This book is the first to present in a systematic manner the application of game theory to fisheries management at both international and national levels. Strategic interaction among fishers and nations exploiting fishery resources is an inescapable fact of life. This has long been recognized at the international level, and is becoming increasingly recognized at the national/regional level. It follows, therefore, that, in order to be able to analyse effectively the management of these resources, the theory of strategic interaction ̶ game theory ̶ must be brought to bear. In this book the step-by-step development of the game theory is accompanied by numerous applications to the real world of fisheries management policy. As such, it is designed to appeal to policy makers and stakeholders, as well as to graduate students in Economics.

Today, there is a growing sense of urgency among fisheries scientists regarding the management of fish stocks, particularly among those who predict the imminent collapse of the fishing industry due to stock depletion. This book takes a game theoretic approach to discussing potential solutions to the problem of fish stock depletion. Acknowledging the classification of fish stocks as destructible renewable resources, these essays are concerned with the question of how much of the stock should be consumed today and how much should be left in place for the future. The book targets both economists and students of economics who are familiar with the tools of their trade but not necessarily familiar with game theory in the context of fisheries management. Importantly, the goal is not to give a summary evaluation of the current views of the ‘appropriate’ response to immediate policy questions, but rather to describe the ways in which the problems at hand can be productively formulated and approached using game theory and couched on real world fisheries. Game Theory and Fisheries consists of twelve previously published but updated articles in fisheries management, a number of which address a gap in the fisheries literature by modelling and analysing the exploitation of fishery resources in a two-agent fishery, in both cooperative and non-cooperative environments. The author’s work ultimately illustrates that the analysis of strategic interaction between those with access to shared fishery resources will be incomplete without the use of game theory.

Praised by Entertainment Weekly as “the man who put the fizz into physics,” Dr. Len Fisher turns his attention to the science of cooperation in his lively and thought-provoking book. Fisher shows how the modern science of game theory has helped biologists to understand the evolution of cooperation in nature, and investigates how we might apply those lessons to our own society. In a series of experiments that take him from the polite confines of an English dinner party to crowded supermarkets, congested Indian roads, and the wilds of outback Australia, not to mention baseball strategies and the intricacies of quantum mechanics, Fisher sheds light on the problem of global cooperation. The outcomes are sometimes hilarious, sometimes alarming, but always revealing. A witty romp through a serious science, Rock, Paper, Scissors will both teach and delight anyone interested in what it what it takes to get people to work together.

A true landmark publication, Advances in Fisheries Economics brings together many of the world’s leading fisheries economists to authoritatively cover the many issues facing the field of fisheries economics and management today. Compiled in honour of the work and achievements of Professor Gordon Munro of the University of British Columbia, Canada, this exceptional volume of research serves as both a valuable reference tool and fitting tribute to a man whose work has shaped the discipline. Divided into four sections, the text includes coverage of: • Property Rights and Fisheries Management • Capital Theory and Natural Resources • Game Theory and International Fisheries • Applied Fisheries Economics and Management The book is an important addition to the resources of all fisheries economists, managers, scientists and fish biologists. Libraries in universities and research establishments where these subjects are studied and taught should have copies on their shelves. About the Editors Dr. Trond Bjørndal is Professor of Economics, Centre for Fisheries Economics, Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway and Director, CEMARE, University of Portsmouth, England. Dr. Daniel V. Gordon is Professor of Economics, University of Calgary, Canada and Distinguished Research Fellow, Centre for Fisheries Economics, Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway Dr. Ragnar Arnason is Professor of Economics and the Chairman of the Institute of Economic Studies, University of Iceland. Dr. U. Rashid Sumaila is Director of the Fisheries Economics Research Unit, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia.

This book includes chapters by experts from developing and developed countries that apply game theory to issues in natural resources and the environment, demonstrating the usefulness of game theory in policy-making and appealing to a wide audience.

Today, there is a growing sense of urgency among fisheries scientists regarding the management of fish stocks, particularly among those who predict the imminent collapse of the fishing industry due to stock depletion. This book takes a game theoretic approach to discussing potential solutions to the problem of fish stock depletion. Acknowledging the classification of fish stocks as destructible renewable resources, these essays are concerned with the question of how much of the stock should be consumed today and how much should be left in place for the future. The book targets both economists and students of economics who are familiar with the tools of their trade but not necessarily familiar with game theory in the context of fisheries management. Importantly, the goal is not to give a summary evaluation of the current views of the ‘appropriate’ response to immediate policy questions, but rather to describe the ways in which the problems at hand can be productively formulated and approached using game theory and couched on real world fisheries. Game Theory and Fisheries consists of twelve previously published but updated articles in fisheries management, a number of which address a gap in the fisheries literature by modelling and analysing the exploitation of fishery resources in a two-agent fishery, in both cooperative and non-cooperative environments. The author’s work ultimately illustrates that the analysis of strategic interaction between those with access to shared fishery resources will be incomplete without the use of game theory.

As an outgrowth of the advancement in modern control theory during the past 20 years, dynamic modeling and analysis of economic systems has become an important subject in the study of economic theory. Recent developments in dynamic utility, economic planning, and profit optimiza tion, for example, have been greatly influenced by results in optimal control, stabilization, estimation, optimization under conflicts, multi criteria optimization, control of large-scale systems, etc. The great success that has been achieved so far in utilizing modern control theory in economic systems should be attributed to the effort of control theorists as well as economists. Collaboration between the two groups of researchers has proven to be most successful in many instances; nevertheless, the gap between them has existed for some time. Whereas a control theorist frequently sets up a mathematically feasible model to obtain results that permit economic interpretations, an economist is concerned more with the fidelity of the model in representing a real world problem, and results that are obtained (through possibly less mathematical analysis) are due largely to economic insight. The papers appearing in this volume are divided into three parts. In Part I there are five papers on the application of control theory to economic planning. Part II contains five papers on exploration, exploita tion, and pricing of extractive natural resources. Finally, in Part III, some recent advances in large-scale systems and decentralized control appear.