Hartenian’s history of George W Bush propaganda for an invasion of Iraq returns the administration’s approach to its conceptual origins. Hartenian places "evidence" in the center of his analysis, showing that Rumsfeld’s "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" meant that no evidence was necessary to justify an invasion. The 9/11 attacks, indeed, "changed everything" for the Bush administration and in its aftermath the time for regime change in Iraq had simply come. With no good evidence to support its fears, the administration was certain of a post-9/11-conceived Iraq–al Qaeda "nexus," just as with no evidence except the "absence of evidence" it was certain of Iraqi mastery of "denial and deception" that hid "Saddam’s" "evil" activities. Resting on Cheney’s "one percent doctrine," administration "certainty" of the threat from Iraq required a US invasion. The policy offices of Douglas Feith at the Pentagon, with the help of George Tenet at CIA, would generate a case of such fright and enormity—the "mushroom cloud"—that required administration action. Manipulating intelligence and ignoring the growing body of evidence undermining its case, the Bush administration invaded Iraq to bring about "regime change."

Why America Fights explores how the U.S. government has sold war aims designed to rally public support throughout the 20th century.

"Hartenian's history of George W Bush propaganda for an invasion of Iraq returns the administration's approach to its conceptual origins. Hartenian places "evidence" in the center of his analysis, showing that Rumsfeld's "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" meant that no evidence was necessary to justify an invasion. 9/11, indeed, "changed everything" for the Bush administration and in its aftermath the time for regime change in Iraq had simply come. With no good evidence to support its fears, the administration was certain of post-9/11 conceived Iraq-al-Qaeda "nexus," just as with no evidence except the "absence of evidence" it was certain of Iraqi mastery of "denial and deception" that hid "Saddam's" "evil" activities. Resting on Cheney's "one percent doctrine," administration "certainty" of the threat from Iraq required a US invasion. The policy offices of Douglas Feith at the Pentagon, with the help of George Tenet at CIA, would generate a case of such fright and enormity-the "mushroom cloud"-that required administration action. Manipulating intelligence and ignoring the growing body of evidence undermining its case, the Bush administration invaded Iraq to bring about "regime change.""--

The real story behind the investigation of Iraq, and the basis for the MSNBC documentary of the same name hosted by Rachel Maddow Filled with news-making revelations that made it a New York Times bestseller, Hubris takes us behind the scenes at the White House, CIA, Pentagon, State Department, and Congress to show how George W. Bush came to invade Iraq--and how his administration struggled with the devastating fallout. Hubris connects the dots between Bush's expletive-laden outbursts at Saddam Hussein, the bitter battles between the CIA and the White House, the fights within the intelligence community over Saddam's supposed weapons of mass destruction, the outing of an undercover CIA officer, and the Bush administration's misleading sales campaign for war. Written by veteran reporters Michael Isikoff and David Corn, this is an inside look at how a president took the nation to war using faulty and fraudulent intelligence. It's a dramatic page-turner and an intriguing account of conspiracy, backstabbing, bureaucratic ineptitude, journalistic malfeasance, and arrogance.

Weapons of Mass Deception reveals: How the Iraq war was sold to the American public through professional P.R. strategies. "The First Casualty": Lies that were told related to the Iraq war. Euphemisms and jargon related to the Iraq war, e.g. "shock and awe," "Operation Iraqi Freedom," "axis of evil," "coalition of the willing," etc. "War as Opportunity": How the war on terrorism and the war on Iraq have been used as marketing hooks to sell products and policies that have nothing to do with fighting terrorism. "Brand America": The efforts of Charlotte Beers and other U.S. propaganda campaigns designed to win hearts overseas. "The Mass Media as Propaganda Vehicle": How news coverage followed Washington's lead and language. The book includes a glossary — "Propaganda: A User's Guide" — and resources to help Americans sort through the deceptions to see the strings behind Washington's campaign to sell the Iraq war to the public.

"Mass Deception argues that the George W. Bush administration manufactured public support for the war on Iraq."--Page 4 of cover.

Read the actual intelligence reports (not the spin)and make up your own mind. In America, the wife of the former ambassador who exposed George Bush's sixteen-word State-of-the-Union fib about uranium from Niger, is now being harassed by allies of the Administration. In Britain, the scientist who blew the whistle on Tony Blair has been driven to suicide. For all of us who, thanks to these whistle-blowers, now realize that we have been hoodwinked and want to understand exactly how, national security analyst John Prados has compiled and annotated the key source documents behind the selling of the Iraq war to the American public. As these CIA reports, Pentagon briefings, and other materials clearly show, Bush and his spokespeople were playing a crude game of three-card monte, claiming Iraqi ties to Al Qaeda, weapons of mass destruction, and imminent threats, which are here exposed as half-truths, exaggerations, and outright fabrications of a war-mongering administration. Prados, a noted historian of intelligence and national security, offers readers a first-hand view of incontrovertible evidence that we were had. Documents include 1995 CIA debriefing of Iraqi defector and former weapons chief Hussein Kamel October 2002 CIA White Paper/intelligence estimate October 2002 letter from CIA Director George Tenet to Senator Bill Graham December 2002 State Department/CIA "Fact Sheet" February 2003 text of Colin Powell's speech to the UN Security Council May 2003 CIA Paper on biological warfare production plants June 2003 Pentagon press briefing