"This paper addresses the issue of the low level of private investment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with special emphasis on the role of governance. Based on the existing literature, the authors categorize what types of governance institutions are more detrimental to entrepreneurial investments. They then estimate a simultaneous model of private investment and governance quality where economic policies concurrently explain both variables. The empirical results show that governance plays a significant role in private investment decisions. This result is particularly true in the case of "administrative quality" in the form of control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, investment-friendly profile of administration, and law and order, as well as for "political stability." Evidence in favor of "public accountability" seems, however, less robust. The estimations also stress that structural reforms-such as financial development and trade openness-and human development affect private investment decisions directly, and/or through their positive impact on governance. These findings bring new empirical evidence on the subject of private investment in the developing world and in MENA countries in particular. "--World Bank web site.

This paper addresses the issue of the low level of private investment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with special emphasis on the role of governance. Based on the existing literature, the authors categorize what types of governance institutions are more detrimental to entrepreneurial investments. They then estimate a simultaneous model of private investment and governance quality where economic policies concurrently explain both variables. The empirical results show that governance plays a significant role in private investment decisions. This result is particularly true in the case of administrative quality in the form of control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, investment-friendly profile of administration, and law and order, as well as for political stability. Evidence in favor of public accountability seems, however, less robust. The estimations also stress that structural reforms - such as financial development and trade openness - and human development affect private investment decisions directly, and/or through their positive impact on governance. These findings bring new empirical evidence on the subject of private investment in the developing world and in MENA countries in particular.

This paper addresses the issue of the low level of private investment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with special emphasis on the role of governance. Based on the existing published reports, we categorize what types of governance institutions are more detrimental to entrepreneurial investments. We then estimate a simultaneous model of private investment and governance quality where economic policies concurrently explain both variables. Our empirical results show that governance plays a significant role in private investment decisions. This result is particularly true in the case of “administrative quality” in the form of control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, investment-friendly profile of administration, law and order, as well as for “political stability.” Evidence in favor of “public accountability” is also found. Our estimations also stress that structural reforms like financial development, trade openness, and human development affect private-investment decisions directly, and/or through their positive effect on governance.

Keywords: Governance, Political Institutions, Private Investment, Middle East and North Africa.

Purpose - The study extends the debate on finance versus institutions in the promotion of investment documented by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014). We assess the effects of various components of governance on private investment, notably: political, economic and institutional governances. Financial indicators of depth, allocation efficiency, activity and size are used.Design/methodology/approach - An endogeneity robust dynamic system GMM estimation technique is employed. Principal component analysis is also employed to reduce the dimensions of governance variables. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Findings - The findings provide support for the quality of governance as a better determinant of private investment than financial intermediary development. Moreover, the evidence of finance and governance as substitutes in their impact on investment implies that good governance fuels private investment and this positive impact is stronger in nations with less developed financial systems. This finding is consistent with Ali (2013) and contrary to the results of Asongu (2014c).Practical implication - Policy measures for fighting involuntary and voluntary surplus liquidities are discussed. The paper provides additional support for the need of strengthening governance institutions to promote investment on the one hand and fighting financial allocation inefficiency by mitigating surplus liquidity issues on the other hand. Originality/value - The paper extends the debate on the substitution of finance and institutions in the promotion of private investment.

A financial system is only as strong as the governing practices and institutions of its participants. The challenge to build efficient and accountable financial institutions that promote confidence is a problem that private financial sector executives and policymakers confront together. In this context, Financial Sector Governance takes a clinical approach to addressing the challenges in emerging and developed markets in each industry: capital markets, private banks, state-owned banks, asset management companies, public pension funds, and mutual funds. It also explores the linkages between public and private sector governance, and the policy implications for strengthening both sides. Financial Sector Governance emerges from the fourth annual Financial Markets and Development conference, organized by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Brookings Institution, during which participants from the public and private financial sectors of emerging and developed markets contribute to an expanding dialogue addressing key policy concerns.

During the last decade, infrastructure finance and provision graduated from traditional means to more innovative ones, primarily initiated by private companies and supported through their equity and debt. Capital markets increasingly became the main funding source for infrastructure projects worldwide, including investments in developing and transition countries where infrastructure penetration still falls considerably short of needs. Infrastructure bonds served as the most popular method of oil, gas, electricity, telecommunications, and transport project financing in these countries throughout 1990-99, thereby substituting government funding. Using an innovative methodological approach, 'Governance Impact on Private Investment' provides a thorough examination of the effect that governance frameworks, both political and regulatory, have on investors' risk perceptions and on associated costs for infrastructure financing. It identifies those political and regulatory risks that most concern investors. It offers a unique comparative analysis of developed and emerging infrastructure bond markets. The analysis demonstrates how the factors that drive infrastructure finance in the two country groups differ, which helps to identify the policy implications of these factors.