This biography, a reader would notice at the outset, was not written by a historian, an investigative reporter, or a professional biographer. It originates instead from the pen of a younger sibling seeking to resolve the mystery surrounding his brother's untimely death. This legitimate curiosity has evolved into a collection of articles depicting General Hieu as a family man, a patriot, a military strategist, and a man of integrity. This collection of articles authored by siblings, friends and fellow military men unexpectedly converges to project a dynamic image of an intelligent soldier and brilliant strategist engaged in the twofold quixotic tasks of overcoming a corrupted military hierarchy and fighting the invading North Vietnamese communist army. The book presents the reader with glimpses of a man living the yin aspect of the Vietnamese society (egalitarian, flexible, spiritual, congenial) and, at the same time, confronting the yang aspect of the neo-Confucianist military and government hierarchy (male dominant, rigid, self-serving, elitist, concerned with face and status). Without any claim to being systematic or thorough in his research, the author has nevertheless gathered a number of revealing personal anecdotes, testimonies from living witnesses, declassified documents from the National Archives, letters from former military academy classmates, phone interviews, excerpts from books, and so forth. From this cacophony of voices emerges the image of a virtuous man, caring father, loving spouse, and competent general respected by Vietnamese and American military personnel of all ranks. The reader would no doubt be surprised to discover this unsung hero in the stark background of negative memories of the Vietnam War and betrayal of the people by the neo-Confucianist military and government hierarchy. Though modest in its presentation, the book managed to do justice to a dedicated soldier and competent general, who was mostly unknown to both the Vietnamese and the American public. After reading this fascinating biography, the reader comes away wondering what might have been had this uncommon general, who epitomized the true Vietnamese people, been allowed to fully exercise his military competence.

Brigadier General George Wear once noted, "When the ARVN troops were well led they fought as well as anyone's soldiers. They simply needed commanders who would support them properly and who could win their confidence and make them believe that their cause was worth risking their lives for." General Hieu had been one of such commanders. Colonel John Hayes, 5th ARVN Division senior advisor remarked in 1970, "General Hieu is an above average commander. Good qualities include dedication, experience as a combat leader, ability to stimulate and maintain morale, and ability to control those in his command. He is quite religious and patriotic, and demands high standards of conduct and discipline. He is methodical but decisive. He is rated better than the average US Division commander in overall performance." American Veterans who had served in Vietnam might be interested in knowing that General Hieu had collaborated closely with the following American units: USMC HMM-364, 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 174th Assault Helicopter Company, 1st Battalion/50th Mechanized Infantry, 7/15th Field Artillery Battalion, 19th Engineer Combat Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade/82nd Airborne Division, 12th Aviation Group and 3rd Squadron/17th Air Cavalry. * General Hieu was obviously a great soldier who put his country and his people foremost. (General Fred C. Weyand) * Biography of a South Vietnam general officer who has been likened to Patton, Rommel, Montgomery, and LeClerc. He was much admired by Vietnamese civilians and respected by his American advisors. (Douglas Pike) * This book sheds light on the ARVN Forces never before told. (Darryl Nelson) * I do not see how anyone studying the Vietnam War on the ARVN side can neglect your book at all. (James Miguez)

Biographie du Général Nguyen Van Hieu de l'Armée de la République du Viet Nam (ARVN)

Brigadier General George Wear once noted, "When the ARVN troops were well led they fought as well as anyone's soldiers. They simply needed commanders who would support them properly and who could win their confidence and make them believe that their cause was worth risking their lives for." General Hieu had been one of such commanders. Colonel John Hayes, 5th ARVN Division senior advisor remarked in 1970, "General Hieu is an above average commander. Good qualities include dedication, experience as a combat leader, ability to stimulate and maintain morale, and ability to control those in his command. He is quite religious and patriotic, and demands high standards of conduct and discipline. He is methodical but decisive. He is rated better than the average US Division commander in overall performance." American Veterans who had served in Vietnam might be interested in knowing that General Hieu had collaborated closely with the following American units: USMC HMM-364, 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 174th Assault Helicopter Company, 1st Battalion/50th Mechanized Infantry, 7/15th Field Artillery Battalion, 19th Engineer Combat Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade/82nd Airborne Division, 12th Aviation Group and 3rd Squadron/17th Air Cavalry. * General Hieu was obviously a great soldier who put his country and his people foremost. (General Fred C. Weyand) * Biography of a South Vietnam general officer who has been likened to Patton, Rommel, Montgomery, and LeClerc. He was much admired by Vietnamese civilians and respected by his American advisors. (Douglas Pike) * This book sheds light on the ARVN Forces never before told. (Darryl Nelson) * I do not see how anyone studying the Vietnam War on the ARVN side can neglect your book at all. (James Miguez)

The first comprehensive military history of the war in Vietnam The Vietnam War cast a shadow over the American psyche from the moment it began. In its time it sparked budget deficits, campus protests, and an erosion of US influence around the world. Long after the last helicopter evacuated Saigon, Americans have continued to battle over whether it was ever a winnable war. Based on thousands of pages of military, diplomatic, and intelligence documents, Geoffrey Wawro’s The Vietnam War offers a definitive account of a war of choice that was doomed from its inception. In devastating detail, Wawro narrates campaigns where US troops struggled even to find the enemy in the South Vietnamese wilderness, let alone kill sufficient numbers to turn the tide in their favor. Yet the war dragged on, prolonged by presidents and military leaders who feared the political consequences of accepting defeat. In the end, no number of young lives lost or bombs dropped could prevent America’s ally, the corrupt South Vietnamese regime, from collapsing the moment US troops retreated. Broad, definitive, and illuminating, The Vietnam War offers an unsettling, resonant story of the limitations of American power.

During its struggle for survival from 1954 to 1975, the region known as the Central Highlands was the strategically vital high ground for the South Vietnamese state. Successive South Vietnamese governments, their American allies, and their Communist enemies all realized early on the fundamental importance of this region. Paul Harris's new book, based on research in American archives and the use of Vietnamese Communist literature on a very large scale, examines the struggle for this region from the mid-1950s, tracing its evolution from subversion through insurgency and counterinsurgency to the bigger battles of 1965. The rugged mountains, high plateaus, and dense jungles of the Central Highlands seemed as forbidding to most Vietnamese as it did to most Americans. During 1954 to 1965, the great majority of its inhabitants were not ethnic Vietnamese. Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime initially supported an American counterinsurgency alliance with the Highlanders only to turn dramatically against it. As the war progressed, however, the Central Highlands became increasingly important. It was the area through which most branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail passed. With its rugged, jungle-clad terrain, it also seemed to the North Vietnamese the best place to destroy the elite of South Vietnam's armed forces and to fight initial battles with the Americans. For many North Vietnamese, however, the Central Highlands became a living hell of starvation and disease. Even before the arrival of the American 1st Cavalry Division, the Communists were generally unable to win the decisive victories they sought in this region. Harris's study culminates with an account of the campaign in Pleiku province in October to November—a campaign that led to dramatic clashes between the Americans and the North Vietnamese in the Ia Drang valley. Harris's analysis overturns many of the accepted accounts about NVA, US, and ARVN performances.

The Vietnam war continues to be the focus of intense controversy. While most people-liberals, conservatives, Democrats, Republicans, historians, pundits, and citizens alike-agree that the United States did not win the war, a vocal minority argue the opposite or debate why victory never came, attributing the quagmire to everything from domestic politics to the press. The military never lost a battle, how then did it not win the war? Stepping back from this overheated fray, bestselling author John Prados takes a fresh look at both the war and the debates about it to produce a much-needed and long-overdue reassessment of one of our nation's most tragic episodes. Drawing upon several decades of research—including recently declassified documents, newly available presidential tapes, and a wide range of Vietnamese and other international sources—Prados's magisterial account weaves together multiple perspectives across an epic-sized canvas where domestic politics, ideologies, nations, and militaries all collide. Prados patiently pieces back together the events and moments, from the end of World War II until our dispiriting departure from Vietnam in 1975, that reveal a war that now appears to have been truly unwinnable—due to opportunities lost, missed, ignored, or refused. He shows how-from the Truman through the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations—American leaders consistently ignored or misunderstood the realities in Southeast Asia and passed up every opportunity to avoid war in the first place or avoid becoming ever more mired in it after it began. Highlighting especially Ike's seminal and long-lasting influence on our Vietnam policy, Prados demonstrates how and why our range of choices narrowed with each passing year, while our decision-making continued to be distorted by Cold War politics and fundamental misperceptions about the culture, psychology, goals, and abilities of both our enemies and our allies in Vietnam. By turns engaging narrative history, compelling analytic treatise, and moving personal account, Prados's magnum opus challenges previous authors and should rightfully take its place as the most comprehensive, up-to-date, and accurate one-volume account of a war that—judging by the frequent analogies to the current war in Iraq—has not yet really ended for any of us.