This Element considers the relationship between the traditional view of God as all-powerful, all-knowing and wholly good on the one hand, and the idea of human free will on the other. It focuses on the potential threats to human free will arising from two divine attributes: God's exhaustive foreknowledge and God's providential control of creation.

Anselm has an amazing thought pattern that captures attention, though very complex, yet one cannot resist his arguments to the next page, which is a joy to read. Michael Ivan, PhD Anselm writes with grace and wit about one of the fundamental issues of our time, drawn from the most ancient to recent research and arguments. He makes the science of old-aged issues on human freedom accessible and insightful to contemporary readers. Iwueke Charles, B Phil Could it be that God views our freedom as a threat to his own powers? God and Human freedom

This Element considers the relationship between the traditional view of God as all-powerful, all-knowing and wholly good on the one hand, and the idea of human free will on the other. It focuses on the potential threats to human free will arising from two divine attributes: God's exhaustive foreknowledge and God's providential control of creation.

Human freedom has been the source of both the high points of humanity as well as of its low points, thus giving rise to the impression that it is a somewhat ambivalent concept. According to Martien Brinkman, the major factor in this ambivalence is the rather narrow meaning that the concept has received in the course of history. Freedom is, for the most part, understood as ‘freedom from’ or ‘freedom to’ but only rarely as ‘freedom for’. However, it is precisely this latter understanding that is closest to the Christian understanding of freedom, which Brinkman defines as ‘internal attachment’. In his view Christian freedom is at bottom characterized by that to which one commits oneself in trust. He sees primarily the Christian theology of baptism, with its accent on ‘dying’ and ‘rising’ with Christ as the model for the way in which one acquires freedom. Brinkman illustrates this in this study by means of a great number of biblical images and images borrowed from the historical debates between Augustine and Pelagius and Luther and Erasmus.

This book argues the provocative thesis that Philip Melanchthon, so often pictured as hopelessly caught in the middle between Erasmus and Luther, and more "Erasmian" than Lutheran in his thought, was, at least in his theological methods and views, not Erasmian at all, but in fact sharply opposed to Erasmus. Author Timothy J. Wengert builds his case largely on the basis of Melanchthon's Scholia on the Epistle of Paul to the Colossians, employing the critically important but seldom used second edition of 1528, which was produced in the aftermath of Luther and Erasmus's famous debate over the free will. Wengert also draws on a wide range of other contemporary sources, many of them well known but, as he argues, frequently misunderstood. Throughout this analysis he subjects a wide range of the secondary literature to sharp critical review. From the vantage point of a relatively narrow exegetical dispute, the book deals with a number of important topics: the complicated and elusive relationships between humanism and the Reformation, Erasmus and Luther, Erasmus and Melanchthon, and Melanchthon and Luther; the theological issues of proper biblical interpretation, of free will, and of divine and human righteousness; and the hotly contested social problem of political order. Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness will be of interest not only to students and scholars of Reformation theology, but to a broader audience of those concerned with Renaissance and Reformation history and literature.

Does humanity possess the freedom to think and act, or are we always caused and determined to think and act--exactly how we think and act--by things outside of our control? If we are always causally determined to think and act by things outside of our control, then how can humans be genuinely responsible for any of our thoughts or following actions? However, if humanity is genuinely free and responsible for at least some of our thoughts and actions, then how can the Christian rationally affirm the doctrine that God is totally sovereign and predestines all things? In Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, Timothy A. Stratton surveys the history of theological thought from Augustine to Edwards and reaches surprising historical conclusions supporting what he refers to as "limited libertarian freedom." Stratton goes further to offer multiple arguments appealing to Scripture, theology, and philosophy that each conclude humanity does, in fact, possess libertarian freedom. He then appeals to the work of Luis de Molina and offers unique arguments concluding that God possesses middle knowledge. If this is the case, then God can be completely sovereign and predestine all things without violating human freedom and responsibility.

The ancient problem of fatalism, more particularly theological fatalism, has resurfaced with surprising vigour in the second half of the twentieth century. Two questions predominate in the debate: (1) Is divine foreknowledge compatible with human freedom and (2) How can God foreknow future free acts? Having surveyed the historical background of this debate in "The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge" and "Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez" (Brill: 1988), William Lane Craig now attempts to address these issues critically. His wide-ranging discussion brings together a thought- provoking array of related topics such as logical fatalism, multivalent logic, backward causation, precognition, time travel, counterfactual logic, temporal necessity, Newcomb's Problem, middle knowledge, and relativity theory. The present work serves both as a useful survey of the extensive literature on theological fatalism and related fields and as a stimulating assessment of the possibility of divine foreknowledge of future free acts.