In a period that began with Britain controlling a world-wide empire and included two world wars, followed by the Cold War and massive expenditure on nuclear armaments, the relationship between the politicians and the generals has been central to British history. While it is correctly assumed that the Armed Forces have never threatened British political stability in modern times, the relationship between the military and their political masters is a major, if under-emphasised, theme of British history. While in theory the politicians decided strategy and the military implemented it, in practice decisions often depended on the personalities and experience of those involved. Asquith, the epitome of the civilian, left major strategic decisions in the hands of the military; while Churchill, an ex-soldier and ex-First Lord of the Admiralty, rode roughshod over professional military advice. In a period when arms before ever more technologically sophisticated, there was also the problem of how far politicians could decide on strategies proposed by the military other than by the crude yardstick of cost. The essays in Government and the Armed Forces in Britain, 1856-1990 provide a coherent account not only of the major decision-making of warfare but also of the changes in the organisation and control of the Armed Forces.

This concise introduction to the growth and evolution of geopolitics as a discipline includes biographical information on its leading historical and contemporary practitioners and detailed analysis of its literature. An important book on a topic that has been neglected for too long, Geopolitics: A Guide to the Issues will provide readers with an enhanced understanding of how geography influences personal, national, and international economics, politics, and security. The work begins with the history of geopolitics from the late 19th century to the present, then discusses the intellectual renaissance the discipline is experiencing today due to the prevalence of international security threats involving territorial, airborne, space-based, and waterborne possession and acquisition. The book emphasizes current and emerging international geopolitical trends, examining how the U.S. and other countries, including Australia, Brazil, China, India, and Russia, are integrating geopolitics into national security planning. It profiles international geopolitical scholars and their work, and it analyzes emerging academic, military, and governmental literature, including "gray" literature and social networking technologies, such as blogs and Twitter.

This book examines the experience of two British Infantry Divisions, the 43rd (Wessex) and 53rd (Welsh), during the Overlord campaign in Northwest Europe. To understand the way the British fought during Operation Overlord, the book considers the political and military factors between 1918 and 1943 before addressing the major battles and many of the minor engagements and day-to-day experiences of the campaign. Through detailed exploration of unit war diaries and first-hand accounts, Louis Devine demonstrates how Montgomery's way of war translated to the divisions and their sub units. While previous literature has suggested that the British Army fought a cautious war in order to avoid the heavy casualties of the First World War, Devine challenges this concept by showing that the Overlord Campaign fought at sub-divisional levels was characterised by command pressure to achieve results quickly, hasty planning and a reliance on massive artillery and mortar contributions to compensate for deficiencies in anti-tank and armoured support. By following two British infantry divisions over a continuous period and focusing on soldiers' experience to offer a perspective 'from below', as well as challenging the consensus of a 'cautious' British campaign, this book provides a much-needed re-examination of the Overlord campaign which will be of great interest to students and scholars of the Second World War and modern military history in general.

What exactly is military history? Forty years ago it meant battles, campaigns, great commanders, drums and trumpets. It was largely the preserve of military professionals and was used to support national history and nationalism. Now, though, the study of war has been transformed by the war and society approach, by the examination of identity, memory and gender, and a less Euro-centric and more global perspective. Generally it is recognised that war and conflict must be integrated into the wider narrative of historical development, and this is why Ian Becketts research guide is such a useful tool for anyone working in this growing field. It introduces students to all the key debates, issues and resources. While European and global perspectives are not neglected, there is an emphasis on the British experience of war since 1500. This survey of British military history will be essential reading and reference for anyone who has a professional or amateur interest in the subject, and it will be a valuable introduction for newcomers to it.

Of all the wars fought by Britain between 1815 and 1914, the South African War was the most extensive and costly. This book offers a survey of the disputes which arose between the British government and the era's most famous soldiers.

The history of nineteenth-century European warfare is framed by the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. The Crimean War and the struggles for Italian and German unification divide this century in two. In the first half, armies struggled to emerge from the shadow of Napoleon amidst an era of financial retrenchment, political unrest and accelerating technological change. The mid-century wars left an equally problematic legacy, including aspects that pointed towards 'total war'. The 26 essays in this volume examine these changes from a variety of innovative and fresh perspectives.

Based on a distinguished 35-year career in the RAF as an Air Commodore, Andrew R. Curtis highlights what is wrong with the way defence is managed today, and presents evidence-based proposals to fix it. Defence is failing to deliver. From the ability of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to develop defence policy, to the single service's - Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force (RAF) - ability to acquire and maintain military capability, and undertake military operations. This is not a new problem; indeed, ever since the creation of the MoD in 1964, there have been tensions between the department of state and the armed forces over allocations of responsibility, authority and accountability. Concerned with political oversight; the allocation of responsibility, authority, and accountability; administration of people; organisational structures; and policies and processes, Curtis compellingly demonstrates the critical need to reform the management of Defence for the UK's armed forces to fight and win in the future.