Goldwater v. Carter tells the story of the Supreme Court ruling that upheld President James Earl Carter’s unilateral decision to nullify the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan), thereby enabling the United States to establish relations with the People's Republic of China. Senator Barry Goldwater and other members of Congress brought a lawsuit against Carter, arguing that the president needed Senate approval to take this action. President Carter’s actions in recognizing the Peoples’ Republic of China were both a continuation of a process begun by President Richard Nixon and a milestone in foreign policy that survived legal and political intervention. In their decision, the Supreme Court placed the removal of the United States from treaties squarely in the political, rather than the constitutional, arena. Goldwater contended that if Carter could withdraw from the treaty with Taiwan, then another president could theoretically withdraw from NATO and thereby endanger the global political order. Ironically, years later President Donald Trump, who stood in the mold of Goldwater’s brand of conservatism, posed this very threat. Joshua Kastenberg places the case of Goldwater v. Carter in the larger context of executive power. While presidential power had increased in the wake of FDR’s New Deal, Congress curbed this expansion during the Vietnam conflict, placing restrictions on the presidency in areas of foreign policy and national security that had not been seen since the defeat of the League of Nations in the Senate in 1919. The Court’s decision in favor of Carter, however, marked a return to the growth of the “imperial presidency,” which has only continued to expand.

Legal brief.

Almost since the beginning of the republic, America's rigorous separation of powers among Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches has been umpired by the federal judiciary. It may seem surprising, then, that many otherwise ordinary cases are not decided in court even when they include allegations that the President, or Congress, has violated a law or the Constitution itself. Most of these orphan cases are shunned by the judiciary simply because they have foreign policy aspects. In refusing to address the issues involved, judges indicate that judicial review, like politics, should stop at the water's edge--and foreign policy managers find it convenient to agree! Thomas Franck, however, maintains that when courts invoke the "political question" doctrine to justify such reticence, they evade a constitutional duty. In his view, whether the government has acted constitutionally in sending men and women to die in foreign battles is just as appropriate an issue for a court to decide as whether property has been taken without due process. In this revisionist work, Franck proposes ways to subject the conduct of foreign policy to the rule of law without compromising either judicial integrity or the national interest. By examining the historical origins of the separation of powers in the American constitutional tradition, with comparative reference to the practices of judiciaries in other federal systems, he broadens and enriches discussions of an important national issue that has particular significance for critical debate about the "imperial presidency."

Material breach of a treaty gives a right to the aggrieved party to suspend or terminate it. This book traces the origins and evolution of the concept of material breach and responses thereto. It undertakes a content analysis thereof, thus clarifying the practical legal problems involved. The effects of breach of treaty are also examined. This book highlights the rules relating to application of the principle of termination or suspension of treaties for material breach in terms of limitations and conditions of their application, consequences, and the course and procedures for termination or suspension. Finally, competence to determine the existence of material breach is examined. The book addresses the settlement of disputes arising from claims of termination or suspension for breach. This work will be of interest to scholars as well as diplomats and practitioners of international law.