Congress has recently expressed concern that the current tenure system for developing general and flag officers does not effectively prepare them for handling increasing levels of responsibility and for performing with maximum efficiency at each level of assignment. This report assesses the continued appropriateness of mandatory retirement of general and flag officers after 35 years. It focuses on the value of extending tenure, specifically examining promotions, number of assignment, and career length. The study discusses two types of consequences resulting from such an extension. Systemic results of longer service lead to fewer promotions and fewer rising to the highest grades, but increased stability and experience. Career-path consequences indicate more depth or breadth of experience could result for officers. The appropriateness of continued mandatory retirement after 35 years depends, finally, on objectives. If the objective is rapid career-path movement to positions of responsibility, the 35-year limit accomplishes this. If the goal is more experienced officers and greater stability, removing the limit seems best. Decision makers will need to decide which objective is most important.

The U.S. Congress determines the maximum number of general and flag officers that the military may have by specifying service-specific ceilings. The Defense Dept. has been required to study officer requirements and to recommend changes to the law, if necessary. This interim report on DoD's progress to date reviews DoD's draft recommendations and estimates the cost to implement them, reviews the criteria the services use in doing their studies, compares troop strength to officer requirements, and determines whether certain general or flag officer positions may be candidates for conversion to civilian status. Tables.

This report describes the professional experiences and other characteristics general and flag officers in the military services tend to share due to each service's approach to personnel management, and potential implications of those approaches.

As the array of expertise required to be a successful leader in the U.S. Navy has become more complex, Navy leaders have become increasingly concerned that senior officers need additional kinds of expertise, beyond those traditionally developed in naval officers, to be successful in commanding, leading, and managing the Navy enterprise. This study explores whether there is a gap in officer development that manifests itself in the flag officer ranks. Through surveys and interviews, and working with the Navy's Office of the Executive Learning Officer (ELO), the authors examined the kinds of expertise required for successful performance in Navy flag billets. They then created a model to determine the kinds of experience that the pool of Rear Admiral officers must have to fill these requirements, and compared it to actual experience possessed by several years of Rear Admiral selectees. The authors did not find major gaps between the kinds of experience required for flag billets and those possessed by candidate officers, but they did identify several combinations of expertise that the Navy should work to develop in officers to better meet current requirements. Hanser et al. also examined the Navy's structure, force development, doctrine, and technology acquisitions to identify the types of expertise likely to become more important for Navy leadership in the future. The authors conclude with a variety of recommendations on how the Navy might better prepare officers for senior leadership roles.