Designed to act as a diversion to the 'big push', Gommecourt was an attempt to force the Germans to commit their reserves to the front line before the main battle took place. This Battlefield Guide tells the reader what happened and relates it to the ground as it now stands today.

What really happened on the first day of the Somme? Much controversy has surrounded the Somme offensive relating to its justification and its impact upon the course of the war. General Sir Douglas Haig's policies have been the subject of considerable debate about whether the heavy losses sustained were worth the small gains that were achieved which appeared to have little strategic value. That was certainly the case on many sectors on 1 July 1916, where British soldiers were unable to cross No Man's Land and failed to reach, or penetrate into, the German trenches. In other sectors, however, breaches were made in the German lines culminating in the capture that day of Leipzig Redoubt, Mametz and Montauban. This book aims to highlight the failures and successes on that day and for the first time evaluate those factors that caused some divisions to succeed in capturing their objectives whilst others failed. An important new study, this book is certain to answer these questions as well as challenging the many myths and misconceptions surrounding the battle that have been propagated for the last 100 years. Skyhorse Publishing, as well as our Arcade imprint, are proud to publish a broad range of books for readers interested in history--books about World War II, the Third Reich, Hitler and his henchmen, the JFK assassination, conspiracies, the American Civil War, the American Revolution, gladiators, Vikings, ancient Rome, medieval times, the old West, and much more. While not every title we publish becomes a New York Times bestseller or a national bestseller, we are committed to books on subjects that are sometimes overlooked and to authors whose work might not otherwise find a home.

This is the story of the British Army's endeavours during the Great War to deceive the enemy and trick him into weakening his defences and redeploying his reserves. In this year-by-year account, Martin Davies shows how Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig actively encouraged their Army commanders to employ trickery so that all attacks should come as a 'complete surprise' to the enemy. The methods of concealment of real military artefacts and the creation of dummy ones were ingenious enough but the real art lay in the development of geographically dispersed deception plans which disguised the real time and place of attack and forced the enemy to defend areas threatened by fake operations. Some of these plans, such as disguising mules as tanks and creating dummy airfields bordered on the farcical but were often amazingly effective. The driving force behind the deception plans was GHQ and the Army commanders, further dispelling the myth of 'Lions led by Donkeys'. Evidence shows that the British Army employed deception to advantage in all their theatres of operation.

This is the history of a pre-war TF division, the 1st London Division. It had the unhappy experience of being broken up right at the beginning of the war to provide reinforcements elsewhere. By the beginning of 1915 the division had ceased to exist, but in January 1916 it was reconstituted in France and numbered ‘56th'. Its first major engagement was the unsuccessful diversionary attack at Gommecourt on 1 July 1916 which resulted in 4,749 casualties. The division remained on the Somme till October and in the following year fought in the 1917 Arras offensive and again at Cambrai. In the German March 1918 offensive the 56th formed the right flank of First Army NE of Arras where, alongside 4th Division, it faced seven German divisions in the ‘Mars' offensive; the German advance here was checked. By the end of the war the division had suffered 34,809 casualties. This account is by an author with a reputation as a writer of regimental and divisional histories, and his experience as a regimental and staff officer in the war show clearly. There is an excellent appendix providing details on order of battle - commanders, staff and units - and the changes, with dates.

Set out topographically, it covers everything from the famous battle sites of High Wood and Mametz Wood to obscure villages on the outlying flanks. The British first began to take the Somme sector over from the French Army in June 1915. From this time onwards they built up a very close bond with the local population, many of whom continued to live in local villages close to the front line. The author draws on the latest research and analysis, as well as the testimony of those who took part, to present all aspects of a battle that was to become a symbol of the horrors of the Great War.