The first full account of Hitler's extensive intelligence network-and the dramatic story of how Germany lost the battle of the secret services in World War II.

Wesley K. Wark catalogs the many misperceptions about Nazi Germany that were often fostered by British intelligence.

Startling new revelations about collaboration between the Allies and the German Secret Service. Based on extensive primary source research, John Bryden’s Fighting to Lose presents compelling evidence that the German intelligence service — the Abwehr — undertook to rescue Britain from certain defeat in 1941. Recently opened secret intelligence files indicate that the famed British double-cross or double-agent system was in fact a German triple-cross system. These files also reveal that British intelligence secretly appealed to the Abwehr for help during the war, and that the Abwehr’s chief, Admiral Canaris, responded by providing Churchill with the ammunition needed in order to persuade Roosevelt to lure the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor. These findings and others like them make John Bryden’s Fighting to Lose one of the most fascinating books about World War II to be published for many years.

The General Staff Division of Fremde Heere Ost (Military Intelligence Service, Eastern Section) which from 1942 was led by Reinhard Gehlen, was the nerve-centre of Hitler's military reconnaissance on the Eastern Front. This department worked professionally and was operationally and tactically reliable. However, at a strategic level there were clear deficits: the industrial capacity of the Soviet arms industry, the politico-military intentions and the details of the Red Army's plans for their offensive remained for the most part hidden from the department. When the Second World War ended, Gehlen put the documents and personnel of Fremde Heere Ost at the disposal of the Americans. With their support he was able to build a new foreign secret service which later evolved into the Federal Intelligence Service. In this book, military historian Magnus Pahl presents a complete overview of the structure, personnel and working methods of Fremde Heere Ost based on a tremendous array of archival sources. This work includes an extensive case study of the East Pomeranian Operation 1945. Pahl's study is a significant contribution to our understanding of German strategic, operational and tactical thinking on the Eastern Front 1941-45.

This edited book examines the East German foreign intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, or HVA) as a historical problem, covering politics, scientific-technical and military intelligence and counterintelligence. The contributors broaden the conventional view of East German foreign intelligence as driven by the inter-German conflict to include its targeting of the United States, northern European and Scandinavian countries, highlighting areas that have previously received scant attention, like scientific-technical and military intelligence. The CIA’s underestimation of the HVA was a major intelligence failure. As a result, East German intelligence served as a stealth weapon against the US, West German and NATO targets, acquiring the lion’s share of critical Warsaw Pact intelligence gathered during the Cold War. This book explores how though all of the CIA’s East German sources were double agents controlled by the Ministry of State Security, the CIA was still able to declare victory in the Cold War. Themes and topics that run through the volume include the espionage wars; the HVA's relationship with the Russian KGB; successes and failures of the BND (West German Federal Intelligence Service) in East Germany; the CIA and the HVA; the HVA in countries outside of West Germany; disinformation and the role and importance of intelligence gathering in East Germany. This book will be of much interest to students of East Germany, Intelligence Studies, Cold War History and German politics in general. Kristie Macrakis is Professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta. Thomas Wegener Friis is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern Denmark’s Centre for Cold War Studies. Helmut Müller-Enbergs is currently a Visiting Professor at the University of Southern Denmark and holds a tenured senior staff position at the German Federal Commission for the STASI Archives in Berlin.

This publication joins two cryptologic history monographs that were published separately in 1989. In part I, the author identifies and presents a thorough account of German intelligence organizations engaged in clandestine work in South America as well as a detailed report of the U.S. response to the perceived threat. Part II deals with the cryptographic systems used by the varioius German intelligence organizations engaged in clandestine activities.

No country can rival the sheer diversity of intelligence organizations that Germany has experienced over the past 300 years. Given its pivotal geographical and political position in Europe, Germany was a magnet for foreign intelligence operatives, especially during the Cold War. As a result of this, it is no wonder that during certain periods of history Germany was probably busier spying on its own citizens than on its enemies. Because of the Gestapo and the SS of Nazi Germany to the Stasi of the German Democratic Republic, the fear of domestic abuse by security agencies with police powers runs far deeper in German society than elsewhere in the West. The Historical Dictionary of German Intelligence presents the turbulent history of German intelligence through a chronology, a bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on the agencies and agents, the operations and equipment, the tradecraft and jargon, and many of the countries involved. No military reference collection is complete without it.