This new edition is unparalleled in breadth of coverage, thoroughness of technical explanations and number of worked examples.

This book provides a critical, selective review of concepts from game theory and their applications in public policy, and further suggests some modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.

Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.

Game theory is a branch of modern applied mathematics that aims to analyse various problems of conflict between parties that have opposed similar or simply different interests.Games are grouped into several classes according to some important features. In Game Theory (2nd Edition), Petrosyan and Zenkevich consider zero-sum two-person games, strategic N-person games in normal form, cooperative games, games in extensive form with complete and incomplete information, differential pursuit games and differential cooperative, and non-cooperative N-person games. The 2nd edition updates heavily from the 1st edition published in 1996.

The study of strategic action (game theory) is moving from a formal science of rational behavior to an evolutionary tool kit for studying behavior in a broad array of social settings. In this problem-oriented introduction to the field, Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly fun-to-solve problems involving human (and even animal) behavior. Game Theory Evolving is innovative in several ways. First, it reflects game theory's expansion into such areas as cooperation in teams, networks, the evolution and diffusion of preferences, the connection between biology and economics, artificial life simulations, and experimental economics. Second, the book--recognizing that students learn by doing and that most game theory texts are weak on problems--is organized around problems, and introduces principles through practice. Finally, the quality of the problems is simply unsurpassed, and each chapter provides a study plan for instructors interested in teaching evolutionary game theory. Reflecting the growing consensus that in many important contexts outside of anonymous markets, human behavior is not well described by classical "rationality," Gintis shows students how to apply game theory to model how people behave in ways that reflect the special nature of human sociality and individuality. This book is perfect for upper undergraduate and graduate economics courses as well as a terrific introduction for ambitious do-it-yourselfers throughout the behavioral sciences.

This book presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It covers topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Every chapter includes a problem section.

The new edition of a widely used introduction to game theory and its applications, with a focus on economics, business, and politics. This widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science. The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.