Theory, the Dual-Entity of Market Competition Theory (DEMC), and the “Double Strong Forms” Theory. The author hopes that these theories of mezzoeconomics can build a new, effective theoretical model and serve as a guidance for regional governments to reform and innovate their governance philosophy and policies. This book will be of keen interest to students and scholars of economics and regional governance.

A quarter of a century has passed since the Thatcher government launched one of its most controversial reforms: privately run prisons. This book offers an assessment of the successes and failures of that initiative, comparing public and private prisons, analyzing the possible and claimed benefits of competition, and looking closely at how well the government has managed the unusual quasi-market that the privatization push created. Drawing on first-person interviews with key players and his own experience working in prison finance, Julian Le Vay presents the most valuable look yet at the results of prison privatization for government, citizens, and prisoners.