Andreu Mas-Colell revolutionized our understanding of competitive markets, price formation, and the behavior of market participants. This volume presents the papers that solidified his standing as one of the preeminent economic theorists of our time. It also is invaluable for anyone wishing to study the craft of a master of economic modeling.

JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.

The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.

Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. Pages: 243. Chapters: Nash equilibrium, Prisoner's dilemma, Pareto efficiency, General equilibrium theory, Rock-paper-scissors, Evolutionarily stable strategy, Tragedy of the commons, The Evolution of Cooperation, Minimax, Bounded rationality, Tragedy of the anticommons, Free rider problem, Compromise, Collusion, Shapley value, Monty Hall problem, Zugzwang, Chicken, Cooperative game, Succinct game, Social dilemma, Mechanism design, Expected utility hypothesis, Ultimatum game, Extensive-form game, Fair division, Stackelberg competition, Social trap, Parrondo's paradox, Justice, Price of anarchy, Auction theory, Martingale, Signaling game, The Bottle Imp, Bayesian game, Common knowledge, Centipede game, Cournot competition, Best response, Inequity aversion, Braess's paradox, Solution concept, Bargaining problem, Coordination game, Dynamic inconsistency, Core, Game semantics, Prisoners and hats puzzle, Simulations and games in economics education, Glossary of game theory, Backward induction, Stable marriage problem, Normal-form game, Topological game, Metagaming, Continuous game, Smart market, Pursuit-evasion, Dictator game, Stable roommates problem, Strategic dominance, Banzhaf power index, Risk dominance, Superrationality, Traveler's dilemma, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction, Negotiation theory, Public goods game, Signalling, Chainstore paradox, Stochastic game, Fixed point, Expected value of sample information, Metagame analysis, Evolutionary game theory, Haven, Cheap talk, Grand coalition, Correlated equilibrium, Max Dominated Strategy, List of games in game theory, Social software, Keynesian beauty contest, Stag hunt, Generalized game theory, Sir Philip Sidney game, Competitive altruism, Rational ignorance, Repeated game, Contract theory, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Replicator equation, Bertrand competition, Battle of the...

Decisions, Games and Markets is designed to stimulate new developments in decision theory, game theory and general equilibrium theory, as well as in their applications to economics. The book is divided into three parts - Decision Theory, Game Theory, and the Theory of Markets. Though its orientation is primarily methodological, some articles are more applied. The consistent use of formal analysis and methodological individualism constitutes the unifying theme of the book. Decisions, Games and Markets will be of considerable interest to both students and teachers of microeconomics and game and decision theory.

The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since the time of Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of competition. Making use of insights from game theory, search theory and bargaining theory, the author develops a model to explain what actually goes on in markets and how a competitive general equilibrium is achieved. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.