The German Army of World War II considered itself an offensive, mobile force. The experiences in the trenches in World War I had done much to shape its concept of field fortification, and its mobile warfare ethos was intended to prevent the previous war's stalemate. This book addresses frontline defensive field fortifications, built by infantrymen using local materials, and includes rifle platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters and more. It also covers anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, as well as field camouflage methods and construction methods. The integration of these positions into permanent systems and theatre-specific defences are also discussed.

From June 1941, the Soviets were forced to undertake large-scale defensive operations in the face of the overwhelming German blitzkrieg assault, operations which ran counter to their preference for highly mobile, offensive warfare. Lessons were quickly learned across a wide variety of terrain and climates, including the open steppes, dense forests, wooded swamps, cities, and in snow and ice, where the availability of construction materials differed greatly. The first to cover this topic in the English language and containing detailed information about the trenches, bunkers, observation posts and weapon positions, this book examines field fortifications built from local materials by infantrymen, as well as their use of mines, field camouflage techniques, and construction tools. It provides a first fascinating insight into Russian defensive attempts against the overwhelming might of the German Army.

The US Army and Marine Corps in World War II considered themselves highly mobile, offensive forces. Their mobile-warfare doctrine envisioned field fortifications and obstacles as temporary in nature. As a result, their design was simple and made use of local materials, and they could be constructed comparatively quickly, whilst still providing adequate protection. By the time of the Korean War, only minor changes had been made to field fortification construction and layout, and to small-unit organization, weapons, and tactics. This title addresses field fortifications built by US infantrymen during World War II and in Korea, and covers rifle-platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters, observation posts and anti-tank obstacles.

German defenses along the Normandy beaches were part of the larger Atlantic Wall fortifications designed to defend Fortress Europe. When Field Marshal Erwin Rommel took command of the invasion front in late 1943, he began a program to enhance fortifications along the Normandy coast as he believed that any Allied assault had to be stopped on the invasion beaches themselves. His most important contribution to the defenses was an extensive program of improvised beach obstructions to complicate any landing attempt. This book analyses these fortifications and describes how the Allied forces overcame them on the morning of June 6, 1944.

The German Army of World War II considered itself an offensive, mobile force. The experiences in the trenches in World War I had done much to shape its concept of field fortification, and its mobile warfare ethos was intended to prevent the previous war's stalemate. This book addresses frontline defensive field fortifications, built by infantrymen using local materials, and includes rifle platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters and more. It also covers anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, as well as field camouflage methods and construction methods. The integration of these positions into permanent systems and theatre-specific defences are also discussed.

Often written during imprisonment in Allied War camps by former German officers, with their memories of the World War fresh in their minds, The Foreign Military Studies series offers rare glimpses into the Third Reich. In this study Oberst a.D. Wilhem Willemar discusses his recollections of the climatic battle for Berlin from within the Wehrmacht. “No cohesive, over-all plan for the defense of Berlin was ever actually prepared. All that existed was the stubborn determination of Hitler to defend the capital of the Reich. Circumstances were such that he gave no thought to defending the city until it was much too late for any kind of advance planning. Thus the city’s defense was characterized only by a mass of improvisations. These reveal a state of total confusion in which the pressure of the enemy, the organizational chaos on the German side, and the catastrophic shortage of human and material resources for the defense combined with disastrous effect. “The author describes these conditions in a clear, accurate report which I rate very highly. He goes beyond the more narrow concept of planning and offers the first German account of the defense of Berlin to be based upon thorough research. I attach great importance to this study from the standpoint of military history and concur with the military opinions expressed by the author.”-Foreword by Generaloberst a.D. Franz Halder.