This article proves a very general version of the Kirman-Sondermann [Journal of Economic Theory, 5(2):267-277, 1972] correspondence by extending the methodology of Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 24(3):217-237, 1995]. The paper first proposes a unified framework for the analysis of the relation between various aggregation problems and the social structure they induce, based on first-order predicate logic and model theory. Thereafter, aggregators satisfying Arrow-type rationality axioms are shown to be restricted reduced product constructions with respect to the filter of decisive coalitions; an oligarchic impossibility result follows. Under stronger assumptions, aggregators are restricted ultraproduct constructions, whence a generalized Kirman-Sondermann correspondence as well as a dictatorial impossiblity result follow. -- Arrow-type preference aggregation ; Judgment aggregation ; Systematicity ; Model theory ; First-order predicate logic ; Filter ; Ultrafilter

Judgment aggregation is a mathematical theory of collective decision-making. It concerns the methods whereby individual opinions about logically interconnected issues of interest can, or cannot, be aggregated into one collective stance. Aggregation problems have traditionally been of interest for disciplines like economics and the political sciences, as well as philosophy, where judgment aggregation itself originates from, but have recently captured the attention of disciplines like computer science, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Judgment aggregation has emerged in the last decade as a unifying paradigm for the formalization and understanding of aggregation problems. Still, no comprehensive presentation of the theory is available to date. This Synthesis Lecture aims at filling this gap presenting the key motivations, results, abstractions and techniques underpinning it. Table of Contents: Preface / Acknowledgments / Logic Meets Social Choice Theory / Basic Concepts / Impossibility / Coping with Impossibility / Manipulability / Aggregation Rules / Deliberation / Bibliography / Authors' Biographies / Index

The Political Theory of a Compound Republic presents the essential logic of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton's design of limited, distributed, constitutional authority proposed inThe Federalist. Two revised and expanded ensuing chapters show how the idea of constitutional choice has been employed since the adoption of the 1789 Constitution of the United States. A new concluding chapter questions commonly accepted beliefs about sovereign nation-states and considers governance from the perspective of twenty-first century 'citizen-sovereigns.'

This volume collects the extended abstracts of 45 contributions of participants to the Seventh International Summer School on Aggregation Operators (AGOP 2013), held at Pamplona in July, 16-20, 2013. These contributions cover a very broad range, from the purely theoretical ones to those with a more applied focus. Moreover, the summaries of the plenary talks and tutorials given at the same workshop are included. Together they provide a good overview of recent trends in research in aggregation functions which can be of interest to both researchers in Physics or Mathematics working on the theoretical basis of aggregation functions, and to engineers who require them for applications.